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Abstract   
 
This thesis explores the role of the Mexican state in alleviating poverty. 
For more than fifteen uninterrupted years, compensatory conditional cash 
transfer programmes (CCTs) have been used with the purpose of alleviating 
poverty in Mexico. The main idea behind these programmes is to provide a 
minimum income to the poorest so that they invest it in the education and health 
of their children, who, once educated and healthy, would acquire capabilities 
that would enable them to keep on obtaining an income in the labour market in 
the mid and long-term to move out of poverty by their own efforts. During this 
period, the CCTs have had many positive effects on the well-being of the poor 
and in particular they have helped to diminish the number of unskilled workers 
in Mexico. However, there is little evidence that proves that the programme is 
achieving its main goal. Moreover, poverty has kept growing over the years. In 
recent decades, it has been demonstrated that within developing countries 
strong institutionalization of the labour market has not only ameliorated the 
impacts of the global transformation initiated in the 1970s and 1980s but it has 
also been more important in alleviating poverty than high educational levels. For 
instance, in Brazil the positive results of their CCT programme (Bolsa Familia) 
have been in part the result of the strengthening of their institutional capacities, 
which allowed them to complement the programme effectively with training and 
labour market policies that enable the ex-recipients to obtain sustained income. 
Using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, we assessed the extent 
to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state, 
among other important factors, has impeded the current Mexican CCT 
programme known as Oportunidades from enabling the ex-recipients to obtain a 
sustained income in the labour market. Our results show that the weakness of 
the institutional capacities of the Mexican state makes poverty alleviation much 
less likely to occur because it impedes the provision of training and labour 
market policies that complement the programme and enable the poor to obtain 
a sustained income.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 i.1 Problem definition 
As far as socio-economic inequality is concerned (income, access to 
health or education services, land distribution, and so on) Mexico is one of the 
most unequal countries in the world (Esquivel 2010, 1).1 As in much of Latin 
America, the underpinnings of socio-economic inequalities are found in the 
bipolar distribution of land during the colonial rule in the fifteenth, sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Klasen & Nowak-Lehmann 2009, 5). The 
processes of independence from European colonizers and of revolutions in the 
nineteenth century did not greatly change the inequalities between the different 
social groups; on the contrary, these processes institutionalized and legalized 
them. After the birth of the Latin American modern nation-states in the early 
twentieth century, military dictators took over, manipulating social groups 
through corporatist and patron-client practices which, even allowing for 
relatively steady economic growth rates, perpetuated or even increased socio-
economic inequality (Teichman 2008, 448).  
The structural reforms implemented in the early 1980s worsened those 
trends even more. From the 1930s to the early 1970s, based on the Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) system, Mexico’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) grew at a relatively rapid pace (3% per year in per capita terms), as a 
result of which it was known as the ‘Mexican miracle’ (Esquivel op. cit., 4-5). 
The economic development strategy relied basically upon state intervention 
encouraging the industrialization of the country, mainly of urban areas, and 
                                                          
1
 According to Scott, the poorest 10% of the population receives around 1.4% of national income while 
the richest 10% receives around 40% (2010, 1). 
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protecting domestic manufacturers from international competition by means of 
ISI programmes. In order to ensure the success of the ISI system, quasi-
universal provision of basic services such as education and health as a means 
of increasing the human capital of the citizenry was provided. At the same time, 
social protection schemes were directed at groups which played important roles 
in the ISI system, such as state workers and the formal workers in the private 
sector – to keep them under control – excluding workers in the informal sector.  
However, not only was the Mexican state unable to develop any 
productive sector that allowed the country to compete internationally, but it also 
depended mostly on international loans and the profits from oil to sustain the ISI 
system (Moreno-Brid et al. 2009, 156-158). In this context, the globalization of 
the economy and the fall of the oil prices during the late 1970s had serious 
effects on the Mexican economy and in 1982 Mexico suffered a high debt crisis, 
bringing about large devaluations and high levels of inflation, which triggered a 
huge increase in the levels of unemployment, income inequality and poverty 
(understood at that time as nutritional).2 Consequently, following 
recommendations from the IMF and later on from the World Bank, like most of 
the Latin American countries, Mexico started a process of structural adjustment 
and economic reforms with the intention of achieving macroeconomic stability, 
increasing employment and reducing income inequality and poverty (Robertson 
2007, 1380).   
The so-called Washington-Consensus reforms started to be implemented 
in the early 1980s and basically comprised two main market-oriented strategies, 
                                                          
2
 This decade was actually called the lost decade by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Otero 2004, 11). 
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the reduction of the size of the state and the openness of economic sectors, in 
order to allow the markets to adjust properly – on their own dynamics – to the 
new conditions and challenges that the new global order presented. Broadly 
speaking, price controls were lifted, social spending was slashed, state-run 
companies were privatized, the financial system was deregulated and tariff 
barriers for domestic markets were reduced. Paradoxically, the socio-economic 
conditions of the citizens during this period were worsened especially due to the 
deep cuts in social spending, which meant a regression in the advancement of 
the social rights that had been attained in the first half of the twentieth century.  
As a result, poverty has kept increasing and income inequality and 
economic growth have been volatile, which has brought about again a strong 
reliance on natural resources, especially oil (Adair 2006; Millán & Pérez 2008, 
18; Moreno-Brid et al. op. cit., 154; Campos 2010, 2; Lusting et al. 2010, 11). 
These adverse effects forced Mexican political leaders to undertake a path 
towards the equalization of the poor´s socio-economic conditions with the 
implementation of compensatory anti-poverty policies known as Conditional 
Cash Transfer programmes (CCTs).3 The main idea behind these programmes 
is to provide a minimum income to the poorest so that they invest it in the 
education and health of their children, who, once educated and healthy, would 
acquire capabilities that would enable them to keep on obtaining an income in 
the labour market in the mid and long-term to move out of poverty by their own 
efforts (Levy 1991, 45-51).  
                                                          
3
 According to Scott, once the Mexican state was born, the history of redistribution can be divided into 
three principal periods: 1. the agrarian reform process from 1917 to the early 1990s and the provision of 
extensive support to the agricultural sector since the 1940s; 2. the expansion of the public education, 
health and social security systems over the second half of the twentieth century, which can be 
categorized as regressive and it never achieved a universal coverage; and 3. the anti-poverty policies 
implemented in the last two decades, such as the cash transfer and increasing spending on basic 
education services and health services for the uninsured (2009, 12). 
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Evaluations of the Mexican CCTs Progresa-Oportunidades have been 
quite encouraging (Mena 2007; Molyneux 2008; Lloyd-Sherlock 2008; Soares et 
al. 2010; González 2012; and others). These evaluations have demonstrated 
significant impacts on the well-being of the recipients, such as increasing school 
attendance, improving health outcomes and reducing income inequality while 
families or recipients belong to the programme, among other short-term effects. 
However, there is little evidence that shows that the programme’s ex-recipients 
are able to obtain sustained income in the labour market, which might leave 
them vulnerable to the shocks of the economy and to falling into poverty again.   
Moreover, it has been found that although in recent years income 
inequality has, to some extent, decreased, poverty has continued to grow 
reaching similar levels to those of 1984 after the structural reforms started 
(Scott 2010, 1).4 Furthermore, the decrease in income inequality could be 
misleading since it was mainly brought about by volatile and/or unsustainable 
factors such as the increase in the foreign remittances that brought about the 
openness of the economy or the grants provided by social development 
programmes such as Oportunidades (Moreno-Brid & Ros 2009, 216-217). A 
relevant question now would then be if the evaluations of Progresa-
Oportunidades have shown positive results in increasing the educational levels 
of the ex-recipients and there are labour market policies aimed at 
                                                          
4
 According to Esquivel et al., from 1996 to 2006 Mexico’s per capita GDP grew at a rate of 4% per year 
and Mexico’s Gini coefficient fell from 0.543 in 1996 to 0.498 in 2006 (2010, 1), which would mean that 
the people with the lowest wages saw an increase in their overall income between 1996 and 2006. 
However, according to the poverty lines defined by the Mexican Technical Committee on Poverty 
Measurement (See Table 4.11), between 2010 and 2012 the number of poor people increased from 59.6 
millions in 2010 to 60.6 millions in 2012. Moreover, food poverty, which represents the lowest of the 
three lines of poverty, went from 22.2 millions in 2010 to 23.5 millions in 2012. Available at: 
www.coneval.gob.mx. Accessed: May 2013.  
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complementing the programme, what is impeding the state from alleviating 
poverty?  
In recent decades, there has been a general consensus that within 
developing and developed countries, strong institutionalization of the labour 
market has not only ameliorated the impacts of the global transformation 
initiated in the 1970s and 1980s but has also been more important in alleviating 
poverty than high educational levels (Stiglitz 2002, 389; Chang 2010, 179). For 
instance, the strong regulatory-market capacity of the East-Asian states, 
through a strongly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus, has allowed them to 
protect workers’ rights while helping the private sector to increase their 
productivity to foster employment generation. The progressive fiscal capacity of 
the Scandinavian welfare states, on the other hand, through strongly 
institutionalized tax collection and social spending systems, has allowed them to 
spend high levels of GDP on social policy, allowing the society to organize and 
participate in the decision-making process, thereby justifying greater tax 
collection.5  
In Latin America, the Brazilian experience has also shown that the 
positive results of their CCT programme (Bolsa Familia) have been in part the 
result of the strengthening of their institutional – regulatory-market and fiscal 
systems – capacities, which allowed them to complement the programme 
effectively with training and labour market policies (effective law enforcement 
                                                          
5
 In the simplest terms, in a progressive fiscal system, on the one hand, taxes are paid in proportion to 
the income earned. The tax as a percentage of income increases as total income increases and 
considerable redistribution takes place between those with high and those with low incomes (Rothstein 
2000, 149). On the other hand, public services and resources are mainly used by those at the bottom of 
the social structure, which brings about low socio-economic inequalities and justifies greater tax 
collection.   
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and access to union representation, access to finance) that enable the ex-
recipients to obtain sustained income.6 In Mexico, on the other hand, since the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force in 1994, there 
has been an emphasis on the growth of the manufacturing sector to generate 
employment, with Mexican workers as the assemblers, whereas the Americans 
provide technology for the production of manufactured goods, especially in 
states that are geographically closer to the United States (Borraz & Lopez-
Cordova 2007, 3; Popli 2010, 806). However, although some pockets of high 
productivity have been developed in the textiles, shoes and clothing industries 
(Bayón 2009, 302), and to some extent in the software and hardware and 
aerospace industries, these sectors are not intensive in employment and/or do 
not have many links to the rest of the economy (Blecker 2010, 12). 
Furthermore, according to Kuznetsov and Dahlman, there are many other 
potentially accessible markets that have not been taken either by the state or by 
the private sector due to the lack of investment in research and development 
(2008, 3). 
Most importantly, most of the Mexican micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs), which represent around 99% of all Mexican firms, 
accounting for more than 70% of all employment and generating more than 
50% of GDP, take advantage of the gaps of the Mexican labour norms and 
regulations to avoid paying tax and/or social security contributions, both legally 
and illegally (Canales & Nanda 2008, 63; Temkin 2009, 50). As a consequence, 
most of the jobs offered in the small and medium enterprises of the 
manufacturing sector are not only low-qualified with poor salaries (Borraz & 
                                                          
6
 See De Andrade et al. 2010. 
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Lopez-Cordova 2007, 3; Popli 2010, 806) but also have high levels of 
informalization since workers normally do not have access to union 
representation, stable contracts or training schemes. Moreover, in the goods 
and service sector, where more than 60% of the whole population works 
nowadays in enterprises of less than five workers, most of them work in 
complete informality since most of the micro-enterprises are not even registered 
with the social security and/or fiscal institutions and in consequence workers do 
not have access to labour contracts and social security services and are not 
covered by minimum wage legislation but have to rely on family networks to 
cover their social protection (Popli op. cit., 803; Chen 2008, 18-22). 
In addition, not only have basic services that could have an impact on 
poverty alleviation such as education remained underfunded, but also they are 
now unreacheable by the poor, especially at the university level, since the 
private sector has been encouraged to provide the service. Moreover, public 
spending on labour market policies has been directed towards information for 
people to find jobs rather than emphasizing training to acquire new skills to join 
the labour market or formalizing employment (Ruiz 2009, 183).7 In sum, in 
recent decades there has been an informalization of labour of different types 
and to varying degrees since workers do not have access to social security 
services, stable contracts, union representation, training schemes and so on. All 
of this impedes the citizenry from obtaining a sustained income in the labour 
market, especially for those at the bottom of the social structure. So why has 
                                                          
7
 As a matter of fact, Cárdenas argues that, although social spending has increased “at an annual real 
rate of 7.0% since 1990, public spending on productive activities, as a percentage of GDP, has actually 
decreased” (2009, 270).  
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the intervention in the labour market of the Mexican state not been as effective 
as in some other developing countries?  
i.2 Scope of the thesis and central research question 
 
Poverty emerged strongly as a problem in Mexico in the early 1980s 
(Rodríguez 2010, 84). The main drivers were the adverse effects brought about 
by the implementation of the Washington Consensus reforms outlined above 
(Cárdenas 2009, 274; Rodríguez 2010, 84-85; González 2011, 166-167). In the 
previous decades, poverty – understood as nutritional – was significantly 
declining and was presented as a collateral issue of economic 
underdevelopment (low levels of industrialization) (Cárdenas op. cit., 274-275; 
González 2011, 166). Accordingly, the poverty reduction approaches developed 
since the early 1980s have been shaped by the same logic as the Washington 
Consensus reforms (Cárdenas op. cit., 275; Rodríguez 2010, 85). 
So, following international organizations such as the World Bank, the first 
definitions and measurements of poverty in Mexico were merely comparisons of 
the levels of income or living standards (consumption) (Coneval 2010, 18). The 
logic behind these definitions or measurements was that poverty was an 
absolute concept; a person was poor only when he/she lacked enough money 
to meet the basic needs to subsist. Accordingly, the first governmental anti-
poverty policies such as PRONASOL (1988) and PROCAMPO (1993) were 
launched with the intention of alleviating the consequences of the structural 
reforms by creating social funds as targeted safety-nets for the poorest who did 
not have income-earning capacities (Székely & Fuentes 2002, 131).  
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After the increasing levels of poverty brought about by the monetary 
crisis of 1994-1995, a new wave of anti-poverty policies such as Progresa-
Oportunidades, more concerned with the causes than the consequences of 
poverty, started to be launched in 1997 (Camp 2011, 20). Accordingly, in 2000 
the first official definition of poverty in the Mexican state was introduced 
(Rodríguez 2009, 108). Following Amartya Sen´s distinction between absolute 
and relative poverty (Anand & Sen 1997, 4) and the Human Development 
Report developed by the UNDP since 1990, it was argued that the former is the 
deprivation of the basic capabilities for subsistence (nourishment, education 
and health) and the latter is the lack of adequate means in a specific society to 
achieve those capabilities (Sedesol 2002, 19). In view of that, the federal 
government defined the degree of poverty of a person according to three lines 
of poverty that were established in 2002: nutritional poverty (considered as 
extreme poverty), poverty of basic capabilities (education and health) and 
poverty of patrimony or assets.  
Since 2004, when the General Law of Social Development (LGDS) was 
enacted, poverty in Mexico has been understood as a multidimensional 
phenomenon and persistent in time and across generations.8 The official 
definition of poverty considers the living conditions of the population from three 
aspects: their economic welfare, their social rights and their territorial context 
(Coneval op. cit., 12). The aspect of economic welfare comprises the needs 
associated with the goods and services that can be purchased by the 
population through their income. For that purpose, in late 2010, Coneval defined 
two lines of poverty to measure the degree of poverty of a person that, in the 
                                                          
8
 This law also involved the creation of the National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development 
Policy (CONEVAL), responsible for applying the criteria for measuring poverty in Mexico.  
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years to come, are going to replace the three lines of poverty introduced in 
2002.9 First, the welfare line which identifies the population that does not have 
an income high enough to satisfy their basic needs (goods and services), and; 
second, the minimum welfare line which identifies the population that does not 
have an income high enough to satisfy their nourishment needs (ibid., 13).10  
The aspect of social rights, on the other hand, comprises the 
fundamental rights expressed in the Mexican Constitution that every citizen is 
entitled to and that are duties of the state but which the poor are limited in their 
ability to exercise. The LGDS established six fundamental rights: access to 
education (primary and secondary school), access to health services, access to 
social security (pension), access to food, quality of housing and access to basic 
services in housing (water, sewerage and electric energy) (ibid., 19).11 
Accordingly, the population in multidimensional poverty is the one whose 
income is insufficient to purchase the goods and services required to satisfy 
their basic needs and lack at least one of the six fundamental rights mentioned 
above (ibid., 20).12  
Finally, the aspect of the territorial context incorporates features that go 
beyond the individual capacities of the poor, such as geographic, social and 
cultural characteristics. The logic behind this aspect is that poverty is suffered at 
                                                          
9
 According to the website of Coneval, the poverty lines introduced in 2002 are still used since most of 
the local governments’ and civil society organizations’ programmes and measurements were initiated 
taking into account the first poverty lines and a time-lag is needed so that all the governmental 
programmes are made consistent.  See: www.coneval.gob.mx. Accessed: February 2014. 
10
 Both lines are updated every month using the national index of general prices produced by INEGI. 
11
 Evaluation of these indicators has been carried out every two years since 2008 and utilizes data from 
the surveys of INEGI. 
12 By 2008, 44.2% of the whole population (47.2 million) lacked access to at least 2.7 of these rights. Out 
of the total population living in multidimensional poverty (36 million), 11.2 million people (10.5 percent 
of total population) suffered extreme multidimensional poverty with a limited access to almost four of 
those rights. People are considered to be in extreme multidimensional poverty when they face three or 
more social deficiencies each and their full income is insufficient to cover their needs for food, even if it 
were all used for that purpose (Sedesol 2010, 7-8). 
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the local level, in a specific context, in a determined place and under 
determined circumstances (ibid.). Accordingly, it measures, on the one hand, 
the social polarization, social networks or economic inequality, and on the other 
hand, the access to basic social infrastructure such as the pavements of 
streets, street lighting and landfills (ibid., 15). However, there are no exact 
definitions of these concepts since they are practically left open to be defined 
according to the characteristics of the different communities in Mexico. 
In line with the LGSD, the whole anti-poverty strategy consists of more 
than ten means-tested programmes, Oportunidades included, which are 
intended to tackle the different dimensions of the official definition of poverty.13 
However, this definition has been accused of presenting poverty as an 
independent phenomenon and disconnected from economic trends (Cárdenas 
op. cit., 269; Rodríguez 2010, 288). This is because it seems to be assumed 
that by opening access to services that allow the poor to develop income 
generating capabilities, the market will eventually create the conditions – 
employment – which will allow them to obtain an income high enough to satisfy 
their basic needs in the mid and long run to move out of poverty by their own 
efforts (Rodríguez 2010, 288-289).  
However, there are many factors, such as the institutional framework of 
the state, economic policies or independent labour market dynamics, which can 
                                                          
13
 Apart from Oportunidades (access to education, health and food), there is Seguro popular (access to 
health), pensión para adultos mayores (pension for elderly), zonas prioritarias (quality of housing and 
access to basic services in housing), seguro de vida para jefas de familia (life insurance for single 
mothers), 3x1 para migrantes (basic infrastructure), opciones productivas (access to finance in rural 
zones), atención a jornaleros agrícolas (food, school grants, economic support and quality of living for 
temporary farmers), LICONSA (Milk), DICONSA (Food), INAPAM (support for handicapped elderly people) 
and co-inversión social a cargo de INDESOL (Social cohesion). In addition, there is a decentralized 
programme for states and municipalities in Mexico for the construction of a basic infrastructure for 
urban and rural marginal settlements (item 33). Source: CONEVAL: www.coneval.gob.mx. Accessed: 
January 2014.  
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affect the labour market performance and which the Mexican anti-poverty 
strategy seems to be overlooking. This is especially so because since the onset 
of globalization the global economy has become more prone to economic 
crises, involving deep sudden downturns that spread from one country or region 
of the world to others (Standing 2010, 3). For instance, as argued above, in 
order to adjust to the global era, the Mexican state replaced the ISI system and 
embarked on an export-growth strategy. The problem here is that around 80% 
of Mexican exports go to the United States every year, which leaves Mexico in a 
very vulnerable position since any significant downturn in the United States 
economy typically produces adverse effects on Mexico´s economy, such as in 
2008 when the American economic recession negatively affected the Mexican 
economy and the levels of food poverty (Cárdenas op. cit., 276; Camp 2011, 
21).  
It is a similar case with the immigration policies of the United States and 
Canada since the signing of NAFTA brought about an increase in the number of 
Mexican undocumented immigrants to these countries looking for better 
economic opportunities (Moreno-Brid & Ros op. cit., 216-217; Camp 2011, 46; 
Calderón 2011, 34).14 However, every time there is a downturn in their 
economy, the number of Mexican undocumented immigrants also declines 
since they are perceived as taking away jobs from the local population (Camp 
2011, 46-47). The problem is that when migrants go back to Mexico they 
sometimes face even more problems in finding employment, which leaves them 
vulnerable to falling into poverty since not only do undocumented migrants 
normally have low skills levels but also Mexico’s economic growth strategy has 
                                                          
14
 According to Camp, by 2011 the Mexican-born population in the United States totalled nearly 11.5 
million (2011, 46). 
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failed to create the number of jobs required by the labour force (Moreno-Brid et 
al. op. cit., 155; Calderón op. cit., 34). 
Furthermore, the problem is not only economic volatility but also the fact 
that the opening up of the economy during the 1980s brought about a tacit 
agreement by which, instead of being taxed, the private sector would lend 
governments money to finance deficits (Centeno & Cohen 2012, 5). As a 
consequence, the Mexican state depends increasingly on foreign investment to 
stimulate economic growth. By way of an example, inward foreign direct 
investment stocks as a percentage of GDP have increased from 7.8% in 1990 
to 15.3% in 2000 and 35.2% in 2010.15 However, foreign direct investment has 
been concentrated in a few states, those which are closer to the United States, 
such as Baja California, Chihuahua and Nuevo León, and those with the highest 
levels of social spending on education (mainly at the university level), health 
and public security, such as Mexico City and the State of Mexico, which has 
brought about a highly unequal income distribution between the Mexican states 
(Germán-Soto & Ríos 2011, 128). 
Moreover, because of their close ties with foreign firms, the exporting 
firms that normally provide little employment and produce for foreign markets 
(mainly the United States) are mainly the ones that take advantage of the 
extensive tax exemptions on imports of machinery, equipment and parts that 
the Mexican state has granted since the opening up of the economy to attract 
foreign investment (Alvarez 2007, 6-8; Teichman 2012, 160). In contrast, the 
medium and small enterprises that produce for the domestic market and that 
provide most of the employment and could provide those inputs are left out of 
                                                          
15
 See http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/statistics.htm. Accessed: January 31 2014.  
 26 
 
the supply chain (Teichman 2012, 160-161). As a consequence, in order to 
survive, medium and small enterprises are forced to lower their production costs 
to a point where they have to sacrifice the workers’ salaries and rights, which 
contributes significantly to constraining employment growth and poverty 
alleviation (ibid.). 
What is more, the causes that could prevent the equal distribution of 
resources and services that would allow the poor to acquire income-generating 
capabilities are not taken into account either (Rodríguez 2010, 289). According 
to Teichman, despite some shift toward social spending to benefit the lower 
classes in the last few decades, social spending is in general regressive, 
meaning that it does relatively little to mitigate inequality and poverty (2012, 
160-163). Furthermore, in the case of the public education service, which does 
show some progressivity (in the primary and secondary levels), the service is of 
low quality, meaning that every time it is more likely that only the lower classes 
make use of the service whilst the middle and upper–middle classes prefer 
private education (ibid.).  
This thesis intends to add an example of the extent to which the 
institutional weakness of the Mexican state can prevent the Oportunidades 
programme from enabling the poor to obtain sustained income in the labour 
market that would allow them to move out of poverty. More precisely, we 
examine the extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the 
Mexican state – here defined as the regulatory-market and fiscal systems – has 
impeded the anti-poverty policy of recent times, the Oportunidades programme, 
from enabling the poor to obtain sustained income in the labour market that 
would allow them to move out of poverty. We do not intend to understand or 
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explain all the forms of constraint that could impede the Oportunidades 
programme from achieving its main goal nor all the actors involved in alleviating 
poverty, but rather what the role of the Mexican state in alleviating poverty might 
be under the logic of the Oportunidades programme and the extent to which the 
weakness of its institutional capacities impedes it from fulfilling it. 
The Mexican case is outstandingly interesting because, as argued 
above, as in much of Latin America the state has been influenced by local and 
international private sector actors, which brought about the perpetuation of the 
socio-economic inequalities inherited from the period of Spanish rule. As has 
already been explained, the structural reforms exacerbated those conditions 
even more and this was an important cause of the shift in the executive branch 
after 70 continuous years of rule of the centre-wing political party PRI. 
Nonetheless, the take-over of the right-wing political party PAN in 2000 not only 
failed to represent an ideological shift, but also both parties have continued to 
push pro-market reforms, reducing the scope of intervention of the Mexican 
state in the economy, claiming that in this way it would be much more efficient. 
However, we are not interested in the way in which the state has changed in 
terms of the number of offices or public servants. What we are most interested 
in is how the state’s functioning might be impeding the Oportunidades 
programme from achieving its main goal. The main research question that will 
guide the discussion and that this research tries to answer is the following:  
What is the role of the Mexican state in alleviating poverty and to what 
extent does the weakness of its institutional capacities impede it from fulfilling 
it? 
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i.3 Aim and objectives of the research 
 
The aim of this research is to understand the role of the Mexican state in 
alleviating poverty and the extent to which the weakness of its institutional 
capacities impedes it from fulfilling it. Our central argument is that the 
Oportunidades programme has failed to enable the recipients to obtain 
sustained income in the labour market due to the lack of effective training and 
labour market policies that complement the programme. The core cause of this 
is the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state, which has 
impeded it from creating the conditions for the poor to obtain sustained income 
in the labour market that would allow them to escape poverty.  
The main objectives that we seek to address in this thesis are five. First, 
we aim to empirically examine the role of the state in alleviating poverty in 
Mexico under the logic of the Oportunidades programme in urban zones. 
Second, we aim to advance the discussion about the importance of institutions 
for the working of human society and the socialization of individuals (North 1981 
and 1990). Third, we also aim to show the importance of the institutionalization 
of the labour market for its proper function (Polanyi 1944; Solow 1990; Hodgson 
2004). Fourth, we seek to develop a methodology based on both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods in order to more accurately assess the role of 
the state in alleviating poverty in a middle-income country such as Mexico in 
urban zones. Fifth, in the analysis of the CCTs as the main anti-poverty policy in 
Mexico, the role of the state has received relatively little attention. We aim to 
add relevant understanding of the extent to which the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the Mexican state has been a key factor that has 
impeded the Oportunidades programme from enabling the ex-recipients to 
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obtain sustained income in the labour market to move out of poverty in urban 
zones.  
i.4 Research Methodology 
 
Our methodology was a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods 
and can be divided into four main parts. The first part was the focus group 
technique, by which we interviewed one small group of ex-recipients in order to 
understand their lives and the constraints they face in obtaining sustained 
income in the labour market in urban zones. The second part was nineteen 
semi-structured interviews that we undertook with different actors of the social 
structure involved in our research problem, such as government officials, private 
sector employers and civil society organizations. The third part was a survey 
applied to ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme who were 
economically active. The fourth part was the analysis of several types of official 
documents related to the institutional capacities of the Mexican state, mainly 
requested through the websites of IFAI (Federal Institute of Access to 
Information and data protection, in English) and INFOEM (Institute of 
transparency, access to public information and protection of personal data of 
the State of Mexico and Municipalities, in English).  
i.5 Contributions to knowledge 
 
There is already an extensive literature on the evaluation of the CCTs, 
especially in the cases of Mexico (Oportunidades) and of Brazil (Bolsa Familia), 
which have some of the largest numbers of families receiving the cash grants. 
However, most literature examining the CCTs has mainly focused on how far 
the programmes' goals have been met, and on the impacts, limitations and 
 30 
 
consequences, intended and unintended, of the programmes in different areas 
of the recipients’ well-being. Only a few of them have focused on the 
institutional weakness of the state as one of the main factors that could impede 
the programme from achieving its main goals despite the fact that most of them 
highlight the point that the state has played an important role either in helping or 
in impeding the achievement of the programme’s desired ends.  
 For Maldonado et al., the Oportunidades programme could be seen as a 
first step by the Mexican state in reconstructing the notion of citizenship in 
Mexico, since one of the programme’s goals is to dignify the rights of children to 
health and education so that they can have the potential to find their own way 
out of poverty (2005, 38). Gertler et al. showed that the countries that are 
implementing this kind of programme are not creating welfare states with 
populations that become dependent on government assistance, as some may 
presume; on the contrary, they provided evidence to show that conditional 
transfer programmes do not create disincentives to work, and that some 
beneficiaries are either re-allocating or increasing the labour supply to take 
advantage of newly-available economic opportunities (2006, 28). 
 Mena reported the impact of the Oportunidades programme on the 
economic security of poor families and highlighted, among other things, how 
this kind of programme could be seen as the first step towards the re-definition 
of the role of the state as a welfare provider (2007, 202). Molyneux (2008) 
critiqued the supposed empowerment of mothers receiving benefits from the 
Oportunidades programme and highlighted the way in which the state plays an 
active role in re-traditionalizing gender roles and identities by creating a 
dependency on a subsidy which confirms mothering as women’s primary social 
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role. Research has also been undertaken into CCT programmes in other 
countries, especially Bolsa Familia in Brazil (Cardoso & Souza 2004; Haagh 
2007 and 2011b; Matarazzo 2007; Soares 2012; Baldwin 2013), the first 
programme of this kind to be introduced in Latin America, and in countries such 
as Colombia (Attanasio et al. 2010) and El Salvador and Paraguay (Soares and 
Britto 2007).    
Some others have examined the outcomes of the CCTs in comparative 
perspective. For instance, Soares et al. 2010 compared the impact of Bolsa 
Família in Brazil to that of other CCTs in Latin America, such as in Mexico, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Chile, and showed that all the programmes have 
helped to reduce nutritional poverty and have improved the educational levels of 
the recipients. Alzúa et al. (2010) examined the effects of the CCTs on work 
incentives and the adult labour supply in rural areas of Mexico, Nicaragua and 
Honduras. Sugiyama (2011) contrasted domestic preconditions (such as 
political ideology, state capacity and human development levels) with 
international pressure (neighbourhood effects, professional norm-creation and 
financial inducements by international financial institutions) to explain the 
diffusion of CCTs in Latin America.  
At the time of the writing of this thesis (2010 - 2013), I have found only 
three research studies on the Oportunidades programme which have 
considered some of the constraints or impacts of the Oportunidades programme 
in enabling the ex-recipients to obtain sustained income in the labour market. 
Santiago Levy argued that poverty will not be alleviated because the regressive 
Mexican taxation system forces the recipients to work in the informal sector of 
the economy, which leaves them vulnerable to falling into poverty again since 
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they do not have access to social security services (2007, 49-50). González 
(2012) discussed the positive impact that the Oportunidades programme has 
had on the educational level of the repicients and how these positive outcomes 
have helped the recipients to obtain better jobs in rural zones. Sánchez and 
Jiménez (2012) analysed the options of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades 
programme once they graduate from the programme in rural zones and argued 
that it is necessary that the Mexican state complement the programme with 
mechanisms that allow the poor either to keep studying to BA level or to obtain 
sustained employment so that they are not vulnerable to falling into poverty 
again. 
We aim to add relevant understanding by researching the extent to which 
the weakness of the institutional capacities of the state has impeded the 
Oportunidades programme from enabling the ex-recipients to obtain sustained 
income in the labour market that would allow them to move out of poverty in 
urban zones. We have chosen urban poverty for three main reasons: First, in 
Latin American countries in absolute terms there are more poor people in the 
urban zones than in rural areas, since the majority of the population now lives in 
cities (World Bank 2006, 149). Second, people in towns cannot depend on self-
produced consumption in the way that their rural counterparts can, and this is 
the reason why they become more dependant on the state provision of 
resources and services to increase their capabilities to obtain sustained income 
in the labour market. Third, due to the high levels of labour informality that exist 
in Latin America, the main concern of state policy regarding employment is that 
poor people have sustained income generation, which is the reason why the 
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relationship with the institutional capacities of the state regarding their 
opportunities in the labour market is more direct in urban zones.  
i.6 Outline of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the 
theoretical framework that will guide the analysis to enable an understanding of 
the interconnections between the state’s institutions and organizations, the 
labour market and poverty. We draw on an institutional political economy 
analysis to explore the contributory role that the state plays in alleviating poverty 
and the extent to which the weakness of its institutional capacities impedes the 
Oportunidades programme from achieving its main goal. We argue that an 
institutional political economy analysis is the appropriate approach because it 
provides a framework which helps us to understand the extent to which the 
institutional weakness of the Mexican state, among other important factors such 
as economic policies or independent labour market dynamics, can impede the 
ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme from obtaining sustained income 
in the labour market.  
In Chapter 2, we review the environment that paved the way for the 
structural adjustment reforms that were implemented in the 1980s and its 
effects on the institutional capacities of the state which have influenced the 
residual social welfare model implemented since the 1980s. In addition, we 
explain in depth the way in which the Oportunidades programme works and 
review the outcomes of the programme on the education of the recipients. 
Finally, we examine the Mexican labour market and argue that the weakness of 
the institutional capacities of the state has influenced informal changes in its 
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characteristics that have brought about high levels of labour informalization and 
economic insecurity as the main issues that have to be tackled so that poverty 
can be alleviated.  
The third chapter presents the research methods applied to carry out the 
analysis. We designed a methodology that combined quantitative and 
qualitative methods, which allowed us to examine the linkages between the 
capabilities of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme, the 
institutional capacities of the state and the labour market. We also discuss how 
we selected the State of Mexico and Toluca as sites to carry out our fieldwork 
and how we used a random sampling technique to select the poor for 
interviews.  
The fourth chapter presents an analysis of the extent to which the 
institutional weakness of the regulatory-market capacity of the state impedes 
the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme from obtaining sustained 
income in the labour market. We argue that the weaknes of the regulatory-
market capacity of the Mexican state in the world of labour, brought about, on 
the one hand, by its weakly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus in charge of 
applying the law in the world of labour and, on the other hand, the limited 
access to workers’ organizations that provide third-party enforcement, 
contributes significantly to hampering the alleviation of poverty because it 
prevents the state from protecting workers’ rights while helping the private 
sector to maintain or increase its productivity.  
The fifth chapter presents an analysis of the extent to which the 
institutional weakness of the fiscal capacity of the state impedes the ex-
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recipients of the Oportunidades programme from obtaining sustained income in 
the labour market. We argue that the federal level has tried to maintain its 
power over access to basic resources, which has impeded the lower levels of 
government from improving their institutional capacities and this has made it 
difficult to use expenditure as a tool for alleviating poverty and in this way to 
justify greater tax collection. 
The sixth chapter presents an analysis of the extent to which the neo-
liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms introduced in Mexico in 
the early 1980s has shaped the behaviour of the ex-recipients in the 
occupational realm. We argue that, contrary to the neo-liberal ideology of the 
Washington Consensus reforms, which assumes that state intervention to help 
the poor through cash transfers and social provision creates perverse incentives 
for them not to move out of poverty by their own efforts, it is the weakness of 
the institutional capacities of the Mexican state which has impeded the 
Oportunidades programme from enabling the poor to obtaining sustained 
income in the labour market to move out of poverty by their own efforts. In this 
way, we were able to complement the findings reported in the previous chapters 
to understand in a better way the extent to which the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the state impedes the Oportunidades programme from 
achieving its main goal. The seventh chapter presents the main conclusions of 
the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ALLEVIATING POVERTY 
 
Introduction    
In this chapter, we shall present the theoretical framework that will help 
us to understand the role of the state in alleviating poverty in a middle-income 
country with high socio-economic inequalities such as Mexico. More precisely, 
the conceptual issues that we shall present here will allow us to analyse the 
extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state 
could prevent the anti-poverty strategy of recent times, Oportunidades, from 
achieving its main goal. We argue that an institutional political economy 
analysis is the appropriate research approach because it provides a framework 
that will help us to understand the role of the state, among other important 
factors such as economic policies or independent labour market dynamics, in 
alleviating poverty. The chapter is divided into seven sections. In the first three 
sections, we shall introduce the origins, logic and key concepts of the 
institutional political economy approach. In the fourth section, we shall consider 
the importance of state intervention to alleviate poverty in the light of the 
institutional political economy approach. In the fifth section, we shall explore the 
role of the state under the logic of the current main paradigm in poverty 
alleviation. In the sixth section, we shall discuss the relationship between the 
institutional capacities of the state and poverty. The final section will conclude 
the chapter.   
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1.1 Institutional Political Economy analysis 
 
Institutional political economy analysis is an approach to explaining how 
and why the political and hierarchical structure and the beliefs of a society 
determine its performance characteristics, such as its internal order, socio-
economic inequality, economic growth and so on. The central idea is that the 
way in which a society is organized is determined by institutions which give 
authorities control over resources, which allows them to shape economic 
outcomes and the behaviour of the citizens. In this sense, it implies a broader 
vision of how societies operate and sustain themselves since it pays attention to 
the way in which axiological, political and economic institutions influence and 
reinforce each other, rather than the typical views that focus only on political, 
economic or cultural variables without considering each other, and 
consequently fail to provide appropriate conclusions.16  
It is mainly based on the work of Max Weber (1964 and 1978), Joseph 
Schumpeter (1991), Adam Smith (1976), Karl Polanyi (1944) and T.H. Marshall 
(1950), among others, who argued that socio-economic inequalities are 
institutionally determined and that the intervention of the state is necessary to 
equalize the opportunities of people to avoid perverse consequences. It was 
brought back during the early 1980s (Evans et al. 1985) as part of the new 
institutionalism movement, in reaction to the economic and society-centred 
rational choice and behavioural approaches, which saw the state as less 
                                                          
16
 Economic, political and behavioural analysis that focuses only on one discipline normally tends to 
conceptualize the state as an actor in order to uncover the aims behind the objectives of the political, 
economic and social policies, to understand how the state interacts with the different actors of the 
social structure. However, as argued by North et al., the difficulty with the single actor approach to the 
state is that it overlooks how the internal structure of the state affects how the state achieves its goals 
or objectives (2009, 17). See Marsh and Stoker (2010) part 1 for an account of the economic, political 
and behavioural perspectives that conceptualize the state as an actor.        
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important as a coordinator of the economy. It has been greatly advanced by 
institutional theorists such as Evans (1989 and 1995), Chang (2007 and 2010), 
Esping-Andersen (1990), Schneider (2009) and Haagh (2011b), although it was 
North et al. (2009) who produced the most far-reaching conceptual framework.    
1.2 The Logic of Institutional Political Economy analysis 
North et al. explained that the logic of institutional political economy analysis 
is, in the broadest terms, that in pre-modern states dominated by traditional or 
charismatic leaders, the latter agree to respect and defend the prerogatives of 
the political and economic elites which belong to that particular society, 
including property rights and access to and control over valuable resources 
such as land, labour and capital, or valuable activities such as trade and 
education. In this way, elites not only avoid fighting with each other but also 
form a coalition to manipulate the political system to increase their rents while 
keeping social order and, at the same time, securing their continuation in power. 
Accordingly, the military, fiscal and judicial systems are subject to the control of 
the political system, which limits access to those valuable resources or activities 
by any other non-elite group, using force, if necessary (op. cit., 13-29).  
However, in order to define their privileges with respect to each other, elites 
have to create public legal institutions that are enforced impartially and 
impersonally but only in relation to their coalition’s members, which allows them 
to organize to pursue their economic, political and social goals, also providing 
third-party enforcement on the activities of the state. Once this limited but 
impersonal institutional framework exists, it might be possible to extend it to the 
rest of the society as well if the elites perceive that their prerogatives will be 
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more secure from intra-elite competition when those privileges are shared as 
rights. This, as a result, prevents the political system from manipulating 
economic interests since it produces a constantly shifting distribution of 
economic and political interests, making it difficult for elites to consolidate their 
advantage through rent-creation since every party finds strong incentives to 
monitor the others and to publicize attempts to subvert the legal-institutional 
framework (ibid.).  
This brings about the formation of a rational-legal or modern state, whose 
capacity to control violence to achieve social order stems from the way in which 
its institutional framework supports complex and specialized organizations 
through which the different groups in society are treated equally as citizens, 
having open access to organize to pursue their own economic, political and 
social goals. However, when elites perceive that their prerogatives are not in 
danger from intra-elite competition, because each member of the coalition 
understands that the other elites find similar incentives to keep manipulating the 
economic system and secure political order, they then do not extend the 
impartial and impersonal enforcement of the public legal institutions to the rest 
of the society. In this way, they can limit access to and control over valuable 
resources and/or activities by any other non-elite group using force, if 
necessary, to control violence and achieve social order while keeping and 
consolidating their prerogatives over time (ibid.).  
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1.3 Key concepts of Institutional Political Economy analysis 
1.3.1 Institutions  
The institutional political economy approach distinguishes between 
institutions and organisations. Institutions are the ‘rules of the game’ that shape 
the motivations behind the economic, political and social interactions in human 
exchange (North 1990, 3). They shape human interaction because they reduce 
insecurity by creating stable expectations of the behaviour of others. In this 
sense, they are constraints that "include both what individuals are prohibited 
from doing and under what conditions some individuals are permitted to 
undertake certain activities" (ibid.). In this sense, institutions constrain in order 
to enable us to do many more activities, defining the set of choices of 
individuals. Tendler (2002) has shown, for example, how the formalization of 
small firms through taxation is a constraint that could enable the improvement of 
their productive opportunities, since it gives them access to credit and links 
them to organizations that could represent their interests, thus increasing their 
sustainability.  
Institutions, however, are also influenced by the cultural environment, 
which is the reason why they can not only be seen as constraints and enabling 
devices of policies and goals, but also as constitutive ones because they are 
constructed according to the values, interests, beliefs, world-views and ideas of 
the different actors involved in institution-building (Leftwich 2007, 10). Citizens 
internalize the values, interests, world-views, beliefs and ideas that derive from 
the structure of organizations and institutions such as their personal or 
impersonal identity, and act accordingly. In this sense, concepts such as 
equality and rationality cannot be maintained unless societies create impersonal 
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identities along those dimensions, altering individual dispositions or preferences 
to form habits.  
Institutions can be formal or informal. Formal institutions are normally 
understood to be written rules and procedures such as constitutions, laws, 
statutes, contracts, formal social conventions and so on. Informal institutions, on 
the other hand, are shared beliefs about the world and may operate behind, 
between and within the formal institutions underlying and supplementing them, 
thus influencing how political organization is used to structure the social order, 
and they are developed and communicated through the cultural or customary 
practices of societies or groups (Helmke & Levitsky 2006, 5). The effect on the 
presence (or efficiency) of an institution, either formal or informal, could 
increase returns from (or the efficiency of) others (Hall & Soskice 2001, 17), and 
their joint existence could reinforce their political resilience (Schneider & 
Karcher 2010, 18).  
These two kinds of rule can be enforced either by the organizations of the 
state or by other cultural practices. The importance of state enforcement lies in 
the fact that it determines its legal status; that is, any institution enforced by the 
state, whether formal or informal, can be considered as a legal institution.17 
Accordingly, we shall mainly focus on four kinds of institution: 1. any kind of 
                                                          
17
 Between 2008 and 2009, I worked for the Superior Auditing Organism of the Mexican Federation (ASF 
– Auditoría Superior de la Federación), auditing the way the local councils spent the money they 
received from the Federation. In Mexico, the local councils have autonomy in the administration of their 
resources. The auditing was mainly based on a small number of federal public finance laws which 
regulate the way the money is given and the ways in which it can be spent, but mainly on the local 
public finance laws, which regulate the way the money is administered. What surprised me was that 
some local governments, in the poorest parts of the country, did not have written laws to administer the 
money; they used to do it based on informal or unwritten laws which were enforced by official 
organizations. In some cases these informal rules were even more effective than the written rules in 
some other local governments. See Tsai (2007) for similar cases in China.   
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enacted legislation based on constitutional provisions and the constitution itself 
that is enforced by the organizations of the state; 2. unwritten laws sanctioned 
and enforced by the organizations of the state; 3. any kind of enacted legislation 
based on constitutional provisions and the constitution itself that is not enforced 
by the organizations of the state; and 4. unwritten laws that are not sanctioned 
and enforced by the organizations of the state but are enforced by the cultural 
practices of the population.18  
   1.3.2 Organizations    
Organizations, on the other hand, are the tools that individuals use to 
increase their productivity, to seek and create human contact and relationships 
to increase their productivity, to coordinate the actions of many individuals and 
groups, and to dominate and coerce others (North et al. op. cit., 7). 
Organizations also comprise internal rules which structure the behaviour of their 
members towards the attainment of organizational goals. Therefore, they can 
be subsets of institutions. Nonetheless, once established, they provide, along 
with institutions, the macro-structure through which individuals interact and can 
shape and influence each other. 
There are two main conceptualizations of organizations: as single actors or 
players (North 1981 and 1990; Tilly 1992; Leftwich 2007), and as groups of 
individuals (North et al. op. cit.). Organizations understood as single actors or 
players could help us to analyse the constraints and incentives that 
organizations face in engaging with the different actors of society. This would be 
                                                          
18
 We recognize that there are many non-state actors, both licit (NGOs, multinational corporations, 
family business groups) and illicit (crime organizations), that also create and enforce their formal and 
informal rules. However, these cannot be considered legal since they are not enforced by the state.  
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the right path to follow if we wanted to explain, for instance, the interests, 
purposes or aims behind the interactions of the different actors in society in 
alleviating poverty. However, the main problem with the single actor 
conceptualization of organizations is that it does not pay attention to the way in 
which organizations fulfil their goals, which, for our purposes is vital since we 
want to explain how and why elite groups influence the economic and political 
system to structure the state and society in a way that impedes the poor from 
obtaining a sustained income.  
For the purposes of our research then, we shall understand 
organizations as groups of individuals, formal or informal, in which there are 
defined and accepted roles, positions and responsibilities structured in some 
relationship to each other, pursuing a mix of common and individual goals 
through partially coordinated behaviour (North et al. op. cit., 15). In order to 
make the members of organizations commit to the arrangements among 
themselves or between the organizations and outside actors, they have to rely 
on third-party enforcement, which is normally provided by the state’s 
organizations, which ensure that law is enforced impartially and impersonally 
(ibid., 14). Seeing organizations in this way will allow us to shed light on issues 
such as the political processes that shape their internal structure or purposes 
and how they enable or impede the distribution of goods and services.  
Shedding light on these aspects is very important for our research because, 
as argued above, although we recognize that there are different aspects that 
can influence the reproduction or alleviation of poverty, we are mainly interested 
in the role of the state. In this sense, and according to the theoretical framework 
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that we have developed so far, it is important to uncover the political processes 
that shape the state’s organizational framework to understand the extent to 
which the functioning of the latter can impede the distribution of goods and 
services, such as education, that can have an impact in alleviating poverty. We 
shall now discuss the importance of state intervention in alleviating poverty. 
1.4 The importance of state intervention in alleviating poverty 
 
We have already briefly explained the role of the state in achieving social 
order. However, our purpose in this chapter is to shed light on why it is 
important that the state intervenes to alleviate poverty and, perhaps more 
important, the extent to which it can contribute to or impede its achievement. 
For that purpose, we have first to draw on the work of Karl Polanyi (1944) and 
T.H. Marshall (1950), who succinctly expressed the logic of institutional political 
economy analysis to explain the importance of state intervention to coordinate 
the economy to avoid poverty and social violence from appearing. In the 
broadest terms, Polanyi argued that the importance of state intervention in the 
economy relies on the fact that there are markets (labour, natural resources and 
money) that cannot be left to follow their own dynamics – as the pro-market 
theorists intend – because when that happens it is the citizenry who bear the 
costs of the market failures. That is, workers, peasants and medium and small 
business become vulnerable to the failures of those markets which reinforce 
each other, bringing about or increasing the levels of unemployment and the 
socio-economic inequalities of the citizenry and thus triggering social diseases 
such as poverty and social violence (2001, 90-140).  
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More precisely, the problem of leaving those markets to follow their own 
dynamics is, in the broadest terms, that, on the one hand, sudden reductions in 
the supply of money and credit can bring about a general fall of prices, which 
could trigger business destruction because the costs of production for business, 
which are normally fixed by contract, remain the same since a time lag is 
needed before they can be adjusted to the new level of prices (ibid., 201-205); 
on the other hand, the deregulation of the labour and natural resource markets 
leaves workers and farmers, especially those at the bottom of the social 
structure, vulnerable to falling into poverty since they live under the threat of 
being fired at any time or unable to compete against international competitors 
that offer cheaper prices, without any financial support to cope with their living 
expenses when they are unemployed. Consequently, it is necessary that the 
state intervenes to adjust the supply of money and credit to avoid deflations that 
would put businesses in danger of liquidation, to implement labour market 
policies and to maintain continuity in the production of natural resources by 
protecting peasants from imports to avoid unemployment in order to prevent 
social diseases such as poverty and social violence from appearing. 
In this sense, for Polanyi, a free-market capitalist system, like the one 
established initially in England during the industrial revolution and which 
expanded all over Europe in the nineteenth century, is a utopia that cannot be 
achieved without at the same time destroying society (ibid., 3-4). The Great 
Depression, at the beginning of the twentieth century, just one decade before 
World War II, was, according to Polanyi, one of the consequences of the self-
regulated market model (ibid., 148-149). The main problem with such a system 
then, is that the state withdraws from coordinating the economy, losing its 
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strength to react in favour of the society when the market institutions fail, which 
brings about a climate of economic instability that puts the social order in 
danger since every social group would act on their own to protect their interests. 
Notwithstanding, it was established in England because it was the outcome of a 
conscious intervention of the government in favour of the private sector elites 
which called the government into action to liberalize the economy to their 
benefit, arguing that the increasing industrialization of the country required it 
(ibid., 258). 
The establishment of a self-regulating market is therefore such a violent 
event that the different groups of the social structure will respond with a 
counter-movement to protect themselves. The most outstanding counter-
movement in England was carried out by the labour movement (Marshall & 
Bottomore 1992, 73), since workers were extremely dissatisfied with the poor 
working conditions and unemployment brought about by the deregulation of the 
labour market that the British state carried out in favour of the private sector to 
make it more competitive.19 As time went by, and the number of the 
unemployed and poor increased, a process of democratization was initiated by 
diverse social groups, especially workers, who struggled for political rights such 
as universal suffrage and the right to be able to run for a position of authority in 
order to be part of the decision-making process and improve their socio-
economic conditions.  
                                                          
19
 Among other labour market reforms, the British government curtailed the subsidies in aid of wages 
that assured workers a minimum income irrespective of their earnings (only those at risk of starvation 
would be relieved) and pushed for the flexibilization of wages and hiring and firing so that national 
enterprises could lower their production costs and compete internationally. See Polanyi (2001) chapters 
7-9 for a detailed explanation of the reforms and their consequences. 
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According to Bottomore, the struggles continued into the twentieth century 
and broadened into campaigns for social rights, instigated by trade unions 
(Marshall & Bottomore op. cit., 73) that created, along the way, political parties 
to organize their voices and raise their demands. The socio-economic 
inequalities brought about by the self-regulated market, however, were not the 
only factor that triggered the struggles for political and social rights in England. 
Marshall and Bottomore argued that political and social rights were actually an 
extension of civil rights that had been attained, one century earlier (in the 
eighteenth century) by the bourgeoisie of medieval towns in opposition to feudal 
aristocracy in the early stages of the development of industrial capitalism (ibid.).  
Accordingly, civil rights were the first rights to be attained for two main 
reasons: 1. the formation of the modern nation-state in Europe during the 
seventeenth century called for legal reformation to clearly define citizens within 
a geographical border to increase the sovereignty of the state, and; 2. they were 
indispensable for the establishment of capitalism since they confer the legal 
capacity to acquire property, conclude valid contracts (including employment), 
and establish associational organization, freedom of speech and the right to 
justice (ibid., 8). O'Donnell argued that at the beginning, elites were fearful of 
granting legal agency to citizens without “moral and cognitive capabilities” 
(2001, 19). However, they saw them as an opportunity to increase their rents by 
also expanding the number of people with whom they could make contracts 
without losing their prerogatives since they had control of the political and 
judicial systems.  
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The problem here was that elites thought that the system that they had 
created was unassailable and decided to take it too far by granting the right to 
collective bargaining in order to be able to control big groups of workers with 
few contracts. As a consequence, as argued above, many groups, especially 
workers, saw this as an important instrument to organize and struggle for the 
equalization of their socio-economic conditions, demanding that as citizens they 
were entitled to social rights such as “economic welfare and social security to 
live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the 
society” (Marshall & Bottomore op. cit., 8). The great disaffection of the different 
social groups with the outcomes of the self-regulating market meant that the 
postwar era, in the twentieth century, was marked by state-dominated 
development strategies and the size of the state expanded considerably, 
especially through the provision of social rights for poor and/or vulnerable 
people, which culminated in the creation of the welfare state (ibid., 8-49).  
Marshall claimed that at the beginning, social rights were at a minimum 
since the common purpose was only to abate poverty without disturbing the 
pattern of inequality that elites had established, which involved the need to 
guarantee a minimum income extended to all citizens in the form of a social 
right to replace the market as the only redistributive mechanism (ibid., 27-28). 
However, eventually political and private sector elites realized that social rights 
were actually not a threat to capitalism since that kind of assistance relieved 
industry from social responsibility outside the contract of employment. 
Accordingly, Haagh noted that within this realm there are occupational rights, 
which aim at dealing with employment problems by forms of assistance such as 
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unemployment insurance, access to training at work and between jobs, access 
to unions and effective mechanisms of job relocation (2002, 89).  
Consequently, to protect citizens' civil, political and social rights, the state 
would need an impartial and impersonal rational-legal framework and a 
progressive taxation system that could balance the quality of public and private 
goods, thus lowering inequality, which in turn would legitimate the tenure of the 
taxation system. Once citizens see this institutional framework as permanent, it 
can be said that they have impersonal and impartial access to pursuing their 
individual and group goals in the polity and the economy, and that only then will 
citizens be treated equally. We have argued so far why state intervention is 
important to reduce socio-economic inequality. We shall now proceed to 
discuss the role that the state plays in alleviating poverty under the logic of the 
current poverty paradigm which the CCTs are based on and finally the extent to 
which the institutional capacities of the state can contribute to or impede 
alleviating poverty.  
1.5 The role of the state in alleviating poverty  
Adam Smith argued that in a free-market capitalist system, socio-economic 
inequality is inevitable and the state plays an important role in equalizing the 
socio-economic conditions of society because a more productive and equal 
society would foster economic growth. Smith was opposed to any intervention 
or regulation which interfered with market mechanisms as long as it did not 
harm the poor, exacerbating the socio-economic inequalities. Whenever this 
was the case, he emphasized the importance of state intervention to restrain 
the power of the capitalists, since they could institutionalize poverty and 
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inequality by constraining access to basic services such as education. 
According to Smith, the differences in education brought about the inability of 
the workers to comprehend both the surrounding environment and how to 
improve their conditions, while the elites perfectly understood the interests of 
society and used that knowledge for their personal benefit (1976, 128).  
The distribution of education and training could help to equalize the 
opportunities of the poor to have an occupation, which, for Smith, was the 
difference in people’s success in living the life that they found worth living. To 
achieve this, Smith found it important as well to have a progressive taxation 
system that could help the state to redistribute income and spend money on 
social programmes and public services. According to him, it was not 
"unreasonable that the rich could contribute to the public expense, not only in 
proportion to their revenue, but something more in that proportion" (ibid., 825), 
since the actions of the state would benefit the different groups in the social 
structure from the poorest to the richest. Moreover, for him, by redistributing 
wealth and income, the owners of the means of production and wealth were 
protecting themselves, since otherwise the deprivation of capabilities would 
force the poor to beg or steal. 
 Working on Adam Smith’s ideas and after the disappointing results of the 
marketization of the economy in developing countries of the 1970s and 1980s, 
Amartya Sen (1993; 1999a and 1999b) criticized the logic behind the pro-
market reforms which understood development in terms of the achievement of 
economic growth. According to Sen, measures such as the growth of gross 
national product (GNP) or industrialization did not take into account people´s 
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interests in equalizing their opportunities or freedom to pursue the way of life 
that they wished. Accordingly, he suggested the notion of capabilities as the 
measure that makes it possible to take into account the interests of people to 
equalize their opportunities or freedom to pursue the way of life that they wished 
as both the paramount goal of development and the leading means of achieving 
economic growth.  
This conception is centred on the individual, more “concerned with the 
removal of disadvantages or sources of unfreedom and the creation of 
opportunities to lead worthwhile lives” (Anand & Sen op. cit., 2). In this sense, 
poverty is a consequence of human underdevelopment, and human 
development is conceptualized as the "capability that every single person is 
able to do or be – the various functionings he or she can achieve" (Sen 1993, 
30). Accordingly, functionings are different from commodities; a commodity is 
an object which a person could use such as a house or food, while a functioning 
is the aspect of living in a way desired by the individual. Consequently, and in 
contrast with previous definitions and measurements of poverty that were 
merely comparisons of the levels of income or living standards (consumption) 
(Lister 2004, 1), from the capabilities approach perspective, income and 
consumption are just tools to achieve what really matters: the spectrum of 
choices and opportunities for living in a way desired by the individual. 
The achievement of that life is determined by a set of capabilities that 
represent the opportunities a person has to achieve the desired life. An increase 
in the capabilities of each person will improve their freedom to choose the way 
of life that they value the most and wish to live. The human development 
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perception, then, consists of the removal of major sources of un-freedom 
socially, politically and economically arranged such as poverty, the lack of 
economic opportunities such as finance, neglect of basic services such as 
education and health care, the lack of opportunities to participate in the public 
decision making-process and the privation of social protection, which would 
reinforce and enhance people´s capabilities to maximize their potentialities (Sen 
1999b, 38-40). 
Accordingly, poverty is seen as "the worst form of human deprivation since 
it can involve not only the lack of the necessities of material well-being, but also 
the denial of opportunities of living a tolerable life" (Anand & Sen op. cit., 4). The 
change of paradigm from income or consumption to the notion of capabilities 
“enhances the understanding of the nature and causes of poverty by shifting 
attention away from means (such as income) to ends that people have reason 
to pursue, and, correspondingly, to the freedoms to be able to achieve those 
ends” (Sen, 1999b, 90). Within this notion, poverty means the impossibility of 
carrying out autonomous life projects, since poor people lack equal 
opportunities to acquire or access the means to pursue their projects.  
According to Sen, the definition of the necessary capabilities to remove the 
sources of un-freedom such as poverty should be an empirical matter, resulting 
from ‘public discussion and reasoning on what should be included and why 
within a democratic environment, which would lead to a better understanding of 
the role, reach and significance of particular capabilities’ (Sen 2004, 77). This 
has brought about different attempts to operationalize it both empirically and 
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philosophically.20 However, it has been the annual United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) where Sen’s approach 
has been operationalized the best, having become since 1990 the main 
paradigm in poverty alleviation. In the broadest terms, a person is poor if he/she 
lacks basic capabilities in three dimensions: health, education and income (life 
expectancy at birth, years of schooling and gross national income per capita). 
As a result of these deprivations, the poor are limited in their opportunities to 
pursue their social, political and economic goals.   
This has led to a renewed emphasis on the importance of the role of the 
state as a crucial actor in alleviating poverty by providing basic services such as 
health care or education so that the poor can obtain a sustained income in the 
labour market to move out of poverty, materialized, among other policies, in the 
CCTs. However, unlike Adam Smith, who pointed to the taxation system as an 
important tool that would allow the state to equalize the opportunities of the poor 
in the occupational realm, Sen’s view falls short in explaining the causes or 
consequences of unequal distribution or redistribution of public services and 
resources that bring about the inequalities in obtaining the means so that the 
poor can pursue their life projects, such as the inequality of income generating 
capabilities to obtain a sustained income in the labour market. As a matter of 
fact, the Human Development Index (HDI) only makes a comparison between 
                                                          
20
 Nussbaum, one of the closest of Sen’s collaborators, has argued that there at least ten central human 
capabilities: (1) Life; (2) Bodily health; (3) Bodily integrity; (4) Senses, imagination and thought; (5) 
Emotions; (6) Practical reason; (7) Affiliation; (8) Other species; (9) Play; and (10) Political and material 
control over one’s environment  (2005, 41-42).  
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the actual distribution of health, education and income and an ideal equal 
distribution.21 
This makes the paradigm difficult to employ in contexts of high socio-
economic inequality such as in Latin American and some African countries 
where, among other important factors, the institutional weakness of the states is 
one of the key causes that prevent the equal distribution of resources and 
services that could have an impact in alleviating poverty. For instance, Saha 
found that in sub-Saharan African countries, the lack of the participation of the 
poor in the policy process brings about poor targeting of poverty-reduction 
policies and a misappropriation of project finances intended for combating 
poverty, since poverty is analysed from beginning to end by civil servants not 
directly affected by the phenomenon (2008, 269). Ranis and Stewart, on the 
other hand, found that effective social expenditure is an important variable for 
reducing poverty in low or middle income countries such as Mexico or Tunisia 
(op. cit., 192). 
This thesis intends to contribute to filling that gap by providing an example 
of the way in which the institutional weakness of the state can prevent the 
Oportunidades programme – based on the HDR and Sen’s views – from 
enabling the poor to obtain sustained income in the labour market to move out 
of poverty. As previously argued, poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon 
whose causes are determined by several factors such as economic policies or 
the independent dynamics of the markets. We shall focus only on the extent to 
                                                          
21
 The standard measure, the Gini coefficient, captures the idea that complete equality would be 
manifest if every person earned the same income, whereas complete inequality would result if a single 
person held all national income. 
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which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state has 
impeded the Oportunidades programme from enabling the poor to obtain 
sustained income in the labour market to move out of poverty. But, what is the 
state and how can its institutional capacities contribute to or impede the 
alleviation of poverty? 
1.6 The capacities of the state to alleviate poverty 
1.6.1 The regulatory-market capacity of the state 
The idea of the modern state as we know it nowadays was born in the 
seventeenth century in Europe after the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, which 
recognized the autonomy and sovereignty of the subscribing states (Axtmann 
2004, 260). As argued above, in pre-modern states, control over territory was in 
the hands of either a traditional or a charismatic authority. In the former case, 
obedience was a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed 
obligations either by the citizens or by the administrative staff; in the latter, the 
leaders were obeyed by virtue of personal trust in their qualities by the citizens 
or the administrative staff (Weber 1964, 328). These states were distinguished 
by the "absence of any shape of institutional infrastructure to rule and govern, 
formally separated from the rulers and officials who ran them, on the one hand, 
and the citizenry, on the other" (Leftwich 2008, 216). 
Weber argued that the operation of a capitalist system could only have 
flourished in a state whose basis is a rational rule of law ascribed for its 
exercise to a professional bureaucratic body of organizations "juridically located 
in a particular territory in charge of making and implementing policies to carry 
out certain functions of the state using, if necessary, force" (1978, 54). To 
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ensure of the impartiality and impersonality of law enforcement and the 
effectiveness of the implementation of policies, bureaucrats should be recruited 
on the basis of technical qualifications tested by examination or diplomas that 
certify technical training, and be remunerated with salaries according to their 
responsibilities. In addition, employment should be full-time and stable, allowing 
them to pursue a career within public service, being promoted on the basis of 
seniority or achievement or both, and to have a hierarchical chain of command 
and a set of rule-based procedures (Weber 1964, 333-334).22  
For Weber, then, the state was an organization of groups of highly skilled 
bureaucrats claiming control over a territory through its rational-legal 
institutional ensemble and invested with the authority to make binding decisions 
for the common good of its citizenry, using force when necessary. The state that 
Weber portrayed, however, was an ideal type whose characteristics were only 
established in developed countries. Consequently, due to the many differences 
in their formation, a comparison with developing countries would be 
meaningless. Therefore, we need to look in more detail at the institutional 
characteristics of states in the developing world in order to extract lessons from 
states in similar circumstances.   
 
1.6.1.1 The regulatory-market capacity of the state in the developing 
world 
 
In the literature, three kinds of state in the developing world have been 
classified following Weber´s ideal: predatory, desarrollista and developmental 
                                                          
22
 For Weber, only the supreme chief of the organization occupies his position of authority by virtue of 
appropriation, of election, or of having been designated for the succession (1964, 333) 
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(Evans 1989, 561; Schneider 1999, 276). Developmental states are 
characterized by an impersonal, highly developed bureaucratic apparatus, 
selected through a meritocratic process in which public servants can follow 
long-term career paths which allow them to achieve expertise in the exercise of 
their activities and reach high posts with competitive salaries in the 
governmental organizations. Accordingly, the apparatus operates under durable 
and clear rules and norms, providing corporate coherence and insulation in its 
relationship with other actors of the social structure, which allows them to work 
closely with them (creating informal institutions along the way), channeling 
domestic and international initiatives into areas of priority for the state to secure 
development objectives, and, when necessary, playing the role of a surrogate 
entrepreneur to support the growth of national and international industry (Evans 
1995, 12). Although these states are not paragons of virtue and they are hardly 
immune to corruption (Evans 1989, 572), the embedded autonomy of their 
bureaucrats has mattered even more to decreasing poverty and inequality than 
the high educational levels of their citizens in countries such as Korea and 
China (Chang 2010, 179). 
Predatory states, on the other hand, are characterized by their fragile 
institutional-legal structures, which limit or open access to resources depending 
completely on the individual identity and personality of the people. In this sense, 
there is a complete absence of an institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus that 
harnesses the interests of the different actors of the social structure into areas 
of general interest. Consequently, they have huge problems in enforcing law 
which brings about high levels of corruption and economic and political 
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instability (Evans 1989, 562). Zaire and some other countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa have been considered as the archetypal cases of such a state.  
It has been argued that there is an intermediate case of states that 
occasionally approximate to embedded autonomy, but not sufficiently to give 
them the transformative capacity of developmental states. This intermediate 
case, also called the desarrollista state, is characterized by “a fluid, weakly 
institutionalized bureaucracy in which appointments structure power and 
representation” (Schneider 1999, 278). The impossibility of constructing a highly 
developed bureaucratic apparatus in these countries is rooted in the weak law 
enforcement due to the historical pervasive influence of domestic traditional 
elites and international actors in the policy-making process (Vanden & Prevost 
2002, 146). This brings about a wide gap between the de jure and de facto 
systems that governmental organizations use to avoid the structure of the 
bureaucratic apparatus legislation by hiring personnel through temporary 
appointments (Grindle 2010, 5-7), which impedes the formation of certain ties 
with the private sector to channel their initiatives into areas of priority for the 
state while helping them to grow, and pushes public-private interaction into 
individualized channels.  
Latin American countries perfectly fit into this type of state. As a matter of 
fact, as explained above, after the birth of the Latin American modern nation-
states at the beginning of the twentieth century, the reasoning was that the path 
to development was through developing internal economic capacity while 
continuing to export primary products. Consequently, when the ISI model was 
implemented, domestic or business groups (BGs) were encouraged to set up 
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new industries and expand old ones, and multinational corporations (MNCs) 
were invited in to set up plants to supply the domestic market (Vanden & 
Prevost op. cit., 161). Additionally, the most powerful unions were in key areas 
such as education, natural resource industries and health care (Bensusam 
2006, 348-349; Schneider 2009, 11). However, due to their weak regulatory-
market capacity, the military dictatorships that took over after the birth of the 
Latin American modern nation states manipulated those social groups through 
corporatist and clientelist practices which perpetuated or even increased the 
socio-economic inequality inherited from colonial rule (Teichman 2008, 448). 
The Washington-Consensus reforms of the 1980s aggravated these 
trends even more, bringing about a business-led development project in which 
social, economic and political relations between the different societal actors 
came to be commanded by those with more economic power (Schneider 2009, 
3-6). The MNCs taking control of high technology sectors, and the BGs of lower 
technology and the service sectors, became so powerful that they have 
influenced the adjustment of the labour norms and regulations to their benefit, 
bringing about high levels of labour informalization and economic insecurity. In 
addition, they pushed for the shrinking of workers’ organizations, which were 
the only force that could counterbalance them, in order to diminish their labour 
costs, bringing about less employment protection and fewer important benefits 
such as training or social security schemes. According to Schneider and 
Karcher, union density varied from 20-25%, in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, to 
10–15% in Peru, Colombia and Chile, which, joined to the new adjustment of 
the labour norms and regulations, has brought about income insecurity since 
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the median job tenure in the continent is three years, whereas in developed 
countries it ranges from 5 to 7.4 years (ibid., 7). 
1.6.2 The fiscal capacity of the state 
 
Weber’s disciple Joseph Schumpeter (1991) argued that the Weberian 
definition was accurate but incomplete. He claimed that Weber had focused on 
the state’s means or capacities for the fulfillment of its economic development 
functions, ignoring the rest of the functions of the state such as the equalization 
of socio-economic conditions. Accordingly, he noted that it was not only the 
bureaucracy and the rule of law which characterized and differentiated the 
modern state from its predecessors, but also the taxation or fiscal systems. 
Schumpeter argued that the pre-modern states in Europe faced two main 
problems which led them to sign the Treaties of Westphalia: 1. the financial 
difficulties of warfare, the expenses of which were normally met by the leader 
and not by state revenues, and 2. the lack of confidence of the people in the 
traditional or charismatic leader’s methods to raise and use funds (ibid., 107).  
These problems led European monarchs to increase direct taxation, 
bargaining with their societies’ elites, which prompted, on the one hand, the rise 
of parliaments and, on the other, the growth of the state’s taxation or fiscal 
systems, which penetrated the private economies, winning dominion over them. 
The relevance of the taxation system then is twofold: on the one hand, it is part 
of and complements the necessary institutional ensemble of any state, and on 
the other, it gives rise to an inclusive social contract between the citizens and 
the state by which the former agree to pay taxes so that the state can carry out 
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its functions, whereas the latter commits to using the revenues collected for the 
common purposes of the society that it represents.  
Following the line of thinking of Schumpeter (1991), Esping-Andersen 
analysed the institutional structure of the fiscal capacity and the political 
orientation of different European and developed states to understand not only 
what kind of social rights were granted to the citizens, but also how welfare 
systems worked. He argued that there are two kinds of welfare system used by 
states to accomplish their social objectives. On the one hand, there is the 
narrow and residual category, in which the pillars of social protection are seen 
as separate processes, whose aim is social and political stability mainly 
pursued through the implementation of compensatory policies for the poor 
against market failures. On the other hand, there is a holistic view, focused on 
the role of the state in providing economic security so that every individual is 
able to participate in the life of the society and fully develop her or his capacities 
(1990, 1).  
According to Esping-Andersen, there are three main principles that 
define the whats and hows of following any of these views: 1. the degree to 
which social rights decommodify citizens; that is, the degree to which 
individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independent of market participation; 2. the way in which state activities are 
interlocked with the roles of the market and the family in social provision; and 3. 
the system of stratification promoted by social policies which provide social 
rights (ibid., 21-37). Working with these three principles and reviewing the path-
dependence of the welfare systems of different states, he identified three 
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different regimes with similar patterns of resource mobilization, political 
ideologies and institutional structures.  
The liberal type presents normally low levels of decommodification and 
favours minimal state intervention and strong involvement of the private sector 
in welfare spending (ibid., 26-27). In this model, citizens are constituted as 
individual market actors and they must seek their welfare in the market. 
Accordingly, labour markets are deregulated since it is believed that in this way 
they reinforce employment growth, which normally brings about high levels of 
labour informalization and economic insecurity. Their security schemes are 
normally conditional on means-testing and market-based insurance. To different 
scopes and degrees, the conventional examples of this type are the United 
States, Canada and Australia.  
In the conservative type of state, the level of decommodification is 
modest, the intervention of the state is seen only when the family’s capacity to 
help its members is exhausted, and the intervention of the private sector is 
marginal although the involvement of civil society is strong in the bargaining of 
labour rights, which brings about a rigid labour market regulation. Their security 
schemes are normally income transfers to satisfy the basic needs of 
households. The archetypical examples of this type are Austria, France, 
Germany and Italy (ibid., 27).  
The third type is the social democrat type, in which the level of 
decommodification is very high. This state is the most successful model in 
terms of poverty reduction and equality of economic opportunities for human 
development (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009, 17; Haagh 2011a, 45). By making 
universalism its main principle for the distribution of public services and social 
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rights benefits, and by marginalizing the role of the private sector in welfare 
provision, this kind of state gives the citizenry access to the public policy-
making process and is focused on maximizing labour supply and promoting full 
employment (Huo et al. 2008, 1). Examples of this kind of state are the 
Scandinavian states, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.  
To make a whole review of the Scandinavian system is outside the scope 
of this thesis; however, their experiences give us five important lessons in 
regard to poverty alleviation. First, large-scale poverty reduction is not possible 
without an institutional framework that ensures a sufficiently high collection of 
revenue through a progressive and effective tax system so that the state can 
fulfil its functions, allocating resources where they are most needed. Second, 
there is income redistribution through income transfer systems composed of: 1. 
universalistic benefits related to work contingencies such as unemployment 
insurance financed from general tax revenue, 2. earnings-related benefits 
against contingencies such as maternity and old age financed by employer and 
employee contributions and 3. social assistance supplements for those in 
poverty such as the CCTs financed from tax revenue.23 Third, the mobilization 
of workers channeled through unions is a crucial determinant of the provision of 
social protection to the citizens since when workers are properly organized they 
can bargain for larger benefits. Fourth, high levels of fiscal decentralization, 
armoured with strong constitutional protections that ensure the political 
autonomy of local governments, are important to allow the effective delivery of 
public goods and resources to where and how they are most needed (Sellers & 
                                                          
23
 Aspalter highlighted the fact that in much of Latin America, the 1960s saw the creation of extensive 
welfare state systems as well along the continental European model, with social security and social 
assistance systems in addition to systems of social and health-care services (2008, 783).  
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Lindstrom 2007, 616-618). Fifth, their institutional framework equalizes 
individual opportunities in relation to the occupational realm because labour 
markets are regulated in terms of hiring and firing and wage setting. In addition, 
workers are given continuous access to social reproduction processes 
(education, health and training), enhancing their human development and 
ensuring their constant incorporation in the labour market. All these 
characteristics enable people to achieve economic security beyond what a 
basic income alone could achieve, which at the same time legitimates the 
distribution of resources for economic adversities even though some people 
have more resources than others (Haagh 2011a, 45).  
We have argued so far that in social democrat countries, the coordination 
and distribution of resources through the institutional and organizational 
framework of the fiscal system is the state capacity that allows them to 
maximize social welfare by equalizing the opportunities of the poor in relation to 
the occupational realm. They provide universal social protection (social 
insurance, direct assistance and so on) and the sources and services 
(education and training) to increase their capabilities, which increases the scope 
for poverty alleviation, legitimating the tenure of a high and progressive taxation 
system. So, if inclusive states are those whose policies are directed towards 
addressing the needs of all their citizens and creating equal opportunities for all, 
what are the factors that constrain the Latin American states, preventing them 
from becoming inclusive and from fulfilling their welfare functions? 
1.6.2.1 Fiscal capacity of the state in developing countries 
Wood and Gough have argued that in developing countries it is not only 
the relationship between the state, the market and the family that determines 
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the welfare outcomes of the population (poverty, inequality, unemployment). 
According to them, the informal institutional arrangements within developing 
countries, which are normally characterized by patron-client relationships and 
the influence of international actors (donors, institutions of development, 
transnational corporations, international NGOs, MNCs) that could be as strong 
as or stronger than the state, must be taken into account as well, since they can 
shape the formal institutional structure of the state and the political mobilization 
of the different actors in the social structure (2006, 1696-1697). Taking these 
aspects into consideration, they identified two kinds of welfare regime in the 
developing world: insecurity regimes and informal security regimes.  
The main difference between these two regimes is basically the extent to 
which the state intervenes in market regulation, which is determined by the 
strength of its institutional capacities. In the former, the feeble institutional 
framework of these states impedes them completely from harnessing the 
interests of the different actors of the social structure in pursuit of the general 
interest, which brings about conflict and political instability, which in turn 
generate gross economic insecurity – among other perverse effects – and block 
the emergence of stable informal mechanisms to mitigate the effects (ibid., 
1699). As a consequence, there is a great dependence on international aid to 
finance their welfare systems since they cannot create ties with the different 
actors of the social structure to extract resources from them. To different 
degrees and extents, most of the sub-Saharan African countries have 
developed insecurity regimes.  
Informal security regimes, on the other hand, refer to institutional 
arrangements by which people rely heavily upon social relationships to meet 
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their economic security needs, which normally results in the exclusion of those 
at the bottom of the social structure, and these can be divided into two types: 
those in which there is a strong presence of the state in the market, such as the 
East Asian states, and those in which there is a mild intervention of the state in 
the market, such as the Latin American states. As argued above, the strong 
institutional framework of the former allows them to harness the interest of the 
private sector in pursuit of the general interest. However, they have 
subordinated social policy to the maintenance of high economic growth rates as 
a developmental goal, concentrating social spending on health and education 
only, rather than on social protection (ibid., 1706). As a consequence, they have 
created neither formal nor informal ties with the civil society to allow them to 
shape policy and ensure the effective delivery of goods and services, leaving 
those at the bottom of the social structure vulnerable to the shocks of the 
economy.  
In Latin America, on the other hand, the notion of citizenship differs from 
that in developed countries because the first rights that were granted were 
social rights – to keep social groups under control – along with protective 
economic measures in the context of the ISI model, although more limited than 
in western countries, and then political and civil rights. In this context, a 
combined conservative-informal welfare state that relied on stratified social 
insurance and employment protection as the core of welfare production that 
applied only to the formal sector (from the industrial and public sectors), leaving 
the informal sector workers unprotected (Barrientos 2004, 167), was developed. 
In addition, there was an aspiration, although it was never achieved, to develop 
universal education and health services to improve the human capital of the 
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labour force. Under this model, urban employment grew by about 4% a year 
between the 1940s and the early 1970s, and by the late 1970s income 
inequality and poverty were clearly decreasing (Altimir 1998, 4-5).  
However, due to their low levels of tax collection, the oil crisis of the late 
1970s had a great impact on most of the Latin American countries, which could 
not continue to invest in social spending, the ISI system and paying their 
external loans. In this context, the IMF and the World Bank agreed to finance 
Latin American and some other developing countries on condition that they 
redefined their institutional and organizational framework. In the broadest terms, 
these international organizations argued that the Latin American debt crisis had 
been the result of the fact that the structure of the welfare states was too obese 
and that they could no longer deal with the issues projected on a global stage, 
such as the expansion of international trade and financial integration, for which 
the ISI system was to be replaced with export-growth oriented strategies and 
social spending cuts. Accordingly, the welfare state that has been developed 
has been classified as liberal-informal since compensatory policies are directed 
only at the poorest; “employment protection has withered in the face of labour 
market adjustment, social insurance was replaced by individual savings and 
market provision, and private financing and provision of health and education 
were encouraged” (Barrientos op. cit., 156).  
As a result, the private financing of basic services such as education, 
joined with the low levels of social spending (around 0.04% of GDP, compared 
with 0.23% to 0.52% in developed countries) brought about by the institutional 
weakness of the fiscal capacities of these states, has increased the gap of skills 
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between the rich and the poor. In addition, despite the fact that it is estimated 
that nowadays more than 50% of the population in Latin America is made up of 
self-employed workers, or workers in micro-enterprises with less than five 
workers (Schneider & Karcher op.cit., 9), with some exceptions such as Brazil, 
Latin American states spend very little on active labour market policies aimed at 
fostering the development of human capital, the creation of jobs or 
intermediation between the employers and employees (Bertranou & Maurizio 
2011, 17-23). On the other hand, passive labour market policies, such as 
unemployment insurance, have only been developed in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela, although in most of these coverage and 
benefits are very low (ibid.).  
1.7 Conclusions  
  
The analytical framework that we have presented in this chapter 
suggests that the capacity of states to fulfil their functions stems from the extent 
to which their institutional framework supports complex and specialized 
organizations through which the different groups in society can pursue their 
political and economic goals irrespective of the personal identity of the leaders. 
Accordingly, poverty alleviation is a function of the state because the state itself 
could create it or reproduce it through its institutional and organizational 
ensemble by limiting access to valuable resources and activities that allow the 
citizenry to obtain sustained income in the labour market. In this sense, it is 
essential to understand the extent to which the institutional framework of the 
Mexican state has led to failure in poverty alleviation preventing the 
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Oportunidades programme from enabling the recipients to obtain sustained 
income in the labour market. 
In the East Asian states, a strongly institutionalized bureaucratic 
apparatus has allowed them to intervene in the economy and harness the 
interests of the private sector into areas of public interest, bringing about, to 
some extent, poverty reduction. In the Scandinavian countries, on the other 
hand, their institutional framework has supported complex organizations that 
have been able to work with civil society and extract revenue from the elites and 
the rest of the society to protect the social rights of the citizens taking into 
account their interests. In contrast, in most of the Latin American countries, the 
institutional weaknesses of their regulatory-market and fiscal capacities have 
complemented and reinforced each other, thus impeding the alleviation of 
poverty. 
However, the developmental and Scandinavian experiences can only 
provide examples but not solutions, since the historical traditions and social 
configurations out of which they arose cannot be identically reproduced. As 
noted by North et al., Latin American cases represent an intermediate case of 
states in development because instead of granting impersonal and defined 
rights, since their creation they have been the adopting institutions of other 
societies. As a consequence, they have only mildly addressed issues such as 
poverty, violence and so on (2009, 257). Consequently, an individual review of 
the states of the region is necessary in order to uncover the extent to which 
their institutional framework impedes the alleviation of issues such as poverty. 
In the next chapter, we shall explore in more depth the effects that the 
structural reforms had on the institutional capacities of the Mexican state, the 
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way in which the Oportunidades programme works and the context that the ex-
recipients face when they try to obtain sustained income in the labour market in 
order to set up the scenario for our field work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES AND THE 
STATE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE 
 
Introduction 
 
As previously argued, the structural reforms implemented in the late 
1970s and early 1980s worsened even more the socio-economic inequalities of 
the Mexican and Latin American citizens, increasing the levels of poverty. In this 
sense, it could be said that socio-economic inequality is the main challenge for 
Latin America. In the last two decades Latin American countries have 
undertaken a path towards the equalization of the poor´s socio economic 
conditions with the implementation of the CCTs, which would allow them to 
have access to basic services such as health and education, acquiring 
capabilities that enable them to obtain sustained income in the labour market to 
move out of poverty by their own efforts.  
 In the first chapter, we discussed why state intervention in the labour 
market to alleviate poverty is important and, by drawing on the experiences of 
some developed and developing countries, we showed the extent to which the 
institutional capacities of the state can be a key factor in alleviating poverty. The 
aim of this chapter is to review in depth the effects that the structural reforms 
have had on the institutional capacities and the welfare model of the Mexican 
state, the way in which the CCT programmes work, examining the Mexican 
experience with the Oportunidades programme, and the context which the 
recipients face when they try to obtain sustained income in the labour market. 
All of this will allow us to set up the scenario for our field work.  
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The chapter is divided into five main sections. In the first, we review the 
environment that paved the way for the structural adjustment reforms that were 
implemented in the 1980s and its effect on the institutional capacities and the 
welfare model of the Mexican state. In the second section, we review the way in 
which the Oportunidades programme has evolved in the last three decades. In 
the third section, we review the outcomes of the Oportunidades programme in 
terms of the education levels of the recipients. In the fourth section we analyse 
the Mexican labour market. The fifth section concludes the chapter.  
2.1 The structural adjustment and its effects on the capacities of the state 
and the welfare system 
 
 In this section, we shall review the economic, political and social 
conditions of Mexico during the 1980s and their effects on the regulatory-market 
and fiscal capacities of the state in order to explain the way in which the welfare 
system in Mexico has evolved in the last three decades. The main argument is 
that due to the weakness of the fiscal and regulatory-market capacities of the 
state, the influence of local and international private actors has determined the 
path of the residual welfare model implemented in Mexico since the 1980s.  
In the post-war period (1940s-1970s), known as a period of ‘stabilizing 
development’, Mexico’s economic development strategy relied upon state 
intervention to encourage the industrialization of the country, mainly of urban 
areas, and protecting domestic manufacturers from international competition by 
means of ISI programmes. During this period, one of the main political actors 
was the PRI political party, which ruled Mexico from 1929 to 2000. In the course 
of the stabilizing development period, this political party built a corporatist and 
clientelist relationship with the private sector and different social actors, 
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directing social protection schemes only to those well-organized enough to 
demand them, such as state workers (the armed forces, the judiciary, and so 
on) and the formal workers of the private sector, excluding workers in the 
informal sector. In addition, since basic services such as education and health 
are considered as rights in the Mexican Constitution, the state complemented 
that model with the universal provision of those services and universal subsidies 
for rural and urban areas (Scott 2009, 11; Moreno-Brid et al. op. cit., 156).   
However, not only was the universal coverage of basic services never 
achieved, but also the quality of the services provided was low. 
Notwithstanding, the ISI programmes and the quasi-universal welfare system 
implemented from the 1940s to the 1970s were, to some extent, successful. 
Mexico’s annual labour productivity growth rate was around 2.1% and GDP per 
capita grew annually between 3.0% and 4.0% in real terms (Cárdenas op. cit., 
271), as a result of which it was known as the ‘Mexican miracle’. The social 
contract implemented was an inclusive one since the economic and social 
models were seen as complementary, “the poverty alleviation strategy and the 
wider development strategy were one and the same” (Székely & Fuentes op. 
cit., 125), and the informal and formal sectors were close to one another, in 
consequence integrating most of the actors of the social structure, and bringing 
about low rates of unemployment and poverty (Escobar & González 2008, 40-
41; Moreno-Brid et al. op. cit., 168). 
Nonetheless, the social rights provided were, on the one hand, just a way 
of keeping the different social groups under control to keep the ISI system 
working and on the other hand, the industrial policies could not find a sector that 
could compete strongly internationally (Moreno-Brid et al. op. cit., 157). 
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Moreover, although the country produced much of the merchandise that was 
traded, the technology with which the products were produced was imported. In 
the late 1970s, Mexico was attempting to replace the technology as well. 
However, the industrial programmes of the state tended to “operate in 
combination with regressive or only mildly progressive tax structures and low 
tax revenues” (Teichman 2008, 447), leaving the oil profits and international aid 
as the only sources of finance, bringing about procyclical social spending and 
economic volatility.  
Most of the Latin American countries have historically suffered from the 
resource curse. Mexico has been no exception; the decline of oil prices at the 
beginning of the 1980s joined with the globalization of the economy forced the 
political authorities to implement measures to control the macroeconomic 
stability of the countries. After the 1982 collapse of oil prices, tied to rising 
inflation and high interest rates on its external debt, Mexico confronted its most 
serious economic crisis since its birth as a nation-state in 1917, with poverty 
and socio-economic inequality as the most prevalent effects, which implanted 
the belief that the conservative-informal welfare model was exhausted. 
Consequently, President López Portillo (1976-1982) declared that it was not 
possible to continue paying Mexico’s external debt, which brought about a 
domino effect over the whole of Latin America, where most of the countries 
found themselves in a similar situation with unpayable external debts (Sánchez 
2006, 775).  
Due to the debt crisis, Latin American governments were no longer able 
to finance public spending through foreign borrowing because the region was 
shut off from international capital markets (ibid.). Thus, conditioned and 
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encouraged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Latin American countries 
initiated a process of state reform that would mark the end of the conservative-
informal state and begin the era of the ‘liberal-informal state’ (Barrientos op. cit., 
156). Seeking to reduce the huge fiscal deficit, lower inflation rates, address 
macroeconomic instability and adjust to the new global order, the Mexican 
government cut public spending, eliminating most of the state subsidies, 
reduced the size and scope of the state by dismantling or privatizing state-run 
companies, and opened up the economic and finance sectors.  
The problem was, as Fukuyama pointed out, that “in the process of 
reducing the scope of the state those reforms decreased its strength or 
generated demands for new types of state capabilities that were either weak or 
nonexistent” (2005, 20). During the industrializing period, the state’s revenue 
was mainly levied on industrial production, natural resources (mainly oil-related 
profits) and international trade with special schemes for workers in the primary 
sector and tax exemptions for corporations that invested in key industrial 
sectors and indirect taxation was based on a single turnover tax (Alvarez 2007, 
5). However, according to Haber et al., taxes came in the form of rents 
distributed to politicians, labour leaders, and the rank and file of labour unions. 
Consequently, so that private enterprises could generate sufficient profits to pay 
rents to political elites and remain in business, the state allowed them to write 
the regulations governing their own activities, by providing subsidized 
production inputs, by crafting regulatory barriers to market entry that helped 
maintain oligopolies and monopolies, and by protecting domestic producers 
from foreign imports via tariffs and import permits (2008, 39-41). 
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The fiscal system was part of the first generation reforms during the early 
1980s and it was reformed to enhance the openness of the economy and 
achieve macroeconomic stability and fairness in income distribution.24 The main 
reforms were the enacting of the Fiscal Coordination National System (FCNS) 
Law, with the purpose of avoiding double or triple taxation and improving the 
fiscal relationships among the three levels of government, the reform of Article 
15 of the constitution in 1983, which delegated to the municipalities the 
responsibilities for providing some public services, the recognition of inflation 
effects in the tax bases, the reduction of personal income tax in order to 
enhance the integration of corporations and individuals, the introduction of 
Value Added Tax (VAT) in order to raise indirect tax collection, and the 
introduction of a scheme of income tax levied in a global scheme for both 
individuals and corporations, which includes all kinds of realized income, among 
others.25 These reforms helped the state to achieve macroeconomic stability 
and lower inflation (Alvarez 2007, 7). However, the tax system is still far from 
providing the Mexican state with enough non-oil revenues to fulfil its functions, 
and in relation to the GDP it is around 4.5 points below the average of Latin 
America for both indirect and direct taxes and 25 points below OECD 
countries.26 
                                                          
24
 Burnell identified at least three generations of reform. First generation reforms included 
macroeconomic stabilization, tariff and budget cuts, privatization, and the like. The second generation 
reforms began in the late 1980s, introducing governance considerations such as the civil service, and the 
delivery of public services, of the institutions that create and maintain human capital (for example, 
schools and the health-care system), and of the environment in which private firms operate (more 
competition, better regulation, stronger property rights). In the late 1990s, a third generation added 
social policy concerns in the form of poverty reduction strategies within international development 
(2008, 296-297). 
25
 Some of the services that were delegated to the municipalities were: drinking water, public lighting, 
rubbish collection, public markets and public municipal safety. 
26
 See OECD tax database. http://www.oecd.org/tax. Accessed: November 2010. 
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The main reasons for this have been the following. First, the influence of 
the international and local private sector, which had greater participation in 
areas previously reserved for state-owned enterprises, to which the state 
“grants extensive tax preferential treatment, currently accounting for about half 
of tax revenue” (Alvarez 2009, 18). After the signing of NAFTA, there has been 
a focus on fostering the growth of the manufacturing sector as the main strategy 
for generating employment. Therefore, corporate income tax reductions and 
duty free VAT exemptions on imports of machinery, equipment, parts and 
material have been granted in order to “set a competitive level against trading 
partners: USA and Canada” and China (Alvarez 2007, 6-8).  
Second, under the FCNS arrangement, the federal government collects 
around 90% of the total government revenue, which leaves the state and 
municipal governments in uncertainty about the budget that they are going to 
receive the following year.27 Also, this highly centralized scheme has favoured 
the construction of an informal scheme of negotiation between the sub-national 
and federal authorities, where the political criteria affect the allocation of the 
resources (Cabrero & Zabaleta 2011, 372). Politicians under strong political 
competition direct more resources to those regions with high voter turnout, or 
leave segments of the population untaxed. Moreover, the federal government 
has focused on trying to decentralize the pull of federal revenue collection 
without helping or encouraging states and municipalities to improve their 
institutional capacities first. For instance, in 2004 state governments were 
empowered to tax individual income obtained from professional services, leases 
of fixed property, disposal of property, and business activity. Nevertheless, “by 
                                                          
27
 The main formula used to allocate these resources is mainly based on the effort that local government 
put into tax collection and the number of people living in a certain region. 
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2006 only three state governments – Chihuahua, Guanajuato, and Oaxaca – 
had already implemented some form of local cellular tax” (Alvarez 2007, 20).  
As a result, the Mexican state has been unable to mobilize enough 
resources towards social needs and the generation of employment despite the 
fact that public expenditure has increased in recent years. Therefore, the state 
has had to implement a residual welfare model directed only at the poorest, who 
have to be involved in participating in the solution to their own problems.28 
Moreover, due to its weakly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus, the state 
has been unable to find sectors in which it could have a competitive advantage 
and this has impeded employment generation.29  
The bureaucratic or civil service reform, on the other hand, was part of 
the second generation reforms, which included governance considerations 
mainly pushed by the World Bank (2002). This reform was considered to be one 
of the most important in the history of the country for scholars, researchers, 
politicians and society in general (Méndez 2004; Merino 2004) since it “aimed 
for the first time at introducing merit as the guiding principle for selecting 
personnel policies across the federal government agencies” (Dussauge 2011, 
53). The law sought to establish ‘‘a mechanism for guaranteeing equal 
opportunity of access to the public administration based on merit and with the 
goal of advancing the development of public administration for the benefit of 
                                                          
28
 According to Bayón, the quasi-universal social protection and redistributive policies (subsidies) were 
thought to be ineffective since the middle and upper classes were part of them. The competition that 
would come along with the privatization of services would improve their quality and would save money 
for the state, which needed to recover after the debt crisis (op. cit., 3).  
29
 On average, the Mexican state has invested less than 0.4% of GDP in Research and Development, 
whereas some other OECD countries such as Korea spend at least ten times more. See OECD 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-mexico_20752288-table-mex, 
accessed: 12/08/2011. 
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society’’ (Article 2, LSPC 2003, my translation). However, the patronage and 
clientelist legacies and issues with the design and implementation of the civil 
service have constrained the development of an effective bureaucratic 
apparatus.  
The key point that allowed the implementation of the civil service was the 
implementation of electoral democracy in the early 1990s (Panizza & Philip 
2005, 690). The public sector reforms in Mexico were always restricted to some 
degree by the PRI political party, whose officials used the resources of the state 
to reward party members and party activists for political support rather than to 
represent the interests of society. When Vicente Fox took over in 2000 
representing the right-wing political party PAN, reform of the civil service was 
made one of the main priorities of the government. The civil service reform was 
part of the 2000-2006 Presidential Agenda of Good Government, which aimed 
at building institutions for markets. However, reformers had to use “non ‘market-
reform’ arguments such as the consolidation of democracy and the 
reconstruction of state capabilities” (ibid., 691) in order to prevent people from 
associating the reform with the negative effects of the first generation reforms, 
finally enacting the Federal Public Service Career Law (LSPC – Ley del Servicio 
Profesional de Carrera en la Administración Pública Federal in Spanish) in 
2003. 
The new law only applied to around 40,000 workers at the federal level, 
leaving aside the unionized officials and those who work in offices where the 
state and the private sector share control. Therefore, it is a limited law if we take 
into account the fact that the number of civil employees of the whole Federal 
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Public Administration is more than 1,500,000, (Grindle op. cit., 15). Moreover, 
the traditional appointing methods are still used; the governmental officers have 
found gaps in the law to keep appointing positions. Dussauge found that many 
workers are appointed using Article 34 of the LSPC, which “was originally 
introduced to allow for non-competitive, temporary appointments, needed in 
case of emergencies and other exceptional circumstances” (op. cit., 62). In 
2007, Felipe Calderón (2006-21012) brought in changes with the aim of 
improving the effectiveness of the law. In particular, he “provided additional 
requirements for using Article 34 of the LSPC-2003, in order to limit the number 
of non-competitive appointments that were apparently being made for partisan 
reasons in most cases” (ibid., 67). However, he opened a window to patronage 
and clientelism by leaving every ministry in charge of the implementation of 
LSPC without clear rules of inspection, constraining the development of an 
effective bureaucratic apparatus.  
In the local governments the situation was even worse. For instance, in 
the case of the states by 2008, only eleven out of the 32 had introduced a 
LSPC.30 However, even in the states that have civil system laws, the same 
patron-client legacies that impede the development of an effective bureaucratic 
apparatus at the federal level do the same at the state level. Moreover, despite 
the fact that most of the public servants hold bachelor degrees and have some 
experience, their human resource systems lack the technical and organizational 
expertise to put it into operation (Martínez 2008, 213-214).   
The situation of the municipalities is the worst of the three levels of 
government. Cabrero and Zabaleta found that most of the municipalities in 
                                                          
30
 Aguascalientes, Baja California, Chiapas, Distrito Federal, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Quintana 
Roo, Veracruz, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas.  
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Mexico, even the urban and metropolitan ones, lack important basic rules and 
norms such as those that regulate basic aspects of the political structure or 
those of citizen participation in the activities of the municipalities. Moreover, 
most of the municipalities still lack civil service systems that provide corporate 
coherence and allow the public servants to gain experience as well. This, in 
consequence, brings about feeble intergovernmental relations between the 
different levels of government (op. cit., 378-391).  
By the early 2000s, the goals of the structural reforms had been 
accomplished, having been successful in lowering inflation, reducing fiscal 
deficits and to some extent income inequality as well. According to Handelman, 
in Mexico economic growth was also stimulated for the first time since the 
Mexican miracle (1997, 127). However, poverty rose inexorably during this 
period since the openness of the economy profoundly changed the governance 
of labour markets in middle-income countries where there was a relaxation of 
traditional employment protection, such as occupational welfare, job security 
and severance pay, bringing about a blurring of the division between the formal 
and informal sectors since employment shifts became more frequent and 
volatile (Haagh & Cook 2005, 171-172). This, along with the decline in the 
quality of public services such as education and health care due to the cuts in 
public spending, has seriously aggravated the situation of the middle and lower 
classes, especially the poor in urban areas, since the industrialization of the 
stabilizing period had transformed the country’s society from a rural to an urban 
context (around 75% of the whole population) (Moreno-Brid et al. op. cit., 157; 
Scott 2010, 6). 
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We shall now review the Mexican anti-poverty policy Oportunidades and 
its effects on the education of the recipients and also briefly the Brazilian 
experience with Bolsa Familia. Brazil is one of the countries that is leading the 
way towards social citizenship in Latin America. In this sense, the review of both 
programmes will give us important elements of analysis to make some 
comparisons about the way in which both have achieved their goals. 
 
2.1.1 The marketization of social policy and employment in Latin 
America: the Brazilian experience.  
 
The consequences of the structural reforms put pressure on Latin 
American leaders to find ways to tackle inequality and poverty. The introduction 
in the early 1990s of the CCTs was one of the main responses to these 
pressures, especially in Latin American countries, which have some of the 
highest levels of inequality in the world. In the last two decades, this programme 
has been used as one of the main poverty alleviation strategies all over the 
continent; Brazil has Bolsa Familia, there is Chile Solidario in Chile, Colombia 
has its Familias en Acción programme (FA), Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano, Honduras the Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF), Jamaica the 
Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH), and 
Nicaragua the Red de Protección Social (RPS).  
Bolsa Familia was the flagship of the Brazilian Workers’ Party and was 
created under the command of Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva (2003-2006). The 
main goal of the programme was to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty 
by helping the poor to acquire capabilities that would improve their chances of 
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obtaining a sustained income in the labour market.31 In Bolsa Familia, Da Silva 
centralized the programmes of direct assistance that already existed and 
expanded the coverage quite quickly; by 2006 it was already covering 11.2 
million families, becoming the biggest CCT programme in the world. 
In the educational component, the objectives of the programme are, as 
we shall see later, very similar to those in Oportunidades: to increase 
educational attainment to reduce poverty in the long run, to reduce poverty in 
the short term with a grant, to reduce child labour and to serve as a safety-net 
for poor families, preventing them from becoming vulnerable to sudden shocks 
in the economy. The programme has been successful in achieving most of its 
objectives; however, its success comes from the strong institutionalization of the 
labour market, which has been materialized in the reduction in the levels of 
labour informalization and economic insecurity. According to ECLAC, in Brazil 
since 2005, the annual employment rates have been higher than the 
unemployment rates, while in Mexico since 2001, the annual employment rates 
have been lower than the unemployment rates (2010, 122-123 and 234).  
Table 2.1 shows how, in Brazil, extreme poverty has been drastically 
decreased in the last decade, whereas in Mexico it has been reduced at a 
slower pace. Unlike the Mexican case, the central factor that shaped the 
Brazilian labour market response to the liberalization of the economy was the 
fact that the inception of a democratic regime started first and this was followed 
by the opening of the economy, which allowed the state to take advantage of its 
developmental tradition (corporatism) and the collective and social capacities of 
                                                          
31
 Bolsa Escola (Education), Bolsa Alimentacao (Nutrition), Cartao Alimentacao (Nutrition) and Auxílio 
Gas (Electric Energy) (Decree No. 5.209 of 17 September 2004). 
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its unions in order to adjust the institutional framework of the labour markets to 
the new conditions (Haagh & Cook op. cit., 179). According to de Andrade et 
al., the main changes introduced were: 1. the expansion and introduction of 
legal open-ended contracts (temporary work contracts, part-time contracts, and 
so on); 2. the increase in the state’s revenue collection to tackle the growing 
public debt; 3. the adjustment of institutions that allow a real enforcement of 
open-ended contracts and the bargaining of employment conditions; 4. the 
formalization of micro and small enterprises, allowing access to credit and tax 
incentive programmes, which has contributed to the formalization of employees 
contracted by small businesses; and 5. the increase in the minimum wage (op. 
cit., 8-31).32  
Table 2.1 Patterns of extreme poverty from 1980 to 2011 (%) 
        Year 
Country 
1981 1990 2000 2008 2011 
Mexico 13.48 18.32 15.20 11.20 …. 
Brazil 24.80 23.40 13.05 7.30 6.1 
Source: ECLAC 2004, 2010 and 2012. 
 
2.2 The introduction of CCTs in Mexico 
 
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) was the president who started 
the implementation of the pro-market structural reforms. Under de la Madrid’s 
command, the government cut public spending, eliminating most of the state 
subsidies, reduced the size and scope of the state by dismantling or privatizing 
                                                          
32
 According to ECLAC, in 2004 the minimum wage in Brazil was 69 dls and the urban poverty line was 53 
dls, while in Mexico, the minimum wage was 124 dls while the urban poverty line was 150 dls (54-57). 
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state-run companies, and opened up the economic and finance sector 
(Handelman op. cit., 127).33 Unexpectedly, from 1980-1988, GDP declined on 
average around 2.0% annually and income per capita in 1988 was 10.38% 
lower than in 1980 (Morley 1997, 158). 
The presidential election of 1988 demonstrated how severely the 
economic crisis had resulted in disaffection with the PRI political party, which 
had ruled Mexico without problem since 1929-1930. President Carlos Salinas 
(1988-1994) took office after a highly contested election deeply tainted by fraud. 
However, although the structural reforms were initiated by de la Madrid, it was 
Salinas who consolidated them. As a matter of fact, he proclaimed Mexico’s 
formal entry into the first world after its acceptance as a new member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Erfani 
1995, 16), his privatization programme, and the linkage of the Mexican 
economy to those of the United States and Canada with the signing of NAFTA 
(the North American Free Trade Agreement). 
In this context, seeking to revive the confidence of Mexico’s citizens, he 
launched Pronasol (National Solidarity Programme in English), a compensatory 
or means-tested programme whose main objective was to reduce poverty, 
creating social funds as targeted safety-nets for the poorest who did not have 
income-earning capacities (Székely & Fuentes op. cit., 131), along with 
measures that would encourage their participation as a condition for obtaining 
                                                          
33
 From the 1940s to the late 1970s social spending represented 9% of GDP; however, after the crisis of 
1982, total spending collapsed by 30% (Scott 2009, 16). In addition, between 1982 and 1992, the 
number of state enterprises was reduced from 1,155 to 280. Privatized firms included telephone 
companies, airlines, copper mines, sugar refineries, steel mills and food processing plants, as well as 
hundreds of smaller parastatals. Salinas also modified some articles of the Mexican Constitution in order 
to foster privatization of land tenure, university education and the pension system (Handelman op. cit., 
120-135). 
 86 
 
benefits (Piester 1997, 469). The programme included food support aid, credits 
to farmers, grants and scholarships for children, building and refurbishing public 
schools, communal electrification, street paving, drinking water, health care, 
nutrition, housing and other similar measures.  
Pronasol’s main accomplishments were twofold: 1. “to revive social 
spending for Mexico’s poor. From 1988 to 1991, expenditure on social 
development rose from 14.9 percent to 26.5 percent of the national budget” 
(Handelman op.cit., 109), and 2. the programme was centralized by the federal 
government, bypassing the state and municipal levels of government to channel 
resources to projects decided at the community level, recognizing the need to 
improve the state-society relationships to implement successful public policies. 
However, the programme was criticized as being corrupt and clientelist, and it 
was used more as a political tool for electoral purposes than as an effective 
poverty-reduction programme. Molinar and Weldon have argued that most of 
the funding was concentrated on states with impending elections, particularly on 
places that had strong sympathy for the opposition political parties (1994, 136).  
Under Salinas, GDP recovered, growing 2.0% annually; however, income 
inequality and urban poverty kept on growing. Moreover, socio-economic 
inequality was practically eliminated from the policy agenda (Camp 2002, 253). 
By the end of his period, not only had socio-economic inequality and corruption 
reached levels never seen in Mexico since colonial rule, but also the EZLN  
rebellion in Chiapas against NAFTA, the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, 
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and the collapse of the Mexican currency aggravated the situation even more.34 
Additionally, during this decade the worldwide wave of democratization hit the 
country and after the accusations of fraud in the presidential election of 1988, 
Salinas created the Federal Electoral Institute in 1990 as an autonomous 
organization in charge of organizing the federal elections.  
Ernesto Zedillo therefore inherited a serious political and monetary crisis. 
In this context, a new means-tested programme was launched with the intention 
of raising the human capital of the extreme poor through the provision of cash 
conditional upon a change in their behaviour as a way to alleviate poverty. In 
1997, Zedillo announced the start of Progresa (an Education, Health and 
Nutrition Programme) supplanting Pronasol, a programme with similar goals but 
more concerned with the causes rather than the consequences of poverty. The 
programme provided a cash transfer delivered every two months to extremely 
poor families conditional upon the school attendance of their children, who had 
to be enrolled between the third grade of primary school and the third grade of 
secondary school, and health checks for the whole family, especially pregnant 
and nursing women, on a regular basis. The general idea behind the 
programme was to provide a minimum income to the poorest so that they could 
invest it in the education and health of their children who, once educated and 
healthy, would acquire capabilities that would enable them to keep on obtaining 
an income in the labour market in the mid and long-term to move out of poverty 
by their own efforts (Levy 1991, 44-55).  
                                                          
34
 The EZLN was a social movement that rebelled against NAFTA and in general against economic 
globalization on the same day NAFTA was supposed to come into effect, arguing that the poor were 
going to be the most negatively affected by the integration with the United States. Luis Donaldo Colosio, 
on the other hand, was the candidate appointed by Salinas to take over the presidency of Mexico. 
However, some months before the election he was assassinated during his campaign, and Salinas chose 
Zedillo as his successor.     
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However, to achieve these aims, the architect of the Mexican CCT 
programmes Progresa-Oportunidades, Santiago Levy, believed that, in a 
middle-income country such as Mexico, state intervention to provide labour 
market policies that complement the CCTs to allow the poor to keep on 
obtaining an income to satisfy their needs in the mid and long-term was 
necessary for three main reasons. First, the huge socio-economic inequality 
between the rich and the poor in Mexico forces the state to provide the 
necessary infrastructure and/or basic services that otherwise the poor would not 
be able to reach and that affect their socio-economic conditions such as 
education or training, health centres and so on. Second, identifying the poor is 
difficult and costly, which could bring about a situation in which non-poor people 
were selected and this is the reason why focusing on creating the conditions so 
that the poor can obtain a sustained income in the labour market by their own 
efforts is a key issue. Third, it is important to avoid the creation of a class of 
'welfare dependents'; the incentive structure must be such that, at the margin, it 
always benefits the poor to work and earn additional income (1991, 51-53). 
Accordingly, Progresa was first directed at rural areas, where the 
incidence of poverty was higher at that time, and using a well-supported 
criterion to identify the right families and avoid clientelism the targeting 
methodology comprised three phases: 1. zones were selected according to the 
marginality index of the National Council of Population (CONAPO) and the 
availability of education and health centres was a prerequisite for the operation 
of the programme in order to encourage the state and municipalities to invest in 
social development; 2. households were assessed by a survey which, using 
statistical methods (discriminant analysis), would determine whether the 
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household was poor or not; and 3. the final list of families integrated into the 
programme was presented to representatives of the community for revision. 
The programme was also said to avoid welfare hazards since it had been 
mainly designed to change the behaviour of families. For instance, in order to 
empower women and change their role within society, the cash transfer was 
given to the mother of the household, and in order to encourage girls to stay in 
school, after elementary school the amount of the cash transfer was higher for 
them than for boys. Finally, it was also expected that the recipients would take 
advantage of the employment opportunities and labour market policies that the 
new economic model would provide for the citizenry.  
When Progresa was launched in 1997, it covered around 300,000 
families in rural areas of twelve states. By the end of Zedillo’s term of office, it 
covered almost 2,500,000 families living in marginal rural areas all over the 
country. The early evaluations of Progresa demonstrated significant impacts on 
the well-being of the recipients, such as increasing school attendance and 
improving health outcomes (Adato 2000; Behrman & Hoddinott 2000; Parker & 
Skoufias 2000). Due to the good initial results of the programme, Vicente Fox 
(2000-2006) not only maintained the programme but also expanded it. 
Nowadays, the programme, re-named Oportunidades in 2002, covers more 
than 6,000,000 families, in both rural and urban areas.  
Fox took over in 2000 representing the right political wing PAN, after 70 
years of the hegemony of the PRI, in a stable political, economic and social 
context. This takeover by the right-wing party, however, is far from being the 
consolidation of democracy in Mexico. On the contrary, it seemed to be more a 
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logical step after the arrival of neo-liberalism (Otero 2004, 10). According to 
Bayón, the course of action of the National Action Party is in line with the 
Washington Consensus (op. cit., 2). As a matter of fact, when Fox took over, 
not only did social and economic policies remain the same but so did most of 
the members of his cabinet as well. The main changes that the programme 
incorporated were the coverage of urban areas, grants to students in high 
school, a pension for elderly people and an official definition of poverty. 
Following Amartya Sen´s distinction between absolute and relative poverty 
(Anand & Sen op. cit., 4), it was argued that the former is the deprivation of 
basic capabilities to subsist (nourishment and health) and the latter is the lack of 
adequate means in a specific society to achieve those capabilities (Sedesol 
2002, 19).   
Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2010), also from the right-wing political 
party, took over in a highly contested election against Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador, who represented the left-wing Political Party PRD (the Democratic 
Revolution Party). Calderón did not inherit any kind of crisis. However, when he 
faced the food crisis in 2007-2008 and the financial crisis in 2008-2009, he not 
only continued spending on social programmes and maintained Oportunidades, 
but also expanded the programme making three main additions that were part 
of a strategy which he labelled: Vivir Mejor (‘To Live Better’): 1. children from 
birth to nine years old were included in the programme; 2. the creation of the 
Living Better Fairs (Ferias Vivir Mejor in Spanish) with the purpose of letting the 
ex-recipients know about the options for study that exist so that they keep 
studying when they have finished high school and; 3. the creation of the website 
Vas con Oportunidades (‘Go ahead with Oportunidades’, in English) with the 
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purpose of giving information to the ex-recipients about ways to finance further 
study, such as scholarships or grants or information about the labour market 
policies offered by the federal government to society in general. Additionally, he 
made it an official requirement that in order to be able to apply for a grant from 
FONAES, a fund that provides subsidies so that the poor can start up a 
business, applicants have to prove that they belong to a social development 
programme. 
As we have seen, the programme has kept growing; however, it is still 
financed from the oil profits and loans from international institutions of 
development due to the weakness of the fiscal institutions. In 2008, for 
example, the Inter-American Development Bank approved a loan of $2 billion to 
expand the programme and in 2013 approved another loan of $600,000,000.35 
Moreover, as shown in Table 2.2, the recipients have many responsibilities to 
fulfil in order to receive the benefits; however, even though the recipients fulfil 
their responsibilities they do not have access to employment, which is the main 
goal of the programme. We shall expand on the latter point in the following 
chapters. For now, it is relevant to review whether it is actually helping people to 
acquire capabilities that could allow them to obtain sustained income in the 
labour market.  
 
                                                          
35
 See http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2008/12/17/335694/bid-concede-credito-
de-us-2-mil-millones-a-mexico-para-lucha-antipobreza.html accessed: January 2011 and 
http://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com/noticias/presta-bid-m%C3%A9xico-600-mdd-programa-
oportunidades-165827321--finance.html accessed september 2013. See also 
http://www.iadb.org/es/noticias/comunicados-de-prensa/2004-03-26/mexico-y-bid-firman-
convenio-de-25-millones-de-dolares-para-programa-de-incentivos-para-atraer-empresas-al-
sector-formal,1542.html accessed: November 2010.  
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Table 2.2 Oportunidades main rights and duties 
Education 
Benefits Co-responsibilities 
Cash Transfers are delivered to the mother 
every two months until secondary school and 
to the student in high school. There are school 
grants from third grade in elementary school 
to twelfth grade in secondary school and/or 
high school. In elementary school grants are 
the same for girls and boys and vary from 
MXP $145 (around 7 pounds) to MXP $290 
(around 15 pounds) with an extra grant of 
MXP $195 (around 10 pounds) to buy 
materials twice a year. In secondary and high 
school the grants are higher for girls than for 
boys and vary from MXP $425 (around 20 
pounds) to MXP $810 (around 40 pounds) for 
boys and from MXP $450 (around 22 pounds) 
to MXP $925 (around 45 pounds) for girls, 
depending on the school grade in which they 
are enrolled, and an extra grant to buy 
materials once a year of MXP $365 (around 
18 pounds).   
There is an extra grant for young people who 
finish high school before the age of 22 of MXP 
$4 044.77(around 202 pounds). 
Regular attendance at school. If a child has 
more than four non-justified absences in a 
month, then the scholarship for that month is 
suspended. If a child has more than twelve 
non-justified absences in a three-month 
period, or three temporary suspensions, the 
scholarship will be suspended for the rest of 
the school year. 
For high school, it is mandatory to attend 
seven educational sessions and complete the 
requirements to be enrolled in the next grade.  
Health 
Benefits Co-responsibilities 
Provision of a set of basic health services. 
Encourages preventative health through 
educational sessions especially nutrition in 
pregnant women and babies with the delivery 
of nutritional supplements. 
Check-ups are required for the whole family, 
but children and pregnant women are the 
main target. 
An additional cash transfer for adults older 
than 70 is provided MXP $305 (around 15 
pounds). 
Registration with the local health units is 
mandatory. There are mandatory regular 
check-ups; the frequency depends on age and 
priority is given to small children and pregnant 
and nursing women. 
Monthly attendance by the members of the 
family at education sessions on health. 
Nutrition 
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Benefits Co-responsibilities 
 Nutrition cash grant per household of MXP 
$220 (around 11 pounds). 
A cash grant of MXP $120 for rising prices 
due to the food crisis in 2007-2008 (around 6 
pounds). 
A cash grant for energy expenses of MXP 
$120 (around 6 pounds).  
An additional cash grant of MXP $120 (around 
11 pounds) is given to families with children 
from 0 to 9 years old, due to the financial 
crisis. 
Attendance of the families at their health 
checkups. 
Presence of the mother at health sessions. 
Source: SEDESOL 2011 (the comparative currency is pounds sterling). 
2.3 Oportunidades and the Educational Component  
Education is the component of the Oportunidades programme on which 
most money is spent. Moreover, as far as social spending is concerned, 
education is the area on which the country spends the most, at around 6.6% of 
GDP. However, the low levels of taxation revenues have brought about an 
educational gap of nine years between the richest and the poorest (Scott 2010, 
1). This means that while members of the poorest population attend one or two 
years of elementary school, those of the richest population complete at least 
high school and most of them have access to university. This gap was brought 
about as well by inappropriate public spending since during the postwar period 
most of the poor were concentrated in rural areas, and public spending on 
education was directed towards universities, which were established in urban 
areas. It was not until the 1990s that social spending was directed towards 
basic education at the lower levels (Scott 2009, 18). 
Accordingly, the main achievements of the programme in this component 
have been the high enrolment and attendance of children (especially girls) in 
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primary and secondary schools (ibid., 19). However, although school 
attendance has increased in recent years (see Table 2.3), the gap between the 
poorest and the richest has widened, especially in high school and upper levels, 
which are the most important in terms of integration into the labour markets in 
an adverse context of slow growth-employment such as in Mexico (Moreno-Brid 
et al. op. cit., 155; Bayón op. cit., 309-310). A likely reason for this is the fact 
that most of the high schools and universities in the country are private schools 
(Brunner et al. 2008, 18), which puts the poor in a very weak position to 
compete against the general population for the few places in the public 
universities.   
Table 2.3 Scholarships 2000 to 2009 
     School level 
Year 
Primary school 
Secondary 
school 
High school Total 
2008-2009 2,496,012 1,751,866 782,363 5,030,241 
2007-2008 2,586,258 1,768,341 771,160 5,125,759 
2006-2007 2,728,676 1,757,110 739,530 5,225,316 
2005-2006 2,867,760 1,734,643 696,353 5,298,756 
2004-2005 2,854,886 1,629,449 616,044 5,100,379 
2003-2004 2,609,692 1,432,254 535,063 4,577,009 
2002-2003 2,588,587 1,330,589 436,751 4,355,927 
2001-2002 2,046,407 1,012,152 266,965 3,325,524 
2000-2001 1,677,138 808,185 -- 2,485,323 
Source: www.oportunidades.gob.mx, accessed May 2011. 
In this context and in view of the developmental and Scandinavian states’ 
experiences that we discussed in Chapter 1, it would be more important for 
poverty alleviation to have an employment generation strategy since access to 
the upper levels of education is not the only constraint. Despite the fact that the 
internationalization of education is an important strategy of the Mexican state, 
according to the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) of 
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2010, which evaluates how educational systems prepare students for life in a 
larger context, the average Mexican student is one of the worst performers in 
Latin America.36 Moreover, the levels of education in these families are very low 
(see Table 2.4) and according to Arias et al. the secondary level is the minimum 
level required so some enterprises decide to train their own workers (2005, 19) 
and in some cases high school is needed as the minimum level to work for 
some enterprises and even for the government. 
Table 2.4 Levels of education per age of the recipients of Oportunidades 
                        Years of school      
Age 
    00 1–5 6–8 9 10 or more Total 
16–24 10.3 4.3 8.6 6.4       4.0 33.7 
25–35 5.7 7.2 8.7 4.5 2.7 27.2 
36–45 5.0 7.5 4.8 1.7 0.5 19.6 
46–55 4.9 4.9 1.5 0.3 0.1 11.7 
56–65 4.4 2.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 7.6 
Total 30.3 26.6 24.0 12.9 7.3 100.0 
Source: Levy (2007, 17).  
Furthermore, the evaluations have also indicated that “high schools and 
universities in Mexico have, at best, very weak ties with the productive sector in 
general and with industry, in particular” (Brunner et al. op. cit., 50). In this 
context, Escobar and González (2002 and 2006) argued that in semi-urban and 
urban environments there are not enough opportunities for the populations to be 
involved in the labour market, which leads to the unsustainability of their 
households. According to Moreno-Brid et al., the answer depends not so much 
on “opportunities per se, but on whether the Mexican economy can grow rapidly 
and create enough jobs” (op. cit., 167).  
                                                          
36
 See http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisa2009keyfindings.htm. Accessed: November 
2011. 
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Sedesol concluded in 2006 that only 20,000 families, from more than 
5,000,000 that were receiving the cash grant, had graduated from 
Oportunidades, having an income high enough to satisfy their food, health and 
education needs.37 However, Levy (2007) reported that in 2005 there were 
more than twelve million economically active people who belonged to 
Oportunidades, around 25% of the total economically active population, and 
only 6% had access to social security (see Table 2.5), and in comparison with 
the active economic population, only 1.5% had access to social security (see 
Table 2.6). At this point, it is relevant to review the context that the recipients 
face when they finish high school and try to obtain sustained income in order to 
set the scene for our empirical research.  
Table 2.5 Workers who belonged to Oportunidades 
Sector Profession % Social security 
Without social 
security 
Total 
Formal 
Labourer/share-
cropper  
47.7 147,679 6,005, 621 6,153,300 
Mason/worker/e
mployee 
32.1 579,726 3,561,174 4,140,900 
 
 
Informal 
Employer 1.2 20,743 134,057 154,800 
Independent 8.7 39,281 1,083,019 1,122,300 
Housemaid 11.3 2,851 164,849 167,700 
Member of 
cooperative 
11.7 13,377 205,923 219, 300 
Assistant on 
Ranch  
22.2 7,946 275,854 283,800 
Owner of land 22.0 7,998 250,002 258,000 
Other 22.9 21,324 352,776 374,100 
  Total 1100 
840,925 
(6%) 
12,033,275 
(94%) 
12, 874,200 
(100%) 
Source: (Levy 2007, 17-18). 
 
 
                                                          
37
 See www.sedesol.gob.mx. Accessed: May 2010. 
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Table 2.6 Active economic population in 2005 
Concept PEA % 
Formal 17,158,987 39.1 
Salaried with IMSS
38
, 
ISSSTE or other social 
security service 
16,512,821 37.7 
Oportunidades with IMSS 646,166 1.5 
Informal 26,707,666 60.9 
Salaried (tax evasion) 3,258,908 7.4 
Nonsalaried 14,370,998 32.7 
Salaried with 
Oportunidades (tax 
evasion) 
4,440,824 10.1 
Nonsalaried with 
Oportunidades  
4,636,937 10.6 
Source: Levy (2007, 23). 
2.4 Mexican labour markets and their informal flexibility 
The main advantage of our perspective on the institutions and 
organizations of the state and their interaction with the welfare system is that it 
helps us to shed light in more detail on some of the specific causes of the 
disappointing adjustment of the labour markets to the openness of the economy 
during the 1980s than previous explanations (see Schneider & Karcher op. cit.). 
As for the role of the Mexican state in that regard, we argue that the main issue 
is the weakness of its institutional capacities, which have brought about an 
increase in the levels of labour informalization and economic insecurity. More 
specifically, the weakness of the regulatory-market capacity of the state has 
brought about less employment protection, triggering short job tenure, which, 
joined with the weakness of the fiscal capacity of the state that constrains the 
effective provision of basic services such as education, impede the citizens from 
obtaining sustained income in the labour market, as we shall see next. 
 
                                                          
38
 IMSS: Mexican Institute of Social Insurance and ISSSTE: Institute of Security and Social Services of the 
State’s Workers. 
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2.4.1 Weak enforcement of the labour regulations  
 The Mexican labour market model of the post-war period was the result 
of the process of the integration of the different social groups to maintain social 
stability and at the same time to provide the labour institutional environment of a 
capitalist system. It was a top-down process that was materialized in Article 123 
of the Mexican Constitution and the Federal Law of Employment (LFT – Ley 
Federal del Trabajo, in Spanish). According to Bensusam, the enactment of the 
LTF in 1931 and the new law of 1970 were to counterbalance Article 123 of the 
constitution, which gave occupational rights to the people without taking into 
account the BGs and the MNCs, harming their interests. 
This, added to the 1929 crisis, forced the state to enact a law that 
protected the interests of the private sector, expanding the limits of the 
discretion of the state to intervene in the conflict between labour and capital 
both in times of growth and stability and in  times of economic crisis (2006, 
137). It was thought that with the LFT and a system of labour justice that 
worked under the executive branch without formal ties to judicial power, the 
control of the different actors of the social structure would bring about social 
stability, allowing economic growth to be achieved.39 The reality was that the 
state controlled the private sector and civil society through corporatist and 
clientelist relationships, channeling their demands into personal relationships, 
which limited the expansion of universal social rights.  
                                                          
39
 The organizations in charge of labour justice in the world of labour in Mexico are the local and 
national Conciliation and Arbitration Courts. We expand more on their performance in Chapter 4. 
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During the 1980s, the 1990s, and the first decade of the 2000s, the 
Mexican labour markets did not have any changes in their institutions despite 
the enormous transformation that the structural reforms brought about and 
electoral democracy (Bayón op. cit., 307). Nonetheless, after the openness of 
the economy, combined with the clientelist legacies of the Mexican state, the 
bargaining power of the private sector (national and international) grew so much 
that it escaped the control of the state, influencing the adjustment of the labour 
market institutions informally in their own interest without going through a formal 
process.40 These groups have influenced the disappearance of social 
protection, bringing about high levels of labour informalization and economic 
insecurity, where the poor are the most affected.41  
This is a paradox because the reach of Mexican labour legislation is quite 
wide since it includes every waged worker from both the formal and the informal 
sectors without the need for a formal contract (Bensusam 2006, 321). 
Moreover, Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Federal Labour Law establish that all 
labour relations, except for those covered by temporary contracts and contracts 
for a specified job, are indefinite and even despite the fact that there is no 
written contract, the workers should still receive the same rights because the 
responsibility for the lack of a formal contract lies with the employer and not the 
employee. However, due to the weak enforcement of the labour regulations, not 
                                                          
40
 Bensusam noted, for example, that considering the scope of legal protection and the cost of dismissal, 
Mexico has a more rigid labour market institutional framework in comparison with countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, or Chile. However, it is the country where labour conditions have stalled the most 
since it has the longest working hours, shortest holidays, shortest maternity leave and the smallest end 
of year bonus, and it is the least effective country in terms of law enforcement in the world of labour 
(2008, 36). 
41
 Fernández argued that the three main domestic groups that played an important role in the 1980s for 
the liberalization of the economy were the Carso group, whose president is Carlos Slim the richest man 
in the world, the Salinas group and the Zambrano group (2000, 97).  
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complying with labour regulations in Mexico implies a low cost, which has been 
utilized by the private sector not only to avoid investing in organizing labour but 
they have also pushed the shrinking of unions in order to have leeway to adjust 
the labour market to their benefit since unions are the only force that could 
counterbalance the power of the private sector in relation to the workers´ rights 
and working conditions.  
Labour inspection, for instance, is not properly coordinated between 
federal and state or local governments. The Federal Labour Inspectorate covers 
the whole monitoring of all labour regulations in the industrial branches 
indicated by Article 527 of the LFT and Article 123 of the Mexican 
Constitution.42 As for the health and safety conditions at work and training, the 
federal level is in charge of the inspections in these branches of all the 
companies that perform work in federal areas such as in territorial waters or 
those placed in the exclusive economic zone of the Nation, whereas the states 
are in charge of inspecting and monitoring all the companies that are only in 
their jurisdiction. However, according to Bensusam, in 2006 only twelve states 
had agreements with the federal government (2006, 347). Moreover, there is a 
very small number of inspections per year, 0.8 per 1000 workers (Ruiz op. cit., 
180) and there is no responsibility on the employers to enroll or register workers 
in IMSS; on the contrary, it is IMSS that is in charge of checking that employers 
                                                          
42
 Textile, electric, cinematographic, sugar, mining, rubber, metal and steel, hydrocarbons, 
petrochemicals, cement, lime; automotive including mechanical and electrical auto parts; chemistry, 
including pharmaceutical chemistry and medicine; cellulose and paper; vegetable oils and fats, 
production of packaged, canned or bottled food, production of bottled or canned beverages;  railroad; 
basic timber, glass, and tobacco, banking and credit services whatever their location (Mexican 
Constitution art. 123; LFT art 527). Matters related to conflicts involving two or more states, collective 
agreements that had been made mandatory in more than one federal entity and employer obligations in 
education will also be the exclusive competence of federal authorities,. 
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formalize social security for their employees if the labour inspectors let them 
know and the inspection excludes the self-employed (Bensusam 2006, 354).43  
2.4.2 Weak labour unions 
During the post-war period, the relationship between the government and 
the unions was always based on corporatist arrangements. In order to make 
sure that the state could control the formation and activities of the unions, it was 
established that unions needed authorization from the state to be established 
and that the employer could hire only those employees who belonged to the 
union that the company or firm chose to work with. Consequently, the most 
powerful unions were in key areas such as education, the oil industry and health 
care and their leaders frequently received benefits from their relationship with 
the government, such as seats in the government in exchange for electoral 
support. However, the unions had power to bargain with the firms and with the 
government since some of their members had access to high positions in the 
government and also because after 40 years of working with the government 
representing the interests of workers they had built collective capacities that 
allowed them to escape from the control of state officials.  
The structural reforms of the 1980s reversed and worsened that 
situation. In order to attract international capital, the government offered cheap 
and controlled labour (Hathaway 2000, 10), bringing about a considerable 
decrease in union membership; the percentage of the workforce which was 
unionized went from just over 30% in 1984 to under 20% in 2000, and to 10% in 
                                                          
43
 According to data obtained from the STyPS through IFAI requested between 2011 and 2012, there 
were only three advertisements of this kind in the whole country.  
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2009, and in the micro-enterprises it is practically non-existent (Ruiz op. cit., 
178), and the same corporatist practices of the past have been used to keep the 
few empowered unions left, such as the education union, under control. In 
consequence, the credibility of the government-allied unions has changed 
radically since unions are no longer capable of delivering customary benefits to 
their members, bringing about discrepancies between the main workers’ 
organizations (Bensusam & Middlebrook 2012, 74). In this context, the private 
sector normally prefers to break or distort the law to reduce its labour costs 
since there are no unions strong enough to bargain with about any issue related 
to the workers, such as social security, training or the conditions for hiring and 
firing, which has brought about an increase in the levels of labour 
informalization, short job tenure and the perpetuation of low skill levels.  
2.4.3 Short job tenure 
Due to the weakness of the unions and the failure of the state to enforce 
labour norms and regulations, labour mobility has relentlessly increased. Levy 
argued that in 2006 18.5 million economically active people remained in the 
same job for less than five years (2007, 7). Moreover, by June 2009 the number 
of formal full-time and temporary workers registered with the IMSS had declined 
by 596,200 compared with a year earlier (ILO 2010, 1). The ways in which the 
private sector takes advantage of the labour justice system in Mexico vary; 
enterprises such as Wal-Mart and Office Max, for instance, treat their 
employees as associates and not as employees in order to avoid paying taxes 
and contributions from which social security is normally financed (Ruiz 2009, 
175).   
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However, the main gap that they have found is perhaps outsourcing, 
which is used to reduce costs and eliminate job duties but mainly to avoid 
distributing the share of the profits that workers deserve, which is something 
that is not clearly regulated by Mexican labour norms. There are two kinds of 
outsourcing: 1) labour outsourcing, where a company or firm that needs to have 
some work done resorts to an intermediary to hire workers to have it done;44 
and 2) outsourcing of goods and services, where a company or firm entrusts to 
another the provision of goods and services and the latter undertakes to carry 
out the work at its own risk, with its own financial, material and human 
resources (Ermida & Orsatti 2009a, 20).45  
Mexican legislation ‘covers’ mild labour outsourcing but it does not cover 
goods and services outsourcing, which companies use to avoid distributing 
profit-sharing. The companies that outsource, normally big or medium sized 
companies, are forced to be fully responsible (Article 15 of the LSS) for the 
health and safety issues of the workers that the medium company utilizes, but 
all they do is to put a clause in the contract stating that the small company will 
register the personnel that the medium company uses to provide the service or 
good with IMSS (although this does not necessarily always happen), and with 
this formula they do not have any other duty to the employees of the medium or 
small company. Small companies, then, normally through an intermediary, 
outsource the personnel that they need to have the work done, hiring them on 
temporary contracts.  
                                                          
44
 By 2009, labour outsourcing amounted to around 60% of the whole labour of the private sector (De la 
Garza 2011, 50). 
45
 For instance, in 2004 Grupo Modelo, a beer firm, finished the collective contract of their workers of 
their factory in Zacatecas and opened a smaller company specifically to manufacture the bottles for the 
beer, signing a new agreement under which, instead of giving profit sharing, they were going to be 
giving bonuses and gratuities (Retama 2009, 115). 
 104 
 
In addition, according to Bayón, since the minimum wage is only an 
instrument against inflation, from 1980 to 2000 it lost 70% of its purchasing 
power. This has also forced people to migrate to the United States looking for 
jobs with higher salaries and better working conditions. She found that 9.6 
million Mexicans emigrated between 1990 and 2008; approximately 40,000 
leave the country every year (op. cit., 312). This context, on the one hand, 
disincentivizes workers from investing in acquiring specific skills since they are 
not certain whether they will keep their jobs in the long run. On the other hand, it 
also impedes them from organizing labour since workers stay in their posts for 
very short periods of time. 
2.4.4 Low skill levels 
We have already discussed in general the levels of education in Mexico 
and specifically the low level of education of the recipients under the 
Oportunidades programme, which is directly related to the weak fiscal capacity 
of the Mexican state. What we want to argue in this section is that since the late 
1990s, with the implementation of the CCTs and the signing of NAFTA, more 
than 50% of the employment in Mexico has been generated in the goods and 
service sector (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). According to Bayón, most of the 
employment growth has been in micro-enterprises, self-employment and 
domestic employment in urban areas (op. cit., 310), where one of the main 
issues is not only the lack of social protection, but also the low wages. 
Moreover, not only does this sector have a significant level of informality as 
argued above, but also the informality is reinforced since due to their low skills 
workers are easily replaceable, discouraging both employers and employees 
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from investing in organizing unions and/or upgrading their skills levels. 
Furthermore, the rigid structure of the Mexican labour market creates even 
more difficulties in climbing the social strata ladder, especially to the highest 
stratum constituted by professionals (Escobar & González 2008, 43), since 
informality is promoted legally.  
Table 2.7 Employment per sector in Mexico 
Year 
Total 
employment 
Agriculture 
% 
Industry 
% 
 
Services 
% 
 
1988 28 128.0 23.5 26.5 49.0 
1990 23 403.4 22.6 27.8 46.1 
1991 30 534.1 26.8 23.1 49.5 
1993 32 832.7 26.9 22.0 50.4 
1995 32 652.2 23.8 21.5 54.2 
1996 33 968.6 22.2 22.5 54.8 
1997 35 924.8 23.7 22.3 53.6 
1998 36 871.7 19.6 24.7 55.3 
1999 37 279.9 20.5 25.4 53.6 
2000 38 044.5 17.6 26.9 55.1 
2001 38 065.8 17.6 26.0 56.1 
2002 38 939.7 17.5 24.9 57.3 
2003 39 221.5 16.3 25.0 58.4 
2004 40 561.0 15.9 24.8 58.9 
2005 40 791.8 14.9 25.7 58.9 
2006 42 197.8 14.3 25.8 59.2 
2007 42 906.7 13.5 25.9 59.9 
2008 43 866.7 13.1 25.7 60.4 
2009 43 678.1 13.3 23.9 62.1 
Source: INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx. Accessed: January 2011. 
2.4.5 Informal sector  
According to Maloney, the informal sector in Latin America is the 
analogue of the entrepreneurial small firm sector found in developed countries 
(2004, 1165). As a matter of fact, Canales and Nanda noted that SMEs 
represent more than 99% of all Mexican firms. They have accounted for more 
than 70% of all employment since 1993, and they generate more than 50% of 
GDP (op. cit., 63).The difference is that in Latin America workers are forced to 
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work informally, relying on family networks to cover their social protection 
(Temkin op. cit., 50), due to the circumstances that we reviewed in the previous 
sections.  
Ruiz has pointed out that in recent years there has been an increase in 
public employment services, training, employment incentives, direct job 
creation, micro enterprises and so on; however, the spending in this area 
represents barely 0.03% of GDP, and almost half of the spending is directed 
towards information for people to find jobs rather than emphasizing training to 
acquire new skills in order to be incorporated into the labour market (op. cit., 
183). There are programmes such as the First-Job programme,46 whose main 
goal is to create permanent and well-paid jobs, working alongside small and 
medium-sized enterprises and freeing them from the obligatory payments that 
they have to make when registering workers with IMSS. However, the main 
issue that these programmes present is that they are directed towards lowering 
unemployment rather than to formalizing employment, so they affect only a very 
small proportion of the active economic population (ibid., 189). Moreover, due to 
the lack of contract enforcement, banks are reluctant to offer credit for firms and 
households, or loans on residential property (Haber et al. op. cit., 120). 
 
 
                       
                                                          
46
 See http://boletin-infomail.typepad.com/DocumentosVarios/ISR-PrimerEmpleo-2.pdf for a detailed 
description of the programme. Accessed July 2011.  
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Table 2.8 Informal employment in Mexico per decade 
Year Total Employment Informal employment 
1981 22,349,735 13,237,522 
1990 30,138,290 16,443,604 
2000 38,044,501 26,250,670 
2010 44, 651, 852 26, 291, 302 
Source: INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx. Accessed: September 2010. 
 In this context, Levy claimed that direct assistance programmes such as 
Oportunidades could act as an incentive to work informally since, trying to 
maximize their gains, people would prefer to stay in the informal sector, where 
they are independent and have help from the government, which limits 
economic growth (2007, 30). However, we agree with Escobar and González, 
who argued that this view could be mistaken because the cost of informal social 
protection could be higher and because relatives are not always in a position to 
help their family. They found that those workers who leave the formal sector in 
order to set up a business in the informal sector to achieve independence or for 
financial reasons even keep paying a fee to the IMSS or ISSSTE in order to 
guarantee their access to a pension (2008, 39). Moreover, if we were to say that 
direct assistance hampers productivity, then any kind of assistance from the 
government would be harmful too, and the lesson that we have learned 
reviewing the Latin American case is that the lack of direct assistance has been 
more harmful, especially for the poor.  
The point on which both Levy (2007) and Escobar and González (2008) 
agree is that if productivity and employment are not raised, perverse incentives 
might be created, impeding economic growth. Cárdenas claimed that what 
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informal firms lack is help to upgrade their production (op. cit., 278), which also 
decreases tax collection and with this the assistance that can be provided to the 
poor. Furthermore, Moreno-Brid et al. argued that Mexico’s growth strategy “has 
failed to create the number of jobs required by the labour force estimated at 
between 800,000 and one million per year” (op. cit., 155) and according to 
Peralta, the average annual generation of necessary jobs for 2008-2030 is 
641,500 per year, and even if GDP grows at 7%, it will not be possible to 
abolish unemployment until 2030 (2004, 1460).  
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Table 2.9 Employment in Mexico 2011 
Total Population Economically active population Employed Informal Unemployed 
113 211 011 47 911 345 45 430 178 29 228 572 2 481 167 
URBAN AREAS 
Economically Active population Employment per sector    Informal  Unemployed 
Employed   Workers Employers Self-employed Agriculture Industry Service Sector 
12 121 538 1 491 367 
  23 140 927 17 101 871 1 070 923 4 221 508 156 265 5 593 883 17 186 980 
SEMI-URBAN 
Economically Active population Employment per sector 
 
 
Informal Unemployed 
Employed   Workers Employers Self-employed Agriculture Industry Service Sector 
9 230 382 655 211 
   13 091 168   8 500 045 670 786 3 036 502 1 559 554 3 424 349 8 064 911 
RURAL                                                               
Economically Active population Employment per sector Informal Unemployed 
Employed   Workers Employers Self-employed Agriculture Industry Service Sector 
7 876 652 334 540 
9 198 083 4 668 973 307 812 3 066 736 4 301 462 1 865 674 3 005 312 
Source: INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx. Accessed February 2011. Note: INEGI understands informal workers as those that lack access to social security services such 
as health insurance and pensions.   
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2.5 Conclusions 
We have seen that the modern Mexican state was born in 1917 with the 
intention of providing extensive social rights as a result of the complementation 
of economic and social strategies. However, the military dictatorships 
manipulated the social groups through corporatist and clientelist arrengements 
that perpetuated the socio-economic inequality inherited from colonial rule, 
bringing about weak institutional capacities of the state, which hampered the 
fulfillment of its functions. The crisis of the 1980s implanted the belief that what 
was needed to solve the institutional problems of the state was to reduce its 
size and implement a market-led development.  
In this context, the Mexican state prioritized macroeconomic stability and 
the control of inflation, embarking on an export-growth strategy, and making 
deep cuts in public spending following the minimalistic view of a welfare system 
that serves only as a safety net where the market fails, bringing about the 
exacerbation of socio-economic inequalities and poverty. In recent years, social 
spending has been increased in order to alleviate these negative 
consequences. Paradoxically, however, the still weak institutional capacities of 
the Mexican state have not only brought about less employment protection but 
also they have impeded employment generation, in this way, constraining the 
alleviation of poverty.  
CCTs are designed to enable poor children to attend schools and health 
centres, allowing them to increase their human capital so that they can obtain 
sustained income in the labour market in the mid and long-term. Research has 
confirmed that the programmes have had positive effects in different areas of 
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the well-being of the recipients. We have reviewed here some of these positive 
achievements in the educational component. However, as we have seen, most 
of the jobs offered in the Mexican labour market are not only low-qualified with 
poor salaries, but also have high levels of informality since they do not have 
access to union representation, stable contracts or training schemes and social 
protection is almost non-existent.    
Consequently, with the conceptual framework that we presented in the 
first chapter and the analysis of the Oportunidades programme and the Mexican 
labour market in this chapter, we shall proceed now to outline the strategies that 
we shall use in order to uncover the extent to which the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the Mexican state impedes the alleviation of poverty in 
Mexico. At the time of the writing of this thesis, the Progresa-Oportunidades 
programme has been in operation for fourteen years. Consequently, we shall be 
able to observe clearly the impact that the programme has had on the recipients 
beyond the first evaluations, which focused on the impact of the programme on 
the well-being of the recipients (school attendance, nutritional improvements 
and so on). The main question that we shall try to answer in the analytical 
chapters of the thesis and that will guide the design of the empirical methods of 
research in our field work is: To what extent does the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the Mexican state impede the Oportunidades 
programme from enabling the ex-recipients to obtain sustained income in the 
labour market that allows them to move out of poverty?  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction  
The main objective of this thesis is to assess the role of the state in 
alleviating poverty, in a middle income country with high levels of socio-
economic inequality, by expanding the capabilities of the poor so that they can 
obtain sustained income in the labour market that allows them to leave poverty, 
and the extent to which the weakness of its institutional capacities impedes it 
from fulfilling that role. In order to do that, we needed first to design a 
methodology that would allow us to get close to and examine our social 
phenomena, especially because at the time that we were carrying out our 
research, 2010-2012, there were few data sets that contained information about 
the linkages between the capabilities of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades 
programme, the labour market and the institutional capacities of the state in 
Mexico. In this chapter, we shall explain the combination of research methods 
that we used in order to shed light on the extent to which the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the Mexican state might be preventing the 
Oportunidades programme from enabling the ex-recipients to obtain sustained 
income in the labour market. The chapter is divided into four main sections. In 
the first section, we present the central research questions of our thesis. The 
second section presents our ontological and epistemological positions. In the 
third section, we introduce the research methods that we used. In the final 
section we present some final remarks.  
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3.1 Central research questions 
 
The central question that we intend to answer in this research is: What is 
the role of the Mexican state in alleviating poverty and to what extent does the 
weakness of its institutional capacities impede it from fulfilling it? This question 
is composed of two interrelated parts. First, what is the role of the Mexican state 
in alleviating poverty under the logic of the Oportunidades programme? and 
second, to what extent does the weakness of the institutional capacities of the 
Mexican state impede the Oportunidades programme from enabling the ex-
recipients to obtain sustained income in the labour market that allows them to 
move out of poverty? 
So far, based on the theoretical and introductory chapters, we have 
answered the first part of our main question. In the empirical chapters we aim to 
answer the second part. As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, the institutional 
capacities that we examine are: 1. the regulatory-market capacity of the state, 
where we explore the capacity of the state to make the private sector comply 
with the law to protect workers’ rights while fostering employment generation; 
and 2. the fiscal capacity of the state, where we explore the capacity of the state 
to use expenditure as a tool to equalize the socio-economic conditions of the 
citizenry and in this way justify greater tax collection. In this chapter, we present 
the methodology constructed to obtain the data that helped us to fully answer 
our main question. 
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3.2 Ontological and epistemological positions 
 
According to Furlong and Marsh, social researchers’ ontological and 
epistemological positions shape the approach to theory and methods which the 
social scientist uses and this is the reason why it is important to recognize them 
(2010, 184). The ontological position, on the one hand, reflects the researcher’s 
view about the nature of the world, and whether or not there exists a real world 
independent of our knowledge of it (ibid., 185), in other words, the way we 
understand how the social world fits together and how we make sense of it 
(Della Porta & Keating, 2008, 21). Epistemological positions, on the other hand, 
reflect the researcher’s view about what we can know about the world (Furlong 
& Marsh, op. cit., 185), the sources to know it and the reasons for it fitting 
together as it does (Della Porta & Keating op. cit., 22). 
We recognize that our ontological position is foundationalist since we 
believe that there is a world which exists independent of our knowledge 
(Furlong & Marsh, op. cit., 190). That is, the relationship of social phenomena 
such as poverty and unemployment exists independent of our knowledge of 
them and by observing them causal associations can be made. Within the 
context of our research, we believe that the relationship between poverty, the 
labour market and the weakness of the institutional framework of the Mexican 
state exists independent of our knowledge of them and that causal statements 
can be obtained by observing them.  
Our epistemological position, on the other hand, is post-posivist or realist 
since we seek to establish a causal relationship between social phenomena. 
However, unlike positivists, we believe that not all the social phenomena, and 
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the relationships between them, are directly observable, and what is observed 
may offer a false picture of the relationship of the social phenomena. 
Nonetheless, although we cannot observe the entire range of relationships 
between the social phenomena, if we posit their existence we approach the best 
possible explanation (ibid, 204).  
In this sense, and in line with the realists or post-positivists, we believe 
that theory and experiment are not entirely separable and that our chosen 
theory will affect the facts that we focus on and how we interpret such facts 
(ibid, 205). Accordingly, we shall put emphasis on the particular and the local, 
and on the way in which factors may combine in different circumstances (Della 
Porta & Keating op. cit., 24) to approach the best possible explanation. 
Additionally, we understand that those contextual effects can be partly 
explained through variation in institutional structures (ibid, 30), which is 
especially important for us since we are going to assess the relationship 
between the institutional capacities of the state, the labour market and poverty 
alleviation. 
In brief, influenced by our foundationalist and realist positions, we have 
designed a methodology using a mix of quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods, putting emphasis on the particular and the local in order to 
approach the best possible explanation of our studied phenomena. Moreover, 
the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods allowed us not only to 
triangulate the results but also the qualitative methods helped us to develop our 
quantitative method. We shall now explain in more detail the research methods 
used in this thesis.  
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3.3 Research methods 
3.3.1 Case study 
It has been argued that once the research questions or hypotheses have 
been established, there follows one of the most important steps in any research, 
namely, how to build these alternative views on the question into an empirical 
study (Hancké 2010, 237-238). According to Yin, the method or strategy to 
follow depends in large part on the type of research question posed. He 
suggested that the more the questions seek to explain some present 
circumstance (for example, ‘how’ or ‘why’ some social phenomenon works), in 
which the researcher does not require or does not have control of behavioural 
events, the more the case study method will be relevant to the research (2009, 
4).  
A case study is therefore normally used to explain a contemporary 
phenomenon (a student, a delinquent clique, a family group, a class, a school, a 
community, an event, or even an entire culture) in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the 
context are not clearly evident (ibid., 18). Bennett argued that there are three 
methods of within-case analysis: 1. process tracing, which focuses on whether 
the intervening variables between a hypothesized cause and observed effect 
move as predicted by the theories under investigation; 2. congruence testing, in 
which the researcher tests whether the predicted value of the dependent 
variable, in view of the values of the case’s independent variables, is congruent 
with the actual outcome in the case; and 3. counterfactual analysis, in which we 
empirically try to test assertions such as whether ‘x’ in a specified case was 
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necessary for ‘y’ or if ‘not-x’ had occurred in the case, then ‘not-y’ would have 
occurred (2004, 30-33).  
As argued above, our main interest is to assess empirically the extent to 
which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state is a key 
cause that has impeded the Oportunidades programme from enabling ex-
recipients to obtain sustained income to move out of poverty. A congruence 
testing analysis would require us to have control of behavioural events and a 
process tracing or historical analysis normally does not focus on contemporary 
events. Therefore, the counterfactual case study method seemed to be the right 
path to follow. Consequently, we had to carefully choose the community and 
data collection techniques that would allow us to assess empirically the extent 
to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state is a 
key factor that can impede the alleviation of poverty.  
3.3.1.1 Defining the community for our fieldwork 
 
As argued above, urban regions were going to work better to achieve our 
goals because due to the high levels of labour informality that exist in Mexico, 
the main concern of state policy regarding employment is that poor people have 
sustained income generation, which is the reason why the relationship with the 
capacities of the state regarding their opportunities in the labour market is more 
direct. Mexico is a Federal Republic, comprised of 31 states and a Federal 
District. In order to develop our fieldwork, we chose a state in the centre of 
Mexico called the State of Mexico (Estado de México in Spanish). Although 
Oportunidades is a Federal programme and the contribution of the state is 
minimal, it was very important to choose a state that allowed us to analyse a 
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context in which the levels of manufacturing and service sector employment 
were high, allowing the ex-recipients to have options regarding urban labour 
markets, to test both the programme´s main goal and the capacities of the 
state.47  
Accordingly, as we shall see next, the State of Mexico not only has these 
relevant characteristics, but also there is a high level of ex-recipients who had 
finished high school level, which allowed us to present a good example of the 
extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the state impedes 
the alleviation of poverty in urban zones. We decided to interview only those ex-
recipients who had completed high school while they were members of the 
programme and who were between eighteen and twenty three years old for six 
main reasons. First, during our fieldwork we were able to verify that high school 
is the minimum school level that can make the difference between obtaining a 
job with high or low levels of security in Mexico. Second, people normally finish 
high school when they are eighteen years old, which is also the minimum age 
required by employers to formalize employment. Third, since the Oportunidades 
programme covers only until high school level, interviewing only those ex-
recipients who had finished high school gave us the opportunity to portray the 
best possible case linkage between the ex-recipients’ capabilities, the labour 
market and the institutional capacities of the state. Fourth, according to the 
people of the local office of Oportunidades, the ex-recipients who had finished 
high school were more likely to be located and interviewed since those who 
drop out of school at lower levels of study normally emigrate either to another 
                                                          
47
 The states only help the federal government to organize the Vivir Mejor fairs, which, as explained 
above, are fairs organized to let the ex-recipients know about the education opportunities that they 
have once they finish the high school level to encourage them to keep studying.  
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state or to the United States to look for better employment opportunities. Fifth, 
Oportunidades started to cover the high school level in urban zones in 2001, 
which would mean that the first cohort of recipients that attended high school 
from the first till the last semester graduated in 2004 - since in Mexico high 
school lasts three years - when most of them were around eighteen years old. 
In this sense, by the time we started our fieldwork in 2011, the first cohort of 
recipients that finished high school must have been around twenty-three years 
old. Sixth, it was important to have a short age range of our population in order 
to have a homogeneous one from which we could make generalizations from 
our findings about the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme of our 
selected region on safe methodological grounds. 
  Likewise, we also decided in our interviews to take into account those 
ex-recipients who were not working or unemployed but who were BA students 
for two main reasons. First, as explained above, since the Oportunidades 
programme started to cover the high school level in urban areas in 2001, by the 
time that we undertook our fieldwork it was going to be difficult to find a 
significant number of ex-recipients who had finished a BA to interview about 
their experiences in the labour market. However, the fact that they were 
students did not mean that they did not have working experience since they 
could have worked before or could be studying and working at the same time. 
Second, most importantly, as previously explained, in recent decades the 
difference in the levels of education between the rich and the poor has been 
widened because the provision of basic education – primary and secondary 
levels – became the priority of the government before the disappointing results 
of the structural reforms introduced in the early 1980s, allowing the private 
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sector to have a bigger role in the provision of this service at high school and at 
university levels. In the light of this, another important point that we wanted to 
uncover by interviewing BA students was the extent to which the poor are 
limited in advancing to this educational level, which, as argued above, can also 
make an important difference between obtaining a job with high or low levels of 
security especially in urban zones, and their perceptions about the possible 
reasons behind it in relation to the weakness of the institutional capacities of the 
state. 
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Table 3.1 Employed population in Mexico 2010 
No STATE 
Total 
population 
112 336 538 
(millions) 
 
 Employed  
population 
45,361,833 
(millions) 
 
% 
Employed 
population 
Primary  
Sector 
6,526,470 
(millions) 
 
14.40 % 
Population 
in primary 
sector 
Secondary 
Sector 
10,762,960 
(millions) 
 
23.72 % 
Population 
in 
secondary 
sector 
Tertiary 
sector 
27,775,236 
(millions) 
 
61.23% 
Population 
in tertiary 
sector 
Not 
specified 
297,167 
 
 
0.65% 
Population 
not 
specified 
1 AGUASCALIENTES 1,184,996 455,665 38.45 27,960 6.13 135,933 29.83 290,792 63.81 980 0.21 
2 BAJA CALIFORNIA 3,155,070 1,315,190 41.68 87,720 6.66 333,594 25.36 811,010 61.66 82,866 6.30 
3 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 
SUR 
637,026 
286,735 
45.01 
25,352 8.84 57,339 19.99 203,270 70.89 774 0.26 
4 CAMPECHE 822,441 357,290 43.44 75,817 21.22 73,103 20.46 206,782 57.87 1,588 0.44 
5 COAHUILA 2,748,391 1,086,885 39.54 63,931 5.88 339,876 31.27 678,477 62.42 4,601 0.42 
6 COLIMA 650,555 299,392 46.02 33,143 11.07 56,235 18.78 208,000 69.47 2,014 0.67 
7 CHIAPAS 4,796,580 1,757,083 36.63 710,152 40.41 234,871 13.36 805,629 45.85 6,431 0.36 
8 CHIHUAHUA 3,406,465 1,231,832 36.16 146,273 11.87 353,954 28.73 685,415 55.64 46,190 3.74 
9 
DISTRITO 
FEDERAL 
8,851,080 
3,895,132 
44.00 
8,629 0.22 687,973 17.66 3,184,809 81.76 13,721 0.35 
10 DURANGO 1,632,934 604,343 37.00 101,431 16.78 152,073 25.16 348,861 57.72 1,978 0.32 
11 GUANAJUATO 5,486,372 2,135,837 38.92 221,413 10.36 682,179 31.93 1,225,589 57.38 6,656 0.31 
12 GUERRERO 3,388,768 1,392,115 41.08 498,866 35.83 185,569 13.33 706,062 50.71 1,618 0.11 
13 HIDALGO 2,665,018 1,044,484 39.19 211,076 20.20 288,275 27.59 542,724 51.96 2,409 0.23 
14 JALISCO 7,350,682 3,176,488 43.21 344,189 10.83 805,552 25.35 2,014,310 63.41 12,437 0.39 
15 MÉXICO 15,175,862 6,022,626 39.68 325,303 5.40 1,615,174 26.81 4,065,979 67.51 16,170 0.26 
16 MICHOACÁN 4,351,037 1,651,393 37.95 368,450 22.31 358,077 21.68 923,338 55.91 1,528 0.09 
17 MORELOS 1,777,227 744,158 41.87 90,738 12.19 167,948 22.56 483,295 64.94 2,177 0.29 
18 NAYARIT 1,084,979 484,881 44.69 103,888 21.42 81,514 16.81 297,096 61.27 2,383 0.49 
19 NUEVO LEÓN 4,653,458 2,081,613 44.73 54,231 2.60 632,711 30.39 1,390,538 66.80 4,133 0.19 
20 OAXACA 3,801,962 1,542,971 40.58 540,048 35.00 288,511 18.69 712,092 46.15 2,320 0.15 
21 PUEBLA 5,779,829 2,317,595 40.09 557,343 24.04 582,673 25.14 1,171,265 50.53 6,314 0.27 
22 QUERÉTARO 1,827,937 674,813 36.91 45,853 6.79 221,453 32.81 406,458 60.23 1,049 0.15 
23 QUINTANA ROO 1,325,578 649,670 49.01 41,181 6.33 89,021 13.70 516,267 79.46 3,201 0.49 
24 SAN LUIS POTOSÍ 2,585,518 1,000,471 38.69 208,443 20.83 240,415 24.03 544,413 54.41 7,200 0.71 
25 SINALOA 2,767,761 1,174,580 42.43 227,851 19.39 192,247 16.36 748,278 63.70 6,204 0.52 
26 SONORA 2,662,480 1,038,221 38.99 118,674 11.43 288,362 27.77 610,962 58.84 20,223 1.94 
27 TABASCO 2,238,603 827,512 36.96 141,329 17.07 173,376 20.95 507,135 61.28 5,672 0.68 
28 TAMAULIPAS 3,268,554 1,314,148 40.20 94,971 7.22 382,876 29.13 817,589 62.21 18,712 1.42 
29 TLAXCALA 1,169,936 449,975 38.46 72,519 16.11 146,201 32.49 229,755 51.05 1,500 0.33 
30 VERACRUZ 7,643,194 2,895,396 37.88 711,367 24.56 566,544 19.56 1,608,800 55.56 8,685 0.29 
31 YUCATÁN 1,955,577 873,140 44.64 95,564 10.94 242,728 27.79 532,526 60.98 2,322 0.26 
32 ZACATECAS 1,490,668 580,199 38.92 172,765 29.77 106,603 18.37 297,720 51.31 3,111 0.53 
Source: INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx. Accessed: September 2010. 
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Table 3.1 shows the percentages of the employed population in the 
different economic sectors in each one of the 31 states and the Federal District 
in Mexico in 2010. The State of Mexico is not only one of the states with the 
highest percentage of population in the service sector, but it also has one of the 
lowest percentages of population in the primary sector.48 However, to be sure 
that we were taking the right decision, we also contrasted and compared levels 
of industrialization and the share of ex-recipients who started and had 
potentially finished high school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48
 The Federal District was rejected from the beginning despite the fact that it is a very important urban 
zone because it has a different political organization to that of the states and we considered it important 
to develop our fieldwork at the state level in order to present a broader picture of the extent to which 
the institutional weakness of the state impedes the alleviation of poverty, which could serve as an 
example to the other 30 states. 
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Table 3.2 Manufacturing sector in every Mexican state 2010 
State Economic Units 
Total income from 
goods and services’ 
supply 
(pesos) 
Total gross output 
(Pesos) 
AGUASCALIENTES 4,174 90,854,905 89,680,880 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 5,993 137,492,713 137,047,964 
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 2,012 4,296,997 4,241,646 
CAMPECHE 3,405 3,788,079 3,707,355 
COAHUILA 7,889 340,886,821 334,949,879 
COLIMA 2,523 6,861,432 6,896,285 
CHIAPAS 13,726 80,573,936 83,383,988 
CHIHUAHUA 8,014 136,309,453 134,081,623 
DISTRITO FEDERAL 30,934 386,057,855 373,185,885 
DURANGO 4,858 43,499,907 43,352,534 
GUANAJUATO 23,112 303,051,012 301,311,903 
GUERRERO 23,272 7,271,600 7,284,328 
HIDALGO 9,735 182,283,978 181,534,815 
JALISCO 29,991 313,138,012 299,987,674 
MÉXICO 48,357 608,312,239 586,763,338 
MICHOACÁN 27,692 84,168,014 83,214,904 
MORELOS 8,212 54,524,910 53,386,718 
NAYARIT 3,567 6,812,993 6,648,208 
NUEVO LEÓN 12,632 515,299,084 508,938,641 
OAXACA 27,459 142,582,608 142,214,797 
PUEBLA 36,526 232,762,813 222,856,454 
QUERÉTARO 5,924 156,734,307 152,493,003 
QUINTANA ROO 2,802 8,421,292 8,197,113 
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ 8,113 133,584,586 130,270,145 
SINALOA 8,171 35,895,637 35,553,567 
SONORA 9,760 159,257,312 158,762,593 
TABASCO 4,577 104,732,312 109,312,323 
TAMAULIPAS 8,381 237,434,648 234,445,131 
TLAXCALA 7,959 42,281,661 42,752,329 
VERACRUZ 23,669 345,959,654 340,486,095 
YUCATÁN 18,442 36,159,557 35,586,641 
ZACATECAS 4,970 24,622,051 24,470,496 
Source: INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx. Accessed: September 2010. 
Table 3.2 shows three variables, the number of economic units, the total 
income from the supply of goods and services, and the total gross output in the 
manufacturing sector in every state in Mexico. As we can observe, the State of 
Mexico’s figures are higher than those of every other state in each one of the 
three variables. There are more economic units, which means that there is more 
business and industrial variety than in any other state, and it is the state with 
more total income from the supply of goods and services and more total gross 
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output. Remarkably, Nuevo León is one of the states with very few economic 
units but is, after the State of Mexico, the state with more total income from 
goods and services’ supply and more total gross output because some of the 
main branches of the main large companies are located there. However, the 
combination of a large population working in the service sector and a great 
variety of business in the State of Mexico was more appealing for our purposes 
since this meant that there were more middle-sized and small companies, which 
are the ones that offer most of the employment in Mexico.  
As we saw in Chapter 2, the operation of the programme is conditional 
on the existence of education and health services in the state and municipalities 
prior to the operation of the programme. Consequently, it was also important for 
us to conduct our fieldwork in a state where there were the best possible 
conditions to fulfill the programme’s goals. Therefore, from the Oportunidades’ 
National Coordination, through IFAI, we requested the number of 
Oportunidades’ ex-recipients who had started high school and the number of 
those who had advanced to the last year of high school since the beginning of 
the programme in every Mexican state.49  
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 We requested information about those who had advanced to the last year of high school and not 
about those who finished high school because according to the people of the local and federal offices of 
the Oportunidades programme there is no exact way for them to know the number of recipients who 
actually finish high school and those who quit in the final year because not all of them attend the office 
to deliver their final certificate of high school, despite the fact that they receive a final payment of 
around 205 pounds sterling if they do so. 
 125 
 
Table 3.3 Recipients who finished high school 2001-2011 
No State 
Total recipients enrolled in 
high school 2001-2002 – 
2010 - 2011 
Recipients enrolled 
in the last year 2001-
2011 
% Recipients 
enrolled in the last 
year 2001-2011 
1 AGUASCALIENTES     45,323  8,011 17.67 
2 BAJA CALIFORNIA     30,588  4,755 15.54 
3 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 
SUR 
    18,335  3,190 17.39 
4 CAMPECHE    101,762  20,337 19.98 
5 COAHUILA     58,406  9,239 15.81 
6 COLIMA     21,783  3,878 17.80 
7 CHIAPAS    803,441  166,285 20.69 
8 CHIHUAHUA     72,196  13,322 18.45 
9 DISTRITO FEDERAL     19,936  3,635 18.23 
10 DURANGO     91,784  16,186 17.63 
11 GUANAJUATO    271,578  49,166 18.10 
12 GUERRERO    492,585  99,146 20.12 
13 HIDALGO    308,377  60,820 19.72 
14 JALISCO    171,867  33,038 19.22 
15 MÉXICO    496,225  94,828 19.10 
16 MICHOACÁN    323,098  57,487 17.79 
17 MORELOS    126,314  23,147 18.32 
18 NAYARIT     88,930  16,602 18.66 
19 NUEVO LEÓN     44,381  6,706 15.11 
20 OAXACA    606,783  122,953 20.26 
21 PUEBLA    661,870  142,504 21.53 
22 QUERÉTARO     86,035  17,391 20.21 
23 QUINTANA ROO     90,264  17,470 19.35 
24 SAN LUIS POTOSÍ    297,612  56,156 18.86 
25 SINALOA    262,755  53,324 20.29 
26 SONORA    111,148  21,312 19.17 
27 TABASCO    338,337  71,599 21.16 
28 TAMAULIPAS    131,222  25,177 19.18 
29 TLAXCALA     91,977  17,058 18.54 
30 VERACRUZ    990,820  212,557 21.45 
31 YUCATÁN    186,401  37,440 20.08 
32 ZACATECAS    132,092  25,228 19.09 
TOTAL 7,574,225 1,509,947 19.93 
Source: Data obtained from the National Coordination of Oportunidades through IFAI requested in 2011.  
Table 3.3 shows the percentage of recipients who started and advanced 
to the final year of high school education. As we can observe, on average in 
most of the states only about one out of five of the recipients who start high 
school advance to the final year. In comparison with other urban regions, where 
it is either slightly higher or lower, the State of Mexico, with 19.10%, is fairly 
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representative. The decision was then taken that the State of Mexico was going 
to be part of our case study, where we were going to find the necessary 
conditions to present a good example of the extent to which the weakness of 
the institutional capacities of the state impedes the achievement of the main 
goal of Oportunidades in urban zones. That is, there is: 1. a labour market with 
a large service sector where capability expansion, especially of those at the 
bottom of the hierarchical socio-economic structure, is needed the most to 
obtain sustained income; 2. a large variety of small, medium and large 
business; and 3. a representative percentage of ex-recipients of the 
Oportunidades programme who could have potentially completed the high 
school level. 
Nonetheless, we recognize that the characteristics of the urban zones of 
the State of Mexico are far from being a representative sample of the 
characteristics of all the urban zones of Mexico. For instance, as previously 
explained, more than 80% of the foreign direct investment is concentrated in 
Mexico City, the State of Mexico, Nuevo León, Baja California and Chihuahua 
and this is the reason why their industrial sectors are larger than the industrial 
sectors of other important urban zones such as Puebla or Jalisco, which have 
had to rely more on encouraging the growth of the service sector to generate 
employment.50 Moreover, as shown above, Nuevo León, in the northern part of 
the country, is one of the states with very few economic units but it is one of the 
states with a greater total gross output because most of the industries located 
there are national and international MNCs, so the demand for labour there 
might be different from that in the State of Mexico where the industrial sector 
                                                          
50
 See also INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx. Accessed: January 2014. 
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relies more on the manufacturing of products by small and medium enterprises 
(Kuznetsov & Dahlman op. cit., 42). Furthermore, as far as the service sector is 
concerned, in the State of Mexico, Baja California, Chihuahua, Jalisco and 
Puebla the main activities are those related to the wholesale and retail trade 
and hosting and restaurant services, whereas in Nuevo León and Mexico City 
the main activities are those related to financial services.51 However, as 
explained above, although the State of Mexico is far from being representative 
of all the urban regions of the country, it provides us with important conditions to 
present a good example of the extent to which the weakness of the institutional 
capacities of the state impedes the achievement of the main goal of 
Oportunidades in urban zones.    
We next had to choose the specific municipality, which was very 
important for our research, since although Oportunidades is a federal-level 
programme, the labour market institutions of municipalities can have a very 
significant influence over the labour opportunities of the recipients and the 
outcomes of the anti-poverty policies. This is because municipalities are also in 
charge of levying some taxes and granting permits for starting up small 
businesses and, constitutionally, they have freedom in the use of their own 
economic resources. Moreover, they are considered to be the basic cell of the 
Mexican political system since they are the level of government that is closest to 
the citizens. Consequently, the study of this level was going to allow us not only 
to assess the taxation capacity of the state but also the strategic use of 
revenues to generate and foster employment generation. At first, we wanted to 
choose two municipalities with similar characteristics in order to compare the 
                                                          
51
 See SE: Ministry of Economy: http://www.se.gob.mx. Accessed: January 2014. 
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way in which the weakness of its institutional capacities impedes the ex-
recipients from obtaining sustained income in the labour market. However, due 
to time constraints, we decided to choose only one municipality, which allowed 
us to present the best possible scenario so that the programme worked.   
Table 3.4 Most populated urban municipalities of the State of Mexico 2010 
Municipality Population 
Employed 
population 
Primary 
sector 
Secondary 
or 
industrial 
sector 
Tertiary sector  
Not 
specified 
Goods 
and 
Services 
Business 
STATE OF MEXICO 15,175,862 
 
5,899,987 
 
 
301,136 
 
1,512,176 
 
1,311,796 
 
2,677,560 
 
97,319 
 
CHIMALHUACÁN 614,453 225,235 1,022 62,677 61,328 98,224 
1,984 
 
CUAUTITLÁN 
IZCALLI 
511,675 217,068 689 53,407 50,832 107,641 4,499 
ECATEPEC 1,656,107 678,179 1,133 159,084 171,887 331,470 
14,605 
 
NAUCALPAN  833,779 344,374 1,351 80,759 71,189 178,056 
13,019 
 
NEZAHUALCÓYOTL 1,110,565 462,940 10,967 88,576 119,252 237,925 
6,220 
 
TLALNEPANTLA 664,225 270,436 206 60,575 63,572 137,978 
8,105 
 
TOLUCA 819,561 333,071 4,106 90,335 65,278 171,077 
2,275 
 
TULTITLÁN 524,074 220,008 770 57,314 53,220 104,980 
3,724 
 
Source: INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx. Accessed: September 2010. 
Table 3.4 presents the total and employed population in the main urban 
and most-populated municipalities of the State of Mexico (those of more than 
500,000 inhabitants).52 As we can observe, most of the population in these 
municipalities is concentrated in the secondary and tertiary or service sector. 
                                                          
52
 In Mexico municipalities are divided into localities; most of the governmental institutions, such as the 
National Council of Population (CONAPO for its acronym in Spanish), INEGI and academic studies 
consider as urban localities those which have more than 15,000 inhabitants, semi-urban localities those 
with fewer than 15,000 but more than 2,500 inhabitants and rural localities are those that have fewer 
than 2,500 inhabitants. 
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The most-populated, and with more population in these sectors, are Ecatepec 
and Netzahualcóyotl. However, we decided to choose Toluca since it is the 
capital of the State of Mexico, where the local executive, legislative and judicial 
powers reside (of both state and municipality), which gave us a sense of unity at 
the local level, allowing us to show the extent to which the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the state impedes the achievement of the main goal of 
the Oportunidades programme. Furthermore, at the same time we were going 
to be able to assess and differentiate the extent to which the capacities of each 
level shape the labour market, increasing informality and in consequence 
impeding poverty alleviation.   
We also requested from the Oportunidades’ National Coordination, 
through IFAI, the number of ex-recipients who had started and advanced to the 
final year of high school in every one of the 125 municipalities of the State of 
Mexico and contrasted this information with the population of every municipality 
and population working in the different economic sectors. Table 3.5 shows the 
number of ex-recipients who could have potentially finished high school in the 
30 municipalities which had more ex-recipients since 2001, when the 
Oportunidades programme started to cover the high school level. The 
municipalities with more ex-recipients were Acambay, Almoloya de Juárez, 
Atlacomulco, Chimalhuacán, Ixtlahuaca, Jilotepec, Jiquipilco, San Felipe del 
Progreso, Temascalcingo, Temoaya and Toluca. However, out of all of them, 
Toluca was the municipality with more potential ex-recipients who could have 
finished high school (4,176) in urban zones, which allowed us to obtain a 
sufficiently large sample to make more reliable generalizations from our findings 
about the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme of our selected region.   
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The only municipality that had more potential ex-recipients who could 
have finished high school than Toluca was Ixtlahuaca (4,598). However, 
according to INEGI, by 2010 most of the localities of Ixtlahuaca were 
considered to be semi-urban or rural and, as explained before, our focus is on 
poverty in urban zones, and that is the reason why it was discarded.  
Additionally, Toluca also has the biggest supply of public universities in 
comparison with most of the urban municipalities of the State of Mexico, where 
the number is very limited or there are no universities at all and people are 
forced either to change their residence or to travel long distances every day to 
be able to attend a public university or to pay for a private university.53 So, 
Toluca also provided us with important conditions to uncover the extent to which 
the ex-recipients are limited in advancing to this educational level even in such 
a favourable context in relation to the weakness of the institutional capacities of 
the state. In sum, in Toluca we found a high number of ex-recipients who had 
finished the high school level, a high level of industrialization and a large 
number of people working in the service sector, especially in small businesses, 
and there was the presence of the state in its three levels of government. If the 
programme worked, it should be there. 
 
                                                          
53
 According to data obtained from the Ministry of Education of the State of Mexico requested through 
INFOEM, by 2010 only 67 out of the 125 municipalities in the State of Mexico had at least one public 
school that offered BA studies. The students of the other municipalities had either to travel every day, to 
move to another municipality to be able to attend a university (if they were admitted) or to pay for a 
private university. Out of the 67 municipalities where there were public universities, only four had more 
than 10,000 students: Naucalpan, with 23,604 students in five public schools; Nezahualcóyotl, with 
23,737 students in twelve public schools; Tlalnepantla, with 16,496 in five public schools; and Toluca, 
with 26, 653 students in 56 public schools.    
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Table 3.5 Recipients enrolled in the last year of high-school in the State of Mexico 
Municipality 
Year 
Total 
2001 - 2002 2002 – 2003 2003 – 2004 2004 – 2005 2005 – 2006 2006 – 2007 2007 – 2008 2008 – 2009 2009 – 2010 2010 - 2011 
1 ACAMBAY  109   194   273   280   271   344   317   383   347   345  2,863 
2 ACULCO  48   63   137   142   164   158   159   197   192   193  1,453 
3 
ALMOLOYA DE 
JUÁREZ 
 110   157   198   278   345   346   368   433   381   391  3,007 
4 AMATEPEC  41   66   86   111   123   122   145   127   123   113  1,057 
5 ATLACOMULCO  127   181   210   266   295   316   335   372   366   367  2,835 
6 CHAPA DE MOTA  52   61   116   109   123   142   128   142   112   100  1,085 
7 CHIMALHUACÁN     124   220   320   486   502   608   721  2,981 
8 DONATO GUERRA  42   67   133   112   160   146   152   166   123   150  1,251 
9 ECATEPEC                   23   67   135   154   229   430   601  1,639 
10 IXTLAHUACA  185   253   359   482   563   569   655   559   449   524  4,598 
11 JILOTEPEC  84   159   240   220   246   286   299   312   310   333  2,489 
12 JIQUIPILCO  138   166   256   326   310   372   350   391   329   312  2,950 
13 JOCOTITLÁN  41   45   87   114  148   152   170   180   186   181  1,304 
14 MORELOS                        38   67   99   79   136   67   138   125   153   155  1,057 
15 NAUCALPAN   -    28   56   79   145   196   296   384  1,184 
16 EL ORO                        44   90   158   149   160   131   128   162   186   154  1,362 
17 OTZOLOTEPEC  9   19   40   68   95   88   133   173   195   194  1,014 
18 
SAN FELIPE DEL 
PROGRESO 
 149   253   368   374   391   458   488   557   530   530  4,098 
19 TEJUPILCO  38   52   76   118   130   160   149   186   141   158  1,208 
20 TEMASCALCINGO  103   154   240   287   285   256   301   257   323   315  2,521 
21 TEMASCALTEPEC  24   60   123   100   111   112   136   144   143   138  1,091 
22 TEMOAYA  55   60   137   214   206   252   280   334   261   304  2,103 
23 TENANCINGO  45   50   77   72   125   120   148   189   186   219  1,231 
24 TLATLAYA  65   114   146   215   214   215   221   186   197   194  1,767 
25 TOLUCA  45   89   224   308   422   465   547   636   692   748  4,176 
26 VILLA  ALLENDE  38   66   85   112   105   123   151   145   141   117  1,083 
27 
VILLA DEL 
CARBÓN 
 43   61   129   104   122   132   171   166   133   183  1,244 
28 VILLA VICTORIA  53   79   168   145   157   165   178   197   162   189  1,493 
29 ZINACANTEPEC                     15   43   74   110   134   156   192   240   283   299  1,546 
30 
SAN JOSÉ DEL 
RINCÓN 
 54   84   105   134   148   139   173   198   207   239  1,481 
Source: Data obtained from the National Coordination of Oportunidades through IFAI requested in 2012. 
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3.3.2 Data collection techniques 
As mentioned above, based on our ontological and epistemological 
positions we used a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to 
aproach the best possible explanation to our problem. It has been recognized 
that there are three main data collection techniques for empirical research: 
survey or questionnaire (quantitative), qualitative interviews and data analysis 
from secondary resources (Denscombe 1998, 83). According to Brannen, the 
purposes of combining them depends on “the phase of the research in which 
the researcher brings the different data sets into play” (2005, 178). Greene et al. 
identified five main justifications in that regard: 1. triangulation: the aim of which 
is to allow the researcher to look at social problems from different angles, thus 
gaining a better perspective on the studied object and increasing the accuracy 
of the results of the research; 2. complementarity: in which the interest is in 
clarifying the results obtained from one method with the results from another; 3. 
development: where the researcher seeks to use the results from one method 
to help develop or inform the other method, where development is broadly 
construed as including sampling and implementation, as well as measurement 
decisions; 4. initiation: in which both methods are contrasted in order to find a 
paradox or a contradiction; and 5. expansion: in which the researcher seeks to 
extend the breadth and range of enquiry by using different methods for different 
inquiry components (1989, 259). 
For the purposes of our research we combined qualitative and 
quantitative methods for three main reasons: 1. development: the use of 
qualitative interviews and data analysis from secondary resources helped us to 
develop our questionnaire and to build the sample to which we applied it; 2. 
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complementarity: the results obtained from one type of interview (either 
qualitative or quantitative) allowed us to clarify the results obtained from the 
other type; and 3. triangulation: the use of quantitative and qualitative interviews 
and data analysis from secondary resources helped us to look at our problem 
from different angles, in this way gaining a better perspective on the studied 
object and increasing the accuracy of the results of the research.  
We shall now describe the data collection techniques that we used in our 
fieldwork research, explaining briefly the way in which they were used. 
3.3.2.1 Documents 
Documentary analysis might be the most ancient kind of analysis since, 
as Matthews and Ross have argued, it has probably been around since writing 
was invented in about 4,000 BC. They described documents as “written records 
about people and things that are generated through the process of living” (2010, 
277) and these can include not only books but also films, audiotapes and videos 
containing very different sorts of data such as numerical, historical, qualitative, 
personal information and interpretation, visual and audio material and so on. 
Moreover, they are socially constructed so they can tell us much more than 
what the actual information contains and they are very useful for triangulating 
data (Burns 2000, 278).  
Denscombe has argued that documentary research can be both “an 
essential part of any investigation and a specific method of investigation which 
offers itself as an alternative to questionnaires, interviews or observation as a 
means for collecting data” (1998, 159). There have been different studies that 
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have focused entirely on the documents of the Oportunidades programme, 
especially on the many surveys which the Ministry of Social Development has 
carried out to monitor the programme (Levy 2007 and 2008). However, the main 
limitation of these surveys is that they do not contain extensive information 
about the linkages between the ex-recipients and the labour market since once 
the recipients are not given the cash grant anymore, either because they finish 
high school or drop out of school, there is no longer any kind of tracking of their 
occupational trajectory.  
Nonetheless, we recognize that documentary research has been an 
essential part of our investigation. Since we started our research, we have been 
able to use several types of official documents provided by the Mexican Ministry 
of Social Development and evaluation reports from national and international 
organizations such as the International Food Policy Research Institute, the 
World Bank, the UNDP, the ILO, academicians and so on. In addition to these 
documents, during our fieldwork we had the opportunity to gather a great deal 
of information about the Mexican labour market institutions and policies that 
could have an impact on the labour opportunities of the ex-recipients as well. 
Furthermore, two very important tools in this regard were the websites of IFAI 
and INFOEM, through which we requested numerous documents and 
information that allowed to us to carry out our methodology such as the number 
of ex-recipients who had advanced to the final year of high school since the 
programme started to cover this educational level in 2001, and especially to 
triangulate our results, as we shall see in the following chapters.  
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3.3.2.2 Qualitative interviews 
Interviews have been recognized as an important means of gathering 
people’s and groups’ opinions, experiences and characteristics by 
governments, market researchers and academics (Matthews & Ross op. cit., 
219). The key feature of an interview is that there is a direct contact between 
the interviewer and the participant, which provides a sense of reality (Burns op. 
cit., 423). However, they can be conducted face to face, or at a distance via 
telephone or on the internet, and are normally of three types: unstructured, 
semi-structured and surveys or questionnaires.  
The first two types are generally used as qualitative data collection 
techniques in which the interviewer participates actively using normally open-
ended questions.54 In an unstructured interview, the researcher focuses on a 
set of topics and allows the interviewee to express her/his ideas freely. In semi-
structured interviews, the researcher focuses on a set of topics following a 
particular order either to explore or to understand people’s behaviours, 
opinions, beliefs or perceptions about a particular problem(s). The third type, 
surveys or questionnaires, on the other hand, is generally used as a quantitative 
data collection technique in which each interviewee receives the same 
structured questions, normally with a set of options, and the role of the 
interviewer is limited to just asking the questions and writing down the 
responses, or simply guiding the interviewee through the questionnaire 
(Matthews & Ross op. cit., 221). For the purposes of our research, we used 
                                                          
54
 Although this is typically the way in which the three types of interviews are used, we recognize that 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews can also contain close-ended questions allowing for a 
quantitative dimension, and semi-structured interviews can contain open-ended questions allowing for 
a qualitative dimension too.  
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semi-structured interviews and a survey. We shall elaborate more on the survey 
later in this chapter. For now, we are going to focus only on the semi-structured 
interviews that we used in our fieldwork.   
Once we had selected the state and the municipality where we would 
undertake our fieldwork, the second step was to use the qualitative technique 
known as a focus group. This technique utilizes non-representative samples of 
groups of individuals and takes an intuitive and subjective approach to data 
collection, in which open-ended questions are posed (Székely & Nateras 2005, 
386). In a focus group, no statistical data is sought; instead an unstructured and 
direct dialogue to understand important issues of the research subject in detail 
is carried out (Neuman op. cit., 459). However, although it is an unstructured 
dialogue, it needs to have clear criteria in terms of the selection of the 
participants so that this is done on sound methodological grounds. Accordingly, 
we interviewed one small group of ex-recipients (eight of them), consisting of 
young people who were between eighteen and twenty-three years old and who 
had already completed high school, in order to understand their lives and define 
the kind of questions we would like to ask about their perceptions and 
experiences of the constraints they face in obtaining sustained income in the 
labour market in relation to the institutional capacities of the state.  
During the discussions, we used both comprehensive written notes and 
audio-tape recording in order to capture as much information as we could. 
Nonetheless, as Table 3.6 shows, the full names of the interviewees were not 
recorded in order to maintain their anonymity and because of this they felt 
relaxed and talked freely and openly. Moreover, we agreed to hold the 
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discussions in the house of one of them so that they were more comfortable 
and also because, in that way, we were able to have sufficient time for the 
discussions since the venue was closer to the homes of most of them.  
Table 3.6 The ex-recipients in the focus group 15 
Name Age Education Occupation 
Jorge 18 General Baccalaureate unemployed 
María 19 Accounting technician unemployed 
Pedro 20 Administrative computer technician unemployed 
Ángeles 20 Accounting technician unemployed 
Juan 19 Administrative computer technician unemployed 
Luz 21 General Baccalaureate unemployed 
Antonia 20 General Baccalaureate Family business (grocery) 
Miguel 22 Accounting technician Father’s business (blacksmith) 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
This preliminary interview allowed us not only to understand the lives of 
the ex-recipients but also put us in an excellent position to locate other relevant 
actors (in the government, the private sector and civil society) with whom we 
could also conduct qualitative semi-structured interviews in order to triangulate 
the findings from the focus groups and later the results from the survey. We 
undertook nineteen semi-structured interviews with important actors related to 
our object of study (see appendix 1). As far as the government was concerned, 
we interviewed people from the three levels of government of the Mexican state 
drawn from public servants in the offices of employment to the economy, tax, 
social development and so on. In the case of the private sector and civil society, 
we interviewed managers of different companies, heads of consultancies and 
small-scale manufacturers. 
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Despite the fact that we were fortunate to have most of the main offices 
of local governments, civil society and the private sector located in Toluca and 
we only needed to travel to Mexico City to interview people at the Federal level, 
the qualitative interviews took us a little more time than we had anticipated for 
two main reasons: 1. most of our interviewees held a high rank in their 
companies/organizations so we had to wait for them to agree to give us some 
time; and 2. despite the fact that we identified ourselves as research students, 
some of them were worried about the way in which we were going to use the 
information.  
However, it was crucial to interview them in order to triangulate the 
beliefs, thoughts, ideas and opinions of the recipients and the other actors. In 
this sense, the previous experience that we had as a public servant and the 
connections that we had helped us both to obtain the interviews with the right 
individuals and to explain to them the way in which the information was going to 
be used so that they were more confident and shared their perceptions about 
our object of study freely. All these interviews were held in the respondent’s 
place of work and on average they lasted around 90 minutes. We used both 
comprehensive written notes and audio-tape recording in order to capture as 
much information as we could. The structure of the interviews followed the 
same logic as the discussions that we described in Chapters 1 and 2 about the 
way in which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the state has 
shaped the labour market in a way that impedes the poor from obtaining a 
sustained income. In order to analyse the data obtained from these interviews, 
we transcribed and coded them in relation to our research questions. Once we 
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had completed the qualitative interviews we proceeded with the development of 
the questionnaire and the building of the sample to which we applied it.  
3.3.2.3 Survey research or questionnaire 
This method is the most widely used social science data-gathering 
technique (Neuman op. cit., 309). Its popularity comes from the fact that it 
enables researchers to make generalizations about a particular population 
without having to interview every member of it. The most typical example of the 
use of the questionnaire is the census which is carried out in almost every 
country to determine the main characteristics of the inhabitants. A questionnaire 
normally involves a list of structured and standardized questions. It can be 
either descriptive, with questions aimed at capturing factual data such as the 
attributes of a particular population (for example, its demographic composition), 
or explanatory, with questions about people’s experiences, perceptions, values 
or opinions, designed to seek to establish cause and effect relationships (Burns 
op. cit., 566). We designed a questionnaire of 32 questions, which took 30-40 
minutes to complete (see appendix 2). Most of the questions were of the 
closed-ended type with three or four options for the ex-recipients to choose 
from. Nonetheless, we still left room for the recipients to write down a different 
option from the ones that we provided in order to avoid limiting the interviewees 
to our answers.  
We arrived in Toluca in the middle of November 2011 and remained 
there throughout the period of the fieldwork. The main constraint that we faced 
in approaching the ex-recipients to interview them was that their personal data 
(name, address, and so on) is considered to be confidential by the Federal Law 
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of Transparency and Access to Public Government Information. In this context, 
the support from the National Coordination of Oportunidades was especially 
important since they helped us to locate ex-recipients who had finished high 
school. Apart from the National Coordination, in every one of the thirty-one 
states in Mexico and the Federal District there is an Oportunidades office. This 
office is responsible for maintaining contact with the local population to organize 
them so that the payment of the cash grants is properly carried out, to select 
new families to be part of the programme when required, and so on. To make 
sure that this is properly done, they invite some mothers who are part of the 
programme, called vocales, to help them to organize the activities of the 
beneficiaries, solve disputes between them and pass on to them relevant 
information about the programme. The local coordination put us in contact with 
these vocales and asked them for their support to help us with our research.55  
By the end of January 2012, the first draft of the questionnaire was ready 
to be tested. We now had to pilot the questionnaire; therefore, we contacted the 
vocales and told them we needed to carry out a pilot application of the 
questionnaire with a small sample of ex-recipients in order to find whether the 
questions were clear, if it was not too long and so on. Quickly, the vocales 
convened some of the ex-recipients who they knew to undertake an application 
of the questionnaire in one of the places where the people from the locality are 
permitted to gather to discuss public issues without the supervision of local 
government officers. We had around thirty ex-recipients for this first pilot. We 
gave half of the questionnaires with options and the other half without options in 
                                                          
55
 Once the state coordination put us in contact with the vocales, they did not intervene any more. This 
was especially important for the research because it was essential that the ex-recipients felt confident 
about expressing their ideas, opinions, perceptions and so on freely when they attended the focus 
groups and during the administration of the questionnaire.  
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order to be sure that the options of every answer were going to capture our 
research interests. After analysing the data, we had the final version of the 
questionnaire ready, and we now needed to choose a sampling method that 
would allow us to obtain a reliable number of ex-recipients to interview, from 
which we could make well-supported generalizations from our findings about 
the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme of our selected region. 
3.3.3 Sampling techniques 
It has been recognized that the selection of a sample of cases from a 
population of research presents two main methodological problems: sample 
representativeness and variations in the dimensions of theoretical interest 
(Seawright & Gerring 2008, 296). As already explained, our main field of 
enquiry was the connection between the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades 
programme, the labour market and the state’s institutions; therefore, we had to 
interview ex-recipients who were economically active. Consequently, we 
interviewed only those ex-recipients who had finished high school while they 
were members of the programme and who were between eighteen and twenty 
three years old.  
Having clarified the dimensions of theoretical interest, the second 
problem was how to ensure the representativeness of our sample. Since we 
knew the characteristics of the population that could provide us with information 
which is theoretically of interest to us, we decided to use purposeful sampling. 
In this method, the sample units are chosen because they have particular 
features or characteristics “which will enable detailed exploration and 
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understanding of the central themes and puzzles which the researcher wishes 
to study” (Ritchie & Lewis 2003, 49-52). 
There are different purposeful sampling strategies: quota or stratified 
sampling, snowball sampling, systematic sampling, cluster sampling, and so on 
(Neuman op. cit., 242). For the purposes of our research and fitting with our 
theoretical interests, the sampling strategies that we decided to use were the 
snow ball and the stratified random sampling methods. In the former, a non-
representative sample of a group or groups of individuals is selected according 
to the theoretical interests of the researcher and then different actors with a 
direct or indirect linkage to the initial group are interviewed as well. In the latter, 
the target population is selected according to the theoretical interests of the 
study, and then a representative selection of cases from the subgroup is made 
at random.  
Accordingly, as previously explained, we started our fieldwork 
interviewing a small group of ex-recipients who had finished high school while 
they were members of the programme and who were between eighteen and 
twenty three years old. Once we transcribed and analyzed this preliminary 
exercise we procedded to interview other relevant actors in the government, the 
private sector and civil society that had been named directly or indirectly in the 
first interviews. After analysing all this data in the light of our theoretical and 
introductory chapters, we had the final version of the questionnaire ready; we 
now needed to obtain a representative number of ex-recipients to interview, 
from which we could make well-supported generalizations from our findings 
about the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme of our selected region. 
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In order to do that we needed to define three things: 1. the level of 
precision; 2. the confidence level; and 3. the degree of variability. Regarding 
levels of precision and confidence level, we based our sample on the general 
standards employed in this type of survey of social content, and worked to the 
usual confidence level of 95% and 5% of sampling error. The level of precision 
or sampling error is the closeness with which the sample predicts where the 
true values in the population lie. That is, if the sampling error is 5%, this means 
we add or subtract 5 percentage points from a value in the sample to find out 
the actual value in the whole population. For instance, if a value in a sample 
says that 70% of ex-recipients think that the state is not capable of alleviating 
poverty, and the sampling error is 5%, we know that in the population from 
which we have drawn our sample, between 65% and 75% are likely to think the 
same. The confidence level, on the other hand, means that if the population 
was sampled 100 times in the same way, 95 of these samples would have the 
true population value within the range of the level of precision specified earlier, 
and five would be unrepresentative samples.  
Finally, the degree of variability is the degree to which the attributes or 
concepts being measured in the questions are distributed throughout the 
population. Regarding the degree of variability, we also used the general 
standard employed in this type of survey of social content: 50%-50%. For 
instance, if we wanted to know the opinion of the ex-recipients towards the way 
in which the public servants of the Ministry of Labour perform their job and due 
to our experience or knowledge we already know that more or less 80% of the 
interviewees will have a negative opinion and the remaining 20% will have a 
positive opinion towards them, then our degree of variability is 80-20. However, 
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when we do not have that knowledge or the answers are not so apparent, the 
standard 50%-50% degree of variability provides a more accurate sample size 
(Dillman & Salant 1994, 55). As explained above, the cohort for our research 
was comprised of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme who had 
potentially finished high school in the municipality of Toluca. Therefore, with a 
population of 4,176 ex-recipients (see Table 3.5) who had been enrolled in the 
final year of education, substituting all the values we argued for above, we 
obtained a sample size of 352 ex-recipients.56 
For the final administration of the questionnaire, the vocales helped us to 
locate ex-recipients who had finished high school in the different localities of 
Toluca. We needed six successive weeks to complete our sample size. The 
interviews were undertaken either in front of the houses of the ex-recipients or 
their places of work, and some of them agreed to meet us in public places 
(public parks or gardens) where the people of Oportunidades held meetings 
whenever they needed to do so in the different localities of Toluca. All the data 
collected from the survey was analysed using the descriptive SPSS functions as 
we shall see later in the following chapters. 
3.4 Final remarks 
In this chapter, we have explained in detail the research design of this 
study. We have highlighted the advantages of combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods for research and we have also pointed out the importance 
of each of them. More precisely, we have reported in depth the way in which our 
fieldwork proceeded and the way we managed to solve the main difficulties that 
                                                          
56
 See: http://biblioteca.uam.es/sc/documentos/encuesta/anexo_iii.pdf. For a full explanation of the 
mathematical formula to determine a sample size. 
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we faced and how we defined and built our sample. Before we went to Mexico, 
our research project was successfully approved by the Humanities and Social 
Sciences Ethics Committee (HSSEC) of the University of York, which made 
only two recommendations regarding the interviews with the ex-recipients. First, 
to make clear verbally (and in writing on the project information form) that we 
were not part of, or connected to, the Ministry of Social Development team and 
that the grant of their family members was not conditional on them completing 
this questionnaire and, second, to obtain a signed record of consent from each 
participant (see appendices 2 and 3).  
The main part of our research methodology is without doubt made up of 
quantitative methods because we wanted to be able to make generalizations 
from our findings about the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme of 
our selected region in order to provide a good example of the relationship 
between the cash transfer programmes, the capacities of the state and the 
labour market in urban zones. Nonetheless, it must also be highlighted that we 
also gave ourselves room to carry out qualitative interviews with the ex-
recipients and other relevant actors in order to explore and understand their 
perceptions towards our object of study. Furthermore, the qualitative interviews 
helped us to develop our questionnaire and to triangulate the results of our 
questionnaire which allowed us to better answer our question. 
The questionnaire was designed to understand and explore the extent to 
which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the state has shaped the 
labour market in a way that has impeded the poor from obtaining sustained 
income to escape poverty. Consequently, our research design allows us to 
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identify the links between the institutional capacities of the Mexican state, at the 
three levels of government, and the labour market, contextualizing poverty 
beyond the understanding that it is the consequence of the lack of basic 
education and health. In the next three chapters, we shall analyse the extent to 
which the weakness of the institutional capacity of the state prevents the ex-
recipients of the Oportunidades programme who had finished high school that 
we interviewed from obtaining sustained income in the labour market.  
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CHAPTER 4 
OPORTUNIDADES, THE LABOUR MARKET AND THE REGULATORY-
MARKET CAPACITY OF THE STATE 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first part of the thesis, we have discussed our research problem, 
contextualized the Mexican anti-poverty policy Oportunidades within the Latin 
American and Mexican scenario and reviewed the way in which the levels of 
labour informalization and economic insecurity have increased in recent 
decades. We also studied the experiences of other developing and developed 
countries and showed why the institutional capacities of the state are a key 
factor in alleviating poverty. In the next three empirical chapters, we shall shed 
light on the extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the 
Mexican state have shaped the labour market in a way that has impeded the 
Oportunidades programme from enabling the poor to obtain sustained income 
that would allow them move out of poverty.   
In this chapter, we shall examine the extent to which the weakness of the 
regulatory-market capacity of the state impedes the Oportunidades programme 
from enabling the poor to obtain sustained income in the labour market. We 
argue that the weakness of the regulatory-market capacity of the state, brought 
about by the weakly institutionalized bureaucratic and third party enforcement 
apparatuses in the world of labour, impedes the state from making the private 
sector comply with the law while fostering employment generation. As already 
explained, Mexico is a Federal state divided into three levels of government: 
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federal, state and municipal. For the purposes of our research, we shall 
undertake our analysis accordingly since the labour market is shared and 
shaped by the institutional capacities of the three levels of government. In the 
case of the local governments, state and municipality, we shall mainly focus on 
the cases of the State of Mexico and Toluca respectively, where we carried out 
our fieldwork. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section will introduce 
brief descriptions of the population that we interviewed. The second section will 
discuss the extent to which the weakly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus 
of the Mexican state impedes the protection of the workers’ rights while 
fostering employment generation. In section three, we shall discuss the extent 
to which the weakly institutionalized third-party enforcement has limited the ex-
recipients from forming or being part of a worker´s organization that represents 
their interests against the employers and the state. Section four will consider the 
extent to which the weaknesses of the regulatory-market capacity of the 
Mexican state has increased the levels of labour informality, which has reduced 
the opportunities of the ex-recipients to obtain sustained income in the labour 
market. Section five presents the main conclusions of the chapter.  
4.1 A brief description of the population interviewed 
 
As we have already explained in Chapter 3, we interviewed 352 ex-
recipients, and of these 209 (59.4%) were female and 143 (40.6 %) were male. 
The age range of the population was a span of six years, with people between 
18 and 23 years old. The mean age of our population was 20.5 years; the mode 
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was 19 and the median was 20 years, as Table 4.1 shows. As for their marital 
status, Table 4.2 shows that almost 80% of the population were single whereas 
the remaining 20% were married, divorced or cohabitating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the time that we undertook our research, the whole population that we 
interviewed resided in Toluca. Table 4.2 shows that 55.4% of our population 
were working or had a job or an occupation, 27% were studying for a BA and 
17.6% of the population were unemployed. The characteristics of our population 
are very similar to those of the general population of Toluca of a similar age. 
According to INEGI, by 2010 among the population of Toluca between 20 and 
24 years old (74,646, 49% men and 51% women), 52% (33% men and 19% 
women) had a job or an occupation whereas the remaining 48% (16% men and 
32% women) did not have a job because they were either studying or 
unemployed.   
 
  
Table 4.1 Sex and age of the ex-recipients 
 
Sex 
Age 
Total 
18 19 20 21 22 23 
Female 22 45 36 40 21 45 
209 
(59.4%) 
Male 16 33 32 23 18 22 
143 
(40.6%) 
 
Total 37 78 68 63 39 67 352 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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Table 4.2 Sex, living and marital status of the ex-recipients 
 
Sex What do you do 
Marital status 
Total % 
Single Married Divorced Cohabitating 
 
 
  Female 
Student 56 2 0 0 58      16.5 
Employed 65 9 2 8 84 23.9 
Own business 8 3 0 2 13 3.7 
Study and work  4 0 0 0 4 1.1 
Unemployed 28 9 1 12 50 14.2 
 Total 171 23 3 22 209 59.4 
 
  Male 
Student 37 0 - 0 37 10.5 
Employed 50 9 - 11 70 19.9 
Own business 17 2 - 1 20 5.7 
 
Study and work  4 0 - 0 4 1.1 
Unemployed 11 1 - 0 12 3.4 
Total 119 12 - 12 143 40.6 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, labour market institutionalization is divided 
between the federal and the state level. Therefore, we shall pay attention to the 
different sectors of the economy where the ex-recipients worked that are the 
responsibility of each level.57 As Table 4.3 shows, of the 352 recipients that we 
interviewed, 46 (13.1%) worked in some industrial or goods and service 
branches that belonged to federal jurisdiction (FJ), 149 (42.3%) worked in 
industrial or goods and service branches that belong to local jurisdictions (LJ), 
95 (27%) were full-time students and 62 (17.6%) were unemployed.  
                                                          
57
 The Federal level is responsible for the general conditions of work in key industries such as textiles, 
electronics, cinematography, sugar, mining, rubber, metal and steel, hydrocarbons, petrochemicals, 
cement, lime; automotive including mechanical and electrical auto parts; chemistry, including 
pharmaceutical chemistry and medicine; cellulose and paper; vegetable oils and fats, production of 
packaged, canned or bottled food, production of bottled or canned beverages; railroad; basic timber, 
glass, and tobacco, banking and credit services whatever their location, while the state level, on the 
other hand, is in charge of monitoring labour laws as a whole in all branches established in its territory, 
other than those that are part of the federal jurisdiction. As for the health and safety and training issues, 
the local jurisdiction is in charge of inspecting all the companies that are established in its territory even 
of those that are under federal jurisdiction. 
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In comparison with the population of Toluca, as far as employment by 
sector is concerned, we could not find data per jurisdiction. However, according 
to INEGI, by 2010 around 50% of the population in Toluca worked in the service 
sector, around 27% in the industrial sector and around 20% had a business of 
some kind. As Table 4.3 shows, of those that we interviewed, more than 50% of 
the ex-recipients who had a job or an occupation were working in the service 
sector, around 22% were working in the industrial sector and around 15% had a 
business of some kind. In this sense too, our population is very similar to the 
general population of Toluca as far as their employment by sector is concerned. 
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Table 4.3 Workers in federal and local jurisdictions18 
Current employment 
High-tech 
FJ 
Manufacturing      
FJ 
Services   
FJ 
Federal 
government 
Manufacturers      
LJ 
Services   
LJ 
Local 
government 
Microenterprises     
LJ 
Informal   
LJ 
Students and 
unemployed 
 
 
Total 
Students 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 95 
Craft 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 0 10 
Helper/ assistant 7 15 0 0 2 25 0 12 0 0 61 
Cashier 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Labourer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 62 
Nurse 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 1 0 6 
Engineer 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Janitor 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 
Instructor 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 4 
Waiter 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Own business 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 5 0 33 
Nanny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Worker man 1 12 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 15 
Clerk 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 6 
Private security 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Public servant 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 7 
Employee 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Technician 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 0 9 
Telemarketer 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 6 
Peddler 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Counter seller 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 2 0 0 13 
 Total 9 (2.8%) 31 (8.8%) 3 (0.9%) 3 (0.9%)  3 (0.9%)   72 (20.5)  12 (3.3%) 44 (12.5%) 18 (5.1%)  157 (44.6%)  352 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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4.2 Weakly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus  
 
Following the logic of our theoretical framework, one of the main reasons 
why the private sector has been able to advance labour market flexibilization 
through an informal process is the institutional weakness of the Mexican state to 
make the employers comply with the law, helping them at the same time to 
increase or maintain their productivity, by institutionalizing specialized 
organizations to fulfil this function. The organizations upon which the 
institutionalization of the labour market depends are, on the one hand, those 
organizations of the state in charge of monitoring and inspecting the labour 
regulations and those in charge of the application of labour justice, and on the 
other hand the unions. In this section, using the data that we obtained in our 
fieldwork, and drawing on Chapters 1 and 2, we shall analyse the extent to 
which the weakly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus of those organizations 
of the state in charge of the labour justice impedes the state from making the 
private sector comply with the law while helping them at the same time to 
increase or maintain their productivity.  
4.2.1.1 Labour inspection  
During all the stabilizing period (1940-1970) and until the late 1990s, 
labour inspection in Mexico, as in most of the Latin American countries, was 
based on a good amount of inspections and strict sanctions, which were 
supposed to force firms to give up violating the law due to the fact that the 
probability of being caught and the cost of punishment were higher than the 
benefits of non-compliance (Pires 2008, 202). However, as we explained in 
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Chapters 1 and 2, after the opening of the economy due to the weakness of the 
regulatory-market capacity of the Mexican state, the bargaining power of the 
private sector (national and international) grew so much that it escaped the 
control of the state, influencing the adjustment of the labour market institutions 
informally in their own interest without going through a formal process.  
In 1995, Carlos María Abascal, the president of the Employers’ 
Confederation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX) and the most influencial 
union leader at that moment, Fidel Velázquez of the Confederation of the 
Mexican Workers (CTM), agreed the principles of the New Labour Culture that 
should be followed within the world of labour.58 In 2000, when the right-wing 
political party PAN took over, Abascal was appointed Minister of Labour and in 
2001, claiming that the lack of compliance with labour norms was due to the fact 
that the private sector and the employees did not know them, the Mexican state 
envisioned a new role for labour inspection as a compliance-guide and advisory 
body. Accordingly, budgets for inspectorates were decreased by as much as 
80% from previous periods (Bensusam 2007, 13-17). Instead they started 
programmes that were supposed to allow employers and workers to know about 
labour legislation, which would encourage their voluntary compliance with 
labour norms, leaving sanctions aside.59  
                                                          
58
 The principles governing the new labour culture that he promoted were: 1. human work has an ethical 
value and transcendence; 2. what determines the value of the work is, first, the dignity of the person; 3. 
the work is a source of rights and obligations; 4. a fair compensation for the work; 5. training for 
personal growth; 6. teamwork; 7. an inclusive society; 8. the dialogue and unity of efforts; 9. solidarity 
between workers and employers; 10. productivity, quality and competitiveness; and 11. social 
responsibility (STyPS 2003). As we can see, none of these involved a real commitment to combine 
productivity and law enforcement, nor even to comply with the law. 
59
 The main programmes are: 1. The Self-Management Programme on Safety and Health at Work (1999) 
(PASST - Programa de Autogestión en Seguridad y Salud en el Trabajo in Spanish). The objective of PASST 
is to encourage the companies to incorporate administrative systems of security and health voluntarily 
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Table 4.4 Number of inspectors per 1000 workers 2006 federal level 
Country 
Number of 
Inspectors 
Number of workers   Rate 
Argentina   392  10,737   3.65 
Brazil  3,048  90,962  3.35 
Chile  320  6,345   5.04 
China  43,000 753,600   5.71 
Germany  3,810  41,149   9.26 
Mexico (2006) 219 42,643 0.51 
USA  2,100  149,320  1.41 
Source: Romero (2008, 130). 
As a result, the labour inspection situation deteriorated seriously. Since 
1994 the number of inspectors has decreased by more than 50% (Bensusam 
2007, 14). By 2006, Mexico had a very low coverage of inspectors per worker, 
as Table 4.4 shows, and the number of inspections decreased significantly; 
between 2001 and 2006 only 1.76% (14,325) of the workplaces registered with 
IMSS and 3.7% of those registered with the Ministry of Labour were visited 
(Romero 2008, 127). Accordingly, sanctions applications decreased too. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and in exchange they will not have inspections related to health and safety. It is directed at high risk 
companies and/or those that have more than 50 employees. However, although since the programme 
started the number of accidents has decreased, due to its complexity most of the firms registered are 
big enterprises, and it is rare for a medium or small firm to register for it (Bensusam 2008, 97). 2. Labour 
Electronic Declaration (2005) (Declaración Laboral Electrónica in Spanish). The objective of DECLARE is 
that companies and workers know the norms and regulations and it covers the declaration of the private 
sector companies of all the labour regulations. There are random checks to verify that the companies 
are fulfilling what they declare; if they do not do so, they are given some time to comply. If they do not 
do so again then they are sanctioned. According to Bensusam, by August 2006 1,288 were registered but 
only 697 declared (ibid, 99) and; 3. Private units of verification. The companies that agree to have 
private certification in health, safety and working environment will not receive any more visits in the 
next two years although random checks are supposed to take place to verify that they are complying 
with the law. Units of verification are classified into three different types: A, those that work as third-
party enforcement; B, those that work as an internal comptroller, that is, they belong to the 
organization that they verify; and C, those that, apart from verifying the norms, design, maintain and 
manufacture the products that they verify. There are 109 units of verification in total but only five that 
undertake real third party enforcement (Type A); all the others have some kind of close relationship 
with the firm that they verify.  
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Bensusam reported that during 2000 and 2006, there were 43% fewer fines 
imposed than in the previous administration and the amount of money collected 
decreased by around 40% from 2002 to 2005, falling from 8,067,254 to 
4,887,163 pesos (2008, 91-93), thereby weakening the fiscal capacity of the 
state as well.   
At the end of the Vicente Fox period (2000-2006), a very unfortunate 
incident showed that this new and friendlier labour inspection was not exactly 
the right one. In the state of Coahuila, located in the northern part of Mexico, in 
a charcoal mine known as Pasta de Conchos, 65 workers died after an 
explosion due to a lack of appropriate health and safety measures.60 Four local 
mine supervisors were convicted of manslaughter and in 2010 the court of 
administrative and fiscal justice found the Ministry of Labour guilty of omission 
and negligence in the accident (Bensusam & Middlebrook op. cit., 58).61 This 
was the first time that the judicial system had recognized the legal responsibility 
of the executive. The response of the Federal government was to increase the 
budget dedicated to labour inspection and in consequence the number of 
inspectors. In 2007, a hundred more inspectors were hired and 458 more 
between 2011 and 2012, although the coverage of inspectors per worker is still 
very low in comparison with some other developing countries, as previously 
noted.62  
                                                          
60
 According to Bensusam, half of the workers who died in the Pasta de Conchos incident worked for an 
outsourced company, had low salaries and were without access to any kind social security (2007, 65). 
61
 On 14 August 2012 and then on 31 January 2013, there were explosions in two different plants of the 
Mexican state oil company (PEMEX), which coincidently was certified as a Type B private unit of 
verification in 2003 due to it being economically very important and a very high-risk company.   
62
 Data obtained from the STyPS requested through IFAI in 2012. 
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However, the low number of inspectors is not the only problem, nor even 
the main one. Due to the nature of their function, being street-level bureaucrats, 
labour inspectors have high discretionary powers to interpret the norms, the 
level of sanction or remedial plan that they apply in each case.63 In recent years 
it has been empirically demonstrated that bureaucratic discretion is not only 
pervasive but also necessary so that labour inspectors can really be a vehicle to 
link social and economic development as long as their activities are properly 
institutionalized formally and informally (Piore & Schrank 2008; Pires 2008 & 
2011; Schrank 2009). More precisely, to make firms comply with their regulatory 
obligations, it is required that inspectors are not only specialized in the 
economic sector that they inspect but are also deeply involved with the 
business and companies in order to develop innovative solutions to maintain 
and/or enhance their productivity and competitiveness but with enough 
autonomy to make them comply with the labour norms and regulations.  
The key elements that some empirical studies in Latin America have 
identified to achieve such a goal are as follows. 1. Public officials are recruited 
and remunerated on the basis of their merits and specialized in economic or 
industrial sectors, which allows them to engage in root-cause analysis and 
open-ended conversations with other government and non-government actors, 
weighing the numerous values at stake, bringing about effective solutions (Piore 
& Schrank 2008, 12; Pires 2011, 61). In a study of the Brazilian case, Pires 
(2008, 208) showed that by targeting different industries as a whole, labour 
                                                          
63
 In Mexico, the inspector decides the exact amount of fines that are imposed. Only if corrective 
measures ordered by labour inspectors are not implemented by the employers and if problems persist 
may the Ministry of Labour order a partial or complete closure of the workplace until the violation has 
been eliminated. According to data obtained from the STyPS requested through IFAI in 2012, from 2001 
to 2012 only one firm was closed for non-compliance with labour regulations. 
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inspectors have been able to find solutions that range from health and safety 
measures that reduced occupational accidents without having to replace 
obsolete and dangerous equipment, which would be costly, improving the 
quality of products that used dangerous chemicals, decreasing the number of 
workers’ accidents, and in the informal sector, establishing temporary contracts 
specific to the business’s activities, and establishing basic protections for 
workers without having to pay all fringe benefits. 2. Coercive strategies are 
necessary for the effectiveness of the technical solutions. In his research in 
Brazil, Pires (ibid., 214,216) also showed that the inspectors had to impose 
fines along with technical solutions to let the employers know that if they did not 
get involved in finding or implementing the solutions proposed, they would have 
to face the strength of the law. 3. It is necessary that the supervision of 
inspections incorporates short-, medium- and long-term goals (ibid., 206-209). 
Short-term goals will allow inspectors to measure the outcomes of inspections 
in terms of the compliance of the labour norms and regulations. Medium- and 
long-term goals, on the other hand, will allow them to define goals, procedures 
and strategies to enhance the firms’ productivity while making them comply with 
labour norms and regulations.  
In Mexico, on the other hand, the labour inspection situation is 
contrastingly different. For instance, at the federal level, despite the fact that in 
2003-2004 a civil service system that was supposed to bring about higher 
organizational capacity, professionalization and corporate coherence was 
implemented, the corporatist practices that structure the institutional framework 
of the state have constrained the development of an effective labour inspection 
apparatus. In the broadest terms, the civil service would combine Weberian 
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principles of meritocracy and the necessary public officials’ market 
responsiveness to adjust to new economic tendencies.64 This would suggest 
that as far as labour inspection is concerned, the civil service should ideally help 
to reconcile the employers’ demand for flexibility with the workers’ demand for 
protection.  
As already explained, in Mexico, at the federal level, there are 776 labour 
inspectors, all of whom are part of the civil service system of the Federal Public 
Administration. There are two kinds of inspector: 1. specialized inspectors, in 
charge of watching the businesses that are considered to be high risk, such as 
chemical companies; and 2. regular inspectors, in charge of watching low-risk 
companies.65 In their respective jurisdictions, both are responsible for the 
enforcement of all the labour norms and regulations. The problem is that 
although they are recruited according to their merit, they are not responsive to 
the market since they are not specialized in the different economic or industrial 
sectors. The profiles that they mainly look for are lawyers and engineers. 
However, the training courses that both of them receive are only about the 
labour norms and regulations and interpersonal relationships and they are not 
trained in the particularities of the production processes of the different sectors 
of the economy. Moreover, the only difference between the regular and 
                                                          
64 Presentation by José Silvestre Méndez, member of the designing group of the LSPC of the federal 
public administration, in the Diploma course in Gestión Integral de la Función Pública en México: 
Profesionalización y Transparencia, organized by UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in 
Spanish) and Cámara de Diputados (National Parliament of Mexico). March to July 2006. Mexico City. 
65
 Federal inspector wages range from around 900 dollars per month for the specialized inspector and 
less than 700 dollars per month for the regular inspector, this being one of the lowest for the staff of the 
Ministry of Labour (Bensusam 2007, 13-17). 
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specialized inspectors is that specialized inspectors are required to have more 
experience at the moment of recruitment or promotion.66  
Furthermore, supervision at the federal level comprises only the 
verification of short-term goals and the procedure to change them is very rigid. 
In consequence, there is no way to establish remedial plans that take into 
account both legal and economic variables in the medium and long term. This 
hinders them when it comes to understanding the obstacles that prevent firms 
from complying with the law and proposing legal and/or technical solutions 
adapted to their needs, which, along with their low wages, lack of experience 
and necessary equipment to perform inspections properly, makes it difficult to 
detect irregularities. For instance, during our fieldwork, we had the chance to 
interview the chief of human resources of a small company that manufactured 
automobile seats and she confirmed that in order to comply with the law 
sometimes a long-term perspective is necessary because the way in which the 
products have to be manufactured, the materials and also the workers change 
constantly and it is not easy for the enterprises to change their machinery or 
train the workers in a short period of time. In this sense, it is necessary that 
labour inspection also incorporate medium- and long-term goals that would 
allow the inspectors to define strategies to enhance the firms’ productivity. 
The situation in the State of Mexico is not very different from what we 
have presented about the federal level. Moreover, were we to take into 
consideration that the state level is in charge of the inspection of most of the 
service sector, and that most of the employment is now growing in that sector, 
                                                          
66
 Data obtained from the STyPS requested through IFAI in 2012. 
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we could easily say that it is even worse. To start with, the role of labour 
inspection is both a compliance-guide and an advisory body that has to fulfil 
short-term goals. Additionally, by 2012 there were only 27 inspectors in the 
State of Mexico, 80% of them politically appointed.67 Of those, twelve were in 
charge of monitoring health and security issues with a goal to inspect 150 
enterprises annually (around 6200 workers) and fifteen were in charge of 
monitoring general conditions of work and training issues with an annual goal of 
300 enterprises (around 11,500 workers).68  
In addition, in interviews carried out with people in the General Direction 
of Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labour of the State of Mexico, we were told 
that due to the lack of budget and staff, they do not have access to an updated 
census of centres of work, which forces them to limit inspections to the 
companies for which they have all the information.69 Therefore, informal 
enterprises, those that do not pay taxes whatsoever, are outside the scope of 
the inspection because they are only inspected if a worker makes a complaint. 
Moreover, they argued that the lack of institutional coordination with the Federal 
Ministry of the Treasury (SHCP) made it even more difficult since the average 
period of life of a business or enterprise in the service sector is normally two 
years, but the two ministries do not share information that could help to keep 
the census updated. Furthermore, as far as the inspection of training conditions 
is concerned, the local inspectors check that the enterprises comply with the 
                                                          
67
 Data obtained from the Ministry of Labour of the State of Mexico (ST) requested through INFOEM in 
2012. 
68
 According to INEGI, by 2012 there were 585,000 centres of work established in the State of Mexico, 
which would give us a rate of one labour inspector for around every 24,375 centres of work. 
69
 The people of the General Direction of Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labour told us that in the last 
ten years, the budget of the Ministry of Labour had been increased by only 500,000 pesos (around 
25,000 pounds sterling) and that they had only five cars for the 27 inspectors to travel around the State 
of Mexico which has a total area of 22,351 km2. 
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labour norms and regulations but only on paper and not in practice. That is, they 
have to verify whether the enterprises have a training programme and let the 
Federal Ministry of Labour know, but they do not confirm that the courses are 
carried out or interview the workers about this. 
In the same interview with the chief of human resources of the small 
company that manufactured automobile seats, she told us that the enterprise 
where she worked was a house that did not even fulfil the minimum 
requirements of security signalled by the labour norms and regulations and that 
although workers are registered in IMSS, if there is an accident they take them 
to a private hospital so that the owners of the enterprise do not have to pay for 
medical leave or attract the attention of IMSS in regard to the working 
conditions that they offer. According to her, when there are health and safety 
issues, workers do not sue the enterprise because they know that a trial will last 
a long time and that hiring a prestigious advocate is very expensive.  
In addition, she told us that in the two years that she had been working 
for that enterprise they had never been inspected. According to her, this was 
mainly because her enterprise was a small one, with only around 100 workers, 
and inspectors prefer to monitor the medium- or large-sized ones because in 
those they can obtain a higher bribe in the case of an enterprise violating the 
labour norms and regulations. When we questioned her about why the inspector 
would be after a bribe if labour inspection was supposed to be an advisory body 
that only fined as a last resort, she told us that the inspectors take advantage of 
the lack of knowledge of the norms by the enterprises and they still made them 
believe that they would be fined if they did not bribe the inspectors.  
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In this sense, the logic of the fact that enterprises do not know the labour 
norms and regulations could be correct. However, there is a constraint that has 
to be overcome first: the corruption of the labour inspectors brought about by 
the weak institutionalization of the state’s bureaucratic apparatus that could be 
involved deep enough with the private sector to help them increase or maintain 
their productivity, but with enough autonomy to protect workers’ rights. This is 
one of the reasons why firms are not always open to inspectors’ advice. Nor are 
they willing to change the way they normally do business at the inspectors’ 
request.  
For instance, during our fieldwork, we also had the opportunity to 
interview a member of an automotive cluster who worked in the State of Mexico 
between 2008 and 2010. The cluster was an initiative of the government of the 
State of Mexico in order to encourage the growth of the automotive industry, 
one of the most important industries in the State of Mexico, and generate 
employment. The idea was to gather the big, medium, small and 
microenterprises and other actors that are part of the automotive sector, link 
them to each other and listen to them, and then come up with solutions that 
benefit everyone. He shared information with the members of another similar 
but successful cluster situated in the city of Monterrey in the state of Nuevo 
León in the northern part of Mexico. When we asked him why the cluster of 
Monterrey, unlike the one of the State of Mexico, was successful, he 
commented that the main difference had been that in Monterrey, although it had 
also been an initiative of the government, the cluster and its organization were 
led by members of the private sector who were able to convince other 
entrepreneurs to invest time and money in the formation of the cluster, whereas 
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in the State of Mexico, the cluster had been led by a public servant, albeit a 
prestigious and educated one, and the entrepreneurs have a negative image of 
public servants. The opinions of the poor people that we interviewed showed a 
reality not so far away from what we have argued here, as we shall show next.  
Table 4.5 Monitoring and inspection of the compliance of labour norms 20 
Type of firm 
There are 
very few 
inspections 
There is 
corruption to 
avoid 
sanctioning 
the employer 
Inspectors are 
not specialized 
enough to 
advise and/or 
enforce the law 
Yes 
No 
answer 
Total % 
High-tech FJ 2 0 2 5 0 9 2.6 
Manufacturing FJ  15 6 4 6 0 31 8.8 
Services FJ 2 0 0 1 0 3 0.9 
 Federal government 0 0 0 3 0 3 0.9 
Manufacturing LJ 1 1 1 0 0 3 0.9 
Services LJ 36 15 7 14 0 72 20.5 
State government 5 0 1 6 0 12 3.4 
Micro enteprises LJ 24 13 0 7 0 44 12.5 
Informal LJ 10 6 1 1 0 18 5.1 
Unemployed LJ 20 9 0 0 33 62 17.6 
Students 2 2 0 0 91 95 27.0 
Total 117 52 16 43 124 352 100 
% 33.2 14.8 4.5 12.2 35.2 100  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
Table 4.5 shows the opinions of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades 
programme on questions 9 and 10 of our questionnaire, ‘Do you consider that 
labour inspectors properly monitor and inspect compliance with labour norms 
and regulations in the companies where you have worked, YES/NO’ and ‘If you 
answered NO to the previous question, please indicate why’. Of the 100% ex-
recipients who we interviewed, only 12.2% answered that the labour inspectors 
monitored the compliance of labour laws in an impartial and impersonal way 
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and 52.6% answered that the labour inspectors did NOT inspect them in an 
impartial and impersonal way, and the remaining 35.2% (all of them either 
students or unemployed) did not answer. Of the ex-recipients interviewed who 
answered NO (52.6%), 14.8% thought that inspectors avoided sanctioning the 
employers, 4.5% answered that inspectors were not specialized enough to 
advise and/or enforce the law, and 33.2% answered that labour laws are not 
enforced properly because there are very few inspections. As we can see, we 
could not find any general pattern or difference in regard to the opinion of the 
ex-recipients between the federal and state inspectors.  
After having reviewed the situation of the labour inspectorates at the 
federal and state level and bearing in mind the results of the ex-recipients and 
some of the interviews with people from the private sector, we confirm first of all 
that labour inspection is far from being seen as an important instrument to 
harness the interests of the private sector in pursuit of the general interest. 
Moreover, we could easily say that it is wrongly seen as a component that could 
constrain employment generation. However, without a strongly institutionalized 
bureaucratic apparatus that protects workers’ rights, the poor might not be able 
to obtain sustained income in the labour market as we shall see later on in this 
chapter.   
4.2.2.2 Labour justice system 
At the federal and state levels, there are two main organizations in 
charge of labour justice: 1. the federal and state Boards of Conciliation and 
Arbitration (JFCyA – Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje and JLCyA – 
Junta Local de Conciliación y Arbitraje in Spanish) and; 2. the federal and state 
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Attorney of Workers’ Defence (PROFEDET – Procuraduría Federal de la 
Defensa del Trabajador and PRODET – Procuraduría Estatal de la Defensa del 
Trabajador in Spanish). The Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration are in charge 
of the resolution of labour disputes that arise between workers and employers, 
or only among employers or among workers in the economic sectors of their 
jurisdiction. They are structured into a tripartite scheme in order to ensure 
“equal” representation between the private sector and workers: an equal 
number of employers’ and workers’ representatives and a representative of the 
government, who plays the role of a referee to defend workers’ rights. The 
Attorneys of Workers’ Defence, on the other hand, are in charge of advising 
workers and representing them in trials against employers or unions.  
The Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration were the cornerstone of the 
corporatist model that prevailed in Mexico before the opening of the economy 
since they were only established to keep unions under control (López 2006, 15). 
This is because in spite of being the organizations in charge of enforcing labour 
justice, they do not belong to the judicial power but they are supposed to be 
autonomous bodies. However, the representatives of the state in both its federal 
and local offices are appointed directly by the federal and state executive 
power, respectively, and the staff of both bodies is appointed directly by their 
superior as well. 70  
Furthermore, Article 919 of the LFT states that these Boards can modify 
agreed working conditions (in collective contracts) in order to achieve balance 
                                                          
70
 The JFCyA is composed of 66 offices called Special Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration. Every one of 
these special boards is specialized in the conciliation and arbitration of the sectors of the economy that 
the Ministry of Labour designates. The JLCyA, on the other hand, has two offices in the State of Mexico 
that cover the most populated regions, one in Toluca and the other one that covers the municipalities 
that surround DF.    
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and social justice in the relations between workers and employers. In this 
sense, there is a major contradiction in the law as far as the performance of the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state is concerned since the Boards should not be 
playing both roles.71 Consequently, there are no real checks on the wrong 
performance of the other organizations of the government, which is, as we 
argued in Chapter 1, the only way to guarantee impartiality and impersonality in 
the solution of labour conflicts. According to Aguilar et al., by 2007 there were 
183,298 trials without resolution because the representatives of the private 
sector delay the trials on purpose, since in order for the boards to carry out a 
trial, 51% of all the members have to be present (2012, 28). 
In the case of PROFEDET and PRODE, the situation is even worse 
since, first of all, both organizations belong to the executive power, which, as 
we argued above, might be more interested in keeping firms running so that 
there is employment than in protecting workers’ rights. Moreover, although the 
budget allocated to these offices has been increased since 2001, albeit only 
nominally, it has not been enough to improve the number of services provided.72 
In the case of PROFEDET, there are only 210 lawyers dedicated to providing 
advice to the more than 42,643 workers who exist within federal jurisdiction, of 
which only sixteen belong to the professional service career and the other 194 
are politically appointed. As for PRODET, there are only 43 lawyers dedicated 
                                                          
71
 Bensusam interviewed magistrates of the judicial power about the performance of the personnel of 
the JFCyA regarding the resolution of conflicts and they pointed out that the wide range of discretion 
and their lack of professionalism are two of the most important problems in the administration of 
labour justice (2007, 24). 
72
 PROFEDET has 45 offices all over the country and two automobiles with one lawyer each that visit the 
most populated working places to provide advice to the workers. Apart from DF, where there are more 
than 100 advisors, the average number of advisors per state is only three. Data obtained from 
PROFEDET through IFAI requested in 2011. 
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to providing advice to the more than 3,000,000 workers within local jurisdiction, 
all of them politically appointed.73 
Accordingly, in our fieldwork we found that the law enforcement in the 
resolution of conflicts between workers and employers is believed to benefit the 
employers and that workers are not properly advised on how to defend their 
rights in those kinds of conflict. Questions 11 and 12 were: ‘With what level of 
impartiality and impersonality do you believe that the labour norms and 
regulations are enforced in the resolutions of conflicts between workers and 
employers?’ and ‘If you answered low or very low in the previous question, 
indicate the main reason you chose that answer’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73
 In the case of PRODE, there are two main offices one in Toluca and another one in the municipality of 
Tlalnepantla. Data obtained from the website of the local Ministry of Labour of the State of Mexico: 
http://portal2.edomex.gob.mx/strabajo/index.htm. Accessed: January 2012. 
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Table 4.6 shows the opinions of the ex-recipients about the way in which 
the labour norms and regulations are enforced in the resolution of conflicts 
between workers and employers. Of the 352 ex-recipients of Oportunidades 
that we interviewed, 76.1% answered that the impartial and impersonal level of 
enforcement was low or very low and 23.9% answered that it was medium, high 
or very high. Most of the recipients who answered either low or very low 
(40.1%) believed that the rights of the workers are usually disregarded to 
benefit the employer, 21.6% believed that the problem is that workers are not 
Table 4.6 Level of impartiality and impersonality with which labour norms and regulations 
are enforced 
Type of firm 
The rights of the 
workers are 
disregarded to 
benefit the employer 
 
Trials take too long 
to finish 
Workers are 
not properly 
advised on how 
to defend their 
rights 
No 
answer  Total 
 
 
% 
 High-tech FJ 5 0 1 3 9 2.6 
Manufacturers FJ 15 5 6 5 31 8.8 
Services FJ 1 0 0 2 3 0.9 
Federal government  2 1 0 0 3 0.9 
Manufacturers LJ  1 1 1 0 3 0.9 
Services LJ  35 11 12 14 72 21.5 
Local government 1 2 5 4 12 3.4 
Microenterprises 6 9 10 19 44 12.5 
Informal*  2 5 6 5 18 5.1 
Unemployment 30 4 10 18 62 17.6 
Students 43 11 25 16 95 27 
Total 141 49 76 86 352 100 
% 40.1 13.9 21.6 24.4 100.0  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
*By informal jobs, we mean those jobs in complete informality since people work on their own as masons or peddlers. That is with no contract, 
no kind of social security, no access to organizations that represent their interests and so on. 
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properly advised on how to defend their rights, and 13.9% answered that trials 
take too long to finish. Again, we could not find any pattern in the answers of the 
ex-recipients that could give us elements of analysis to differentiate their 
opinions in regard to the performance of the federal and local labour justice 
organizations.     
The results presented above would suggest that the corporatist legacies 
of the Mexican state and the ideology of the new economic model have 
reinforced each other, worsening the situation of workers, as we shall see later 
on in this chapter. Therefore, even if a strongly institutionalized bureaucratic 
apparatus was created, it would not be enough in itself, since some sort of 
ideological shift is needed as well to harness the interests of the private sector 
in pursuit of the general interest. The reason is, as we shall see in the next 
section, because the only reason that the Mexican state has found for 
increasing and improving the bureaucracy in the world of labour is that they 
believe that it is a substitute for collective bargaining in the new model rather 
than a complement.   
4.3 Weak unions  
In Chapter 1, we discussed the importance of the institutionalization of 
third-party enforcement in order to guarantee every citizen impersonal open 
access to the organizations that structure society and that allow the citizenry to 
pursue their social, political and economic goals equally. However, the state 
and the private sector have promoted the reduction and shrinking of the unions, 
which play the role of third-party enforcer of law in the world of labour, because 
the new economic model, neo-liberalists argue, excludes them since the 
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economic operations are a great deal more globalized and unions would 
constrain them. This has impeded workers’ organizations from using their 
political rights to press for wider social rights that could increase the chances of 
the poor to obtain sustained income.  
Moreover, the fact that in Mexico, as in some other Latin American 
countries, the structural reforms were introduced prior to electoral democracy 
not only constrained the state from taking advantage of the corporatist legacies 
of the country to build collective capacities, as happened for example in Brazil, 
but also, electoral democracy fragmented the labour movement even more 
since it was more difficult to control the unions at the polls (Bensusam & 
Middlebrook op. cit., 9).74 As a result, the private sector normally prefers to 
break or distort the law to reduce its labour costs since there are no unions 
strong enough to bargain with, which has brought about the perpetuation of low 
skill levels and an increase in labour informalization and economic insecurity.  
As argued above, the employment law was the main tool that has been 
used to keep unions under control. The law introduced two main mechanisms to 
control them: 1. so that they can have representation in the local and national 
Conciliation and Arbitration Courts, unions have to register with the STyPS 
(Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social) if they are in the federal jurisdiction 
sector or with JCyA if they are of local jurisdiction and; 2. the exclusion clause 
(Article 395 of the LFT) brought about collective bargaining as the main source 
                                                          
74
 In Brazil, for example, the federation of chemical workers had worked together with the 
administration of Petrobras in order to flexibilize the labour conditions but giving benefits to the 
workers like participating in the selection of contractors who give more benefits. With Mercedes Benz, 
the union got the prohibition of the appointing of stable posts of the main activities of the enterprise 
and there is going to be discussion between the union and the company before any outsourcing 
procedure (Ermida & Orsatti 2009b, 188). 
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of recruitment. This clause allows the employer to hire only those employees 
who belong to the union that the company or firm chooses to work with, forcing 
workers to join the union or stay in, irrespective of its effectiveness in 
representing their interests.75 This brought about the appearance of the 
employer protection contracts and the so-called white or ghost unions allowed 
by the complacent labour authorities, which would reject any kind of turmoil 
against the union chosen by the employer. 76 
Table 4.7 shows that among the ex-recipients who we interviewed, only 
7.1% of them had access to workers’ organizations, 45.2% did not and 47.7% 
did not answer. The enterprises that belong to the state level jurisdiction present 
perhaps the worst scenario since out of 100% ex-recipients who were working 
in the service sector in an established business, only 11% had access to worker 
organizations. As far as the manufacturing sector is concerned, only one third 
(11) of the ex-recipients (34, most of them of federal jurisdiction) had access to 
workers’ organizations and the situation was the same for the high-tech 
industry, where only three out of nine had access to workers’ organizations. 
                                                          
75 On 17 April 2001, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN – Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación in Spanish) unanimously decided to declare section 395 of the Federal Employment Law 
unconstitutional. Thirty-one workers of the sugar industry were fired after quitting their union. What 
the SCJN defended were the rights of the workers to: 1. create a new union; 2. affiliate to a new one or 
existing one; 3. resign from a union; 4. not affiliate to a union and; 5 belong to any organization. 
However, due to the characteristic of the Mexican type of law, the decision has not become 
jurisprudence yet, so, it does not have any general effect, applying only to the 31 workers who were 
eventually reinstated in their jobs. Similar cases happened in 1996 and 1999 (Garza 2004, 49).   
76
 An employer protection contract is basically a collective contract signed without taking into account 
the workers, pursuant to an agreement between the employer and any union representative, usually a 
federation or confederation. The firms that use these kinds of contracts the most are the big and 
medium-sized ones. According to Zepeda, around 80% of the collective contracts in Mexico are fake 
(2009, 67). A white or ghost union, on the other hand, is a workers’ organization that exists only on 
paper, but in reality there is no such organization since they exist mainly in small firms and the 
employers name people of their own family as union representatives, taking advantage of the fact that 
inspectors do not care if the union is properly formed or not. By 2009, the STyPS Minister of Labour had 
registered 2,375,000 unions, of which only 1180 had real activities (Leyva & Pichardo 2009, 112).  
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The lack of access to workers’ organizations, along with the weakly 
institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus, has impeded the state from harnessing 
private sector interests into areas of general interest. Therefore, the private 
sector has found it relatively easy to flexibilize the labour market institutions. For 
instance, Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show the way in which labour representation in the 
federal chamber of deputies has decreased and how simultaneously the 
purchasing power of the minimum wage has decreased as well, especially from 
the late 1970s onwards when the restrictive wage policy to avoid inflation was 
established as part of the structural reforms between the unions, the state and 
the private sector (Bensusam 2008, 31). Moreover, in the same interview that 
we carried out with the chief of human resources of the small company that 
manufacture automobile seats, she told us that there had not been a review of 
the salaries of the workers for ten years because of the lack of workers’ 
Table 4.7 Access to workers’ organizations 
Type of firm Yes No 
Did not 
answer Total 
% 
 High-tech FJ 3 6 0 9 2.6 
Manufacturers FJ 11 20 0 31 8.8 
Services  FJ 0 3 0 3 0.9 
Federal government  1 2 0 3 0.9 
Manufacturers LJ  0 3 0 3 0.9 
Services LJ 8 64 0 72 20.5 
Local government 2 10 0 12 3.4 
Microenterprises LJ 0 35 9 44 12.5 
Informal LJ 0 16 2 18 5.1 
Unemployed 0 0 62 62 17.6 
Students 0 0 95 95 27.0 
Total 25 159 168 352 100.0 
% 7.1 45.2 47.7 100.0  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
22 
 174 
 
representation. According to her, since it was a family business, the 
representatives of the unions are relatives of the family and the workers 
sometimes do not even know that there is a union in the enterprise or who their 
representatives are, a situation that according to her is known by the Ministry of 
Labour but they prefer to have the companies running rather than to apply the 
law.  
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Table 4.8 Labour representation in Mexico’s Federal Chamber of Deputies, 1979 – 2009. 
Unions 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) 45 50 51 34 36 39 28 12 8 4 8 
Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and 
Peasants (CROC) 
11 12 11 11 5 5 3 1 2 2 1 
National Union of Workers (UNT) 
- - - - - - - 3 1 3 2 
Other confederations 
4 5 3 5 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 
Federation of Public Service Workers’ 
Unions (FSTSE) 
9 6 7 4 9 6 6 1 1 1 3 
National Education Workers’ Unions 
(SNTE). 
12 15 14 13 12 12 7 10 12 17 18 
Other national industrial unions. 
9 8 10 6 5 1 1 2 4 2 1 
Others 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 5 3 
Total labour representatives. 
91 96 96 74 69 65 48 31 31 35 36 
Labour representatives as a percentage of 
all federal deputies. 
23.8 24.0 24.0 14.8 13.8 13.0 9.6 6.2 6.2 7.0 7.2 
Source: (Bensusam & Middlebrook op. cit., 38). 
Table 4.9 Purchasing power of the minimum wage in Mexico, 1970-2004; Base year: 197024 
Year 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1995 2000 2004 
% 100% 108.5% 124.3% 117.2% 98.8% 74% 58.4% 45.9% 43.2% 43% 38% 35% 
Source: (López 2006, 27). 
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 Furthermore, the person who we interviewed who was part of the 
automotive cluster that was due to be formed in the State of Mexico told us that 
apart from the small, medium and large enterprises, other actors invited as well 
were, for example, the different universities that were established in the State of 
Mexico. When we asked him whether the unions had been invited, he told us 
that no-one, not even the government, considered inviting them. When we 
asked him why, he said that it was believed by all members of the cluster that 
they were no longer part of the new economic model.  
In contrast, workers still see unions as the bodies that can look after their 
labour rights. In response to question 13, ‘Do you consider it worthwhile to 
invest your time and pay fees to form unions or workers’ organizations that 
represent your interests to companies? YES/NO’, 65% answered YES, whereas 
only 5.7% answered NO and the remaining 29.3% (mainly students) did not 
answer, as Table 4.10 shows. Even most of those who worked in the service 
sector answered that they found it worthwhile to invest time and pay fees to 
form unions or workers’ organizations. However, as we have shown, the limited 
access to organizations that represent workers’ interests, reinforced by and 
complemented with the weak law enforcement of the organizations in charge of 
applying labour justice, increases the levels of informalization bringing about 
short job tenure and income insecurity.   
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4.4 Short job tenure 
 
We have argued so far that after the opening of the economy, alleging 
that the rigid labour markets stopped their competitiveness, the private sector, 
taking advantage of the weaknesses of the regulatory-market capacity of the 
state, have advanced their preferences, flexibilizing the labour market, 
increasing the levels of informality and bringing about short job tenure and 
income insecurity. In this section, we shall present the extent to which the 
weaknesses of the regulatory-market capacity of the state have increased the 
levels of labour informality, which reduces the opportunities of the poor from 
obtaining sustained income in the labour market, leaving them economically 
insecure and in danger of falling into poverty again. 
25Table 4.10 Do you invest your time and pay fees to form unions or workers’ 
organizations that represent your interests to companies? 
Type of organization Yes No 
No 
answer 
Total 
 
% 
High-tech  9 0 0 9 2.6 
Manufacturering 29 2 0 31 8.8 
Services 3 0 0 3 0.9 
Government  3 0 0 3 0.9 
Manufacturers LJ  3 0 0 3 0.9 
Services LJ  66 6 0 72 20.5 
 Local government 10 2 0 12 3.4 
Microenterprises LJ 34 3 7 44 12.5 
Informal LJ 12 3 3 18 5.1 
Unemployed 58 4 0 62 17.6 
Students 2 0 93 95 27.0 
Total 199 20 133 352 100.0 
% 65 5.7 29.3 100.0  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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According to the poverty lines defined by the Mexican Technical 
Committee on Poverty Measurement, shown in Table 4.11, and in comparison 
with the salaries of the ex-recipients shown in Table 4.12, 38.4% of the ex-
recipients had overcome poverty, 13.6% could satisfy their food, health and 
education needs whereas 21% (taking into account the unemployed) were still 
in poverty of food. The other 44.6% were still studying, which would mean that 
they have also crossed at least the first two poverty lines.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77
 The poverty lines are supposed to be the per capita monthly income that a household should have in 
order to invest that amount of money to satisfy their basic needs. There are three different lines: 1. food 
poverty, which is related to the possibility of buying a determined minimum food basket with the 
income available if all were devoted to that; 2. poverty of capabilities, which is related to having an 
income high enough to buy the food basket of the first poverty line but also to invest in basic capabilities 
such as education and health; and 3. asset poverty, which is related to not having enough income to 
invest in goods and services considered as essential to have a decent way of living; among these we can 
include clothing, housing and transportation (CONEVAL: www.coneval.gob.mx. Accessed March 2012). 
Table 4.11 Poverty lines for urban areas77 26 
Line of Poverty Pesos 2008 
Approximate in pounds 
sterling 
Poverty of Food 949.38 47.5 
Poverty of Capabilities 1,164.41 58.2 
Poverty of Assets 1,904.84 95.2 
Source: CONEVAL: www.coneval.gob.mx. Accessed: October 2010. 
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27Table 4.12 Monthly wage of the ex-recipients 
OCUPPATION 
1000 OR 
LESS 
2000 OR 
LESS 
3000 OR 
LESS 
4000 OR 
LESS 
5000 OR 
LESS 
6000 OR 
LESS 
10000 
OR LESS 
 
NO 
ANSWER 
 
TOTAL 
STUDENTS      
  95 95 
CRAFT  6 2 0 1 1   10 
HELPER/ 
ASSISTANT 
7 8 22 19 4 
1 
  61 
CASHIER 1  6 3     10 
LABOURER  1    1   2 
UNEMPLOYED        62 62 
NURSE 1 2 2  1    6 
ENGINEER    1   1  2 
JANITOR  1 2      3 
INSTRUCTOR 1   2 1    4 
WAITER    2     2 
OWN BUSINESS 1 23 2 6  1   33 
NANNY  1       1 
WORKER MAN  2 2 7 3 1   15 
CLERK   2  3 1   6 
PRIVATE 
SECURITY 
   1 1 
 
  2 
PUBLIC 
SERVANT 
 2 1  1 
1 
2  7 
EMPLOYEE   1   1   2 
TECHNICIAN   4 3  1 1  9 
TELEMARKETER   2 4     6 
PEDDLER  1       1 
COUNTER 
SELLER 
1 1 4 5 2 
 
  13 
TOTAL 12 48 52 53 17 9 4 157 352 
% 3.4 13.6 14.8 15.1 4.8 2.6 1.1 44.6 100 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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However, as we can see in Tables 4.12 and 4.13, most of their jobs are 
not only low-qualified ones but also most of the ex-recipients had temporary or 
informal contracts, which put them in danger of falling into poverty again since 
by 2011, there was only one federal entity all over the country, Mexico City, 
which gives access for workers to unemployment insurance and, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, training and access to credit is scarce or limited. As a 
result, there is a very high level of labour mobility since workers are always 
changing jobs either because their contracts expire or because they are looking 
for something better paid and more stable. For instance, the number of 
temporary workers registered in IMSS by 2000 was 10%, by 2006 10.7% and 
by 2012 13.7%. The State of Mexico follows the same direction: in 2000 there 
was 10.3%, in 2006, 10.6% and in 2012 11.1% of the overall national figure.78  
Table 4.13 shows that of the 100% ex-recipients who we interviewed, 
only 7.4% (26) had jobs with a formal stable contract, 20.5% (72) had jobs or 
occupations without written contracts, 17.4% (61) had temporary formal jobs, 
17.6% (62 were unemployed) and the remaining 37.2% (131, mainly students) 
did not answer. Therefore the income of those without written contracts, those 
with temporary contracts, the unemployed and the micro-entrepreneurs (more 
than 60%) was unstable.79 The sector that offered most of the formal contracts 
was the service sector. However, this is the sector where most of the ex-
recipients without a written contract work as well.  
 
                                                          
78
 Data obtained from IMSS through IFAI requested in 2012. 
79
 We consider the micro-entrepreneurs as recipients without stable income because, as argued above, 
most of the micro-businesses in Mexico are informal and their average period of life is normally two 
years. 
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Table 4.13 Profit sharing and contracts of the ex-recipients 
Profit sharing Yes No No 
answer Total 
 
% 
Type of contract Formal 
Formal 
temporary 
Formal 
Formal 
temporary 
No written 
contract 
High-tech FJ 1 8 0 0 0 0 9 2.6 
Manufacturing FJ 0 0 0 12 17 2 31 8.8 
Services FJ   1 1 1  3 0.9 
Federal government  0 0 1 2 0 0 3 0.9 
Manufacturers LJ    1 2  3 0.9 
Services LJ   20 30 22  72 
20.
5 
Local government  0 0 3 7 2 0 12 3.4 
Microenterprises  0 0 0 0 18 26 44 
12.
5 
Informal  0 0 0 0 10 8 18 5.1 
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0 62 62 
17.
6 
Students 0 0 0 0 0 95 95 
28.
0 
Total 1 8 25 53 72 193 352 100 
% 0.3 2.3 7.1 15.1 20.5 54.8 100.0  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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The situation for the ex-recipients is even less satisfactory when we take 
a look at their profit sharing, since most of the workers did not receive it, even 
though they had formal stable or formal temporary contracts, as Table 4.13 
shows. Accordingly, when we asked the ex-recipients what was the most 
worrying issue about their working conditions, the majority of them (29.3%) 
answered that it was their unstable salary, especially those who were working in 
manufacturing, as Table 4.14 shows, where, as argued before, most of these 
enterprises are outsourced by bigger enterprises. The second most important 
worrying issue that they signalled and which actually was not one of the options 
that we gave but that they wrote in the ‘other’ option in question 15, was that 
there is no employment at all (20.7%). 
In the same interview with the chief of the department of human 
resources of the company that manufactured automobile seats, she argued that 
due to the low salaries (600 pesos per week, around 30 pounds sterling) most 
of the workers were either elderly people who accepted the job because they 
have difficulties in joining the labour market due to their age, or youngsters who 
utilize the enterprise to acquire experience and they leave as soon as they find 
better employment. According to her, around 50% of the workers leave every 
year and most of them had fixed work or term contracts so that they can be 
made redundant whenever the enterprise wants to do so without having to pay 
a severance fee. 
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29Table 4.14 What is the most worrying issue about your working conditions? 
Type of firm 
Inequality 
and abuse 
None 
There is no 
employment 
Health risks 
Unstable 
wages 
Lack of 
social 
security 
Temporary 
contracts 
No 
answer 
Total 
High-tech FJ 2 2 1 0 3 0 2 0 9 
Manufacturing FJ  4 3 1 2 18 1 2 0 31 
Services FJ  2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Federal government  0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Manufacturers LJ  1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Services LJ  7 10 11 3 40 0 1 0 72 
Local government  3 2 2 0 4 0 0 0 12 
Microenterprises  7 7 8 1 16 3 2 0 44 
Informal  0 1 6 1 8 0 2 0 18 
Unemployed  6 0 43 2 10 1 0 0 62 
Students 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 92 95 
Total 33 27 73 9 103 5 10 92 352 
% 9.4 7.7 20.7 2.6 29.3 1.4 2.9 26.1 100 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
 184 
 
Table 4.15 shows, on the other hand, that almost half of the ex-recipients 
who we interviewed have had at least between one and three jobs since they 
finished high school when they were eighteen years old, and as they grow older 
the number of jobs that they have had grows, like the 23-year-olds, most of 
whom have had between four and six jobs. Notwithstanding, as Table 4.16 
shows, most of the ex-recipients (40.1%) remained unemployed for less than 
three months. Moreover, even most of the unemployed answered that the 
maximum time that they remained unemployed was between three and six 
months.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.15  How many jobs have you had?30  
Age  1 2 3 4 5 6 
No 
Answer Total % 
18 19 12 2 0 0 0 4 37 10.5 
19 22 21 14 0 0 0 21 78 22.2 
20 9 13 22 2 0 0 22 68 19.3 
21 11 9 11 9 5 5 13 63 17.9 
22 3 3 10 8 5 3 7 39 11.1 
23 5 3 6 13 14 13 13 67 19.0 
Total 69 61 65 32 24 21 80 352 100 
% 19.6 17.3 18.5 9.1 6.8 6.0 22.7 100  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
Table 4.16 Maximum time unemployed 
What do you do? .31 .60 1.00 1.6 2.00 2.60 3.00 3.60 4.00 4.60 5.60 Total % 
Students 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 27 
Employed  95 27 21 5 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 154 43.8 
Own business  19 5 2 1 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 33 9.4 
Study and work  6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8 2.3 
Unemployed 21 10 13 7 0 6 1 1 1 1 1 62 17.6 
Total 141 42 37 13 8 6 5 1 2 1 1 352 100 
% 40.1 11.9 10.5 3.7 2.3 1.7 1.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 100.0 
 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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The problem is that even though they can find new employment relatively 
quickly, some of those jobs also have different levels of informalization and 
some of them are completely informal. For instance, in our question 18 we 
asked the ex-recipients: ‘If you are or have been an employee in complete 
informality (No contract, no kind of social security, no access to organizations 
that represent your interests), please indicate why you chose that kind of 
employment’; 49.7% had not worked informally (most of them students), 44.6% 
did it because they could not find formal employment, 0.3% because of finding a 
better wage, 0.9% because of the flexibility of time, and 4.5% to acquire 
experience. Therefore, more than 90% of the ex-recipients who were working or 
had worked at some point in complete informality did so because they had not 
found a different kind of job in which they could have more benefits. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter, we have shown the extent to which the weaknesses of 
the regulatory-market capacity of the Mexican state in the world of labour 
impedes the protection of the occupational rights of the ex-recipients of the 
Oportunidades programme and in this way, it reduces their opportunities to 
Table 4.17 Ex-recipients working in complete informality 32 
Occupation Wage 
Flexibility of 
time 
Did not find 
formal 
employment 
Have not 
worked 
informally 
To acquire 
experience 
Total 
Students 0 0 0 95 0 95 
Craft  2 6 1 1 10 
Helper/ assistant 0 1 38 18 4 61 
Cashier 0 0 8 2 0 10 
Labourer 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Unemployed 1 0 28 32 1 62 
Nurse 0 0 4 0 2 6 
Engineer 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Janitor 0 0 1 2 0 3 
Instructor 0 0 2 1 1 4 
Waiter 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Own business 0 0 30 3 0 33 
Nanny 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Worker man 0 0 5 8 2 15 
Clerk 0 0 2 3 1 6 
Private security 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Public servant 0 0 5 2 0 7 
Employee 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Technician 0 0 5 2 2 9 
Telemarketer 0 0 4 1 1 6 
Peddler 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Counter seller 0 0 10 3 0 13 
Total 1 3 157 175 16 352 
% 0.3 0.9 44.6 49.7 4.5 100.0 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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obtain sustained income. More precisely, on the one hand, the weakly 
institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus in the world of labour prevents the 
organizations of the state from enforcing law in an impartial and impersonal 
way. As a consequence, the Mexican state has as a main priority protecting the 
interests of the private sector to avoid job destruction rather than protecting 
worker’s rights. On the other hand, it impedes workers from having access to 
organizations that represent their interests, giving them a voice to bargain with 
the private sector and the organizations of the state itself to press for wider 
social rights that would allow them to improve their working conditions because 
it is believed that the new economic model does not need them. As a 
consequence, the weakness of the regulatory-market capacity of the state has 
brought about high levels of labour informalization and short job tenure, which, 
added to the denial of occupational rights such as training and active labour 
market policies brought about by the weakness of the fiscal capacity of the 
state, as we shall see in the next chapter, impede the Oportunidades 
programme from enabling the ex-recipients to obtain sustained income in the 
labour market to move out of poverty.  
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CHAPTER 5 
OPORTUNIDADES, THE LABOUR MARKET AND THE FISCAL CAPACITY 
OF THE STATE 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed the extent to which the institutional 
weaknesses of the regulatory-market capacity of the Mexican state might 
impede the Oportunidades programme from achieving its main goal due to the 
high levels of short job tenure that those weaknesses have brought about. In 
Chapter 2, we argued that the high levels of short job tenure reinforced by the 
low skill levels of the population and the lack of active labour market policies 
impede the citizenry from obtaining sustained income. In this chapter, we shall 
review the extent to which the institutional weaknesses of the fiscal capacity of 
the state impede the Oportunidades programme from increasing the capabilities 
of the ex-recipients to obtain sustained income in the labour market to move out 
of poverty.  
Mexico, as has already been explained, is a Federal Republic comprised 
of three levels of government: federal, state and municipal, and the institutional 
capacities of the local governments can affect the outcomes of the public 
policies carried out at the federal level even if they are not given direct 
responsibilities. Accordingly, we shall explore the extent to which the 
institutional weaknesses of the fiscal capacity of the Mexican state at its 
different levels might impede the Oportunidades programme from enabling the 
poor to obtain sustained income to move out of poverty. We argue that the 
federal level has tried to maintain its power over access to public services and 
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resources, which has impeded the improvement of the institutional and 
administrative capacities of the lower levels of government and consequently 
has made it difficult to use expenditure as a tool for alleviating poverty and in 
this way to justify greater tax collection. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section we 
explore the extent to which the institutional weakness of the fiscal capacity of 
the state impedes the increase of the skills of the ex-recipients of the 
Oportunidades programme that would allow them to improve their opportunities 
to obtain sustained income in the labour market. In the second section we shall 
show the extent to which the institutional weakness of the fiscal capacity of the 
state impedes the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme from 
accessing active labour market policies that would allow them to increase their 
opportunities to obtain sustained income. Section three presents the main 
conclusions of the chapter. 
5.1 Oportunidades and access to formal education 
As argued in Chapter 2, the low levels of tax collection of the Mexican 
State have brought about a situation in which some important basic services 
that can have an impact on alleviating poverty, such as education, are 
underfunded. Like most Latin American countries, in the last three decades 
Mexico has carried out an extensive process of decentralization of its social 
policies in order to improve the effectiveness of the allocation of resources. This 
is strongly backed up by the idea that the local governments are closer to their 
citizens and know their preferences and necessities better than the federal 
government, and therefore can meet their needs more effectively.  
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However, in order to avoid losing their control over access to public 
resources, the federal government has transferred responsibilities to lower 
levels of government without devolving policy-making power and fiscal 
resources, which impedes local governments from improving their 
administrative and institutional capacities, making it difficult to use expenditure 
as a tool for alleviating poverty and in this way to justify greater tax collection. 
As argued above, in Mexico the federal government collects around 90% of the 
whole revenue of the Mexican state and transfers around 48% of that revenue 
to the states and municipalities, which represents for them around around 90% 
of their budget. The resources are transferred through two items: Item 33 
Federal Contributions for States and Municipalities (Aportaciones Federales 
para Entidades Federativas y Municipios or simply Ramo 33 in Spanish) and 
Item 28 Federal Participations (Participaciones Federales in Spanish). The 
former are conditional grants which have as their main objectives education, 
health, public safety and social infrastructure. The latter, on the other hand, are 
unconditional grants, which were originally revenues of states and 
municipalities, whose collection was delegated to the federal government.  
In order for states and municipalities to be entitled to receive these 
grants, they must adhere to the National System of Fiscal Coordination. The 
examination of all the grants of the two items is out of the scope of this thesis. In 
this section, we shall focus, on the one hand, on the process of the 
decentralization of education, which for our purposes is essential and, on the 
other hand, later in the chapter we shall discuss the way in which the federal 
level has impeded the State of Mexico and Toluca from having a major 
participation in the fiscal system.  
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5.1.1 The decentralization of education 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, the decentralization of social policies was part of 
the structural reforms pushed by the World Bank and the IMF during the late 
1980s with the intention of both reducing the size of the state and its 
intervention in the economy and of improving the effectiveness of the allocation 
of resources. However, unlike Brazil or Argentina, where the processes of 
decentralization were pushed by sub-national actors after the introduction of 
electoral democracy, in Mexico it was a top-down process by the national 
executive carried out before the implementation of electoral democracy only to 
be released by the pressure of the 1980s debt crisis and the loss of confidence 
due to electoral fraud during that decade (Falleti 2010, 188). As a matter of fact, 
some argue, for instance, that when Item 33 was created, what really happened 
was a re-centralization of the expenditures since not only was policy-making still 
dependent on the federal level, but also the expenditures of the local 
governments have to be in accordance with the priorities of the federal level 
(Pliego 2010, 11). 
The first reformed social sector was education, which was seen as “a 
gigantic personnel department” (Falleti op. cit., 196).80 The process was initiated 
in 1973 under the rule of President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) as a process of 
deconcentration rather than of decentralization, since only an office of the 
Federal Ministry of Education with the purpose of dealing with local issues was 
                                                          
80
 According to Falleti, by 1980 the education sector had more employees than any other Ministry, 
around 900,000 (2010, 190).  
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created in every state.81 However, it was not until the period of President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) that the decentralization of education was 
possible with the aim of regaining control of the bureaucratic apparatus and 
educational policy-making (ibid., 190).82  
In 1993 Salinas de Gortari created Item 25, headed Contributions to 
Basic Education in States (Aportaciones para Educación Básica en los Estados 
in Spanish) in order to carry out the process of decentralization.83 In the 
broadest terms, the agreement transferred the administration of the human, 
material and financial resources to the sub-national governments but kept the 
responsibility for policy-making (curriculum design, educational plans, 
production of school textbooks, teacher training, evaluation and so on).84 
However, although the federal government succeeded in raising the education 
budget to reach 5.2% of GDP in 1994, the highest in the country’s history at that 
time, its use was extremely discretional since there was direct negotiation with 
each state over the proportion of the national budget they would receive.  
As explained above, the 1995 financial crisis brought about the loss of 
PRI in 1997 of the majority in the Congress for the first time. In this context, 
                                                          
81
 The decentralization of the health sector, on the other hand, started in 1983 but the agreement was 
finally signed in 1996. 
82
 The main obstacle that the state faced to achieving the so-called decentralization of education was 
the teachers’ union (SNTE – acronym in Spanish), which had been constraining it due to the fear of 
losing its bargaining power. The state, still under the rule of the PRI political party, on the other hand, 
could not afford to lose the electoral support of such a powerful union, especially after the debt crisis of 
1982 when its legitimacy was severely questioned. Accordingly, when the process of decentralization 
was finally agreed between the executive and the teachers’ union in 1992, the state had to concede 
many benefits, among which it was stated that, in spite of the decentralization process, the teachers´ 
union would not be divided or lose its unity (Falleti 2010, 202-203). 
83 Before the creation of item 25, the state concentrated its spending mainly on Item 11, under which 
the Ministry of Education centralized all the public spending related to this field all over the country. 
Since 1997-1998, when the process of the decentralization of social spending was finally achieved, Item 
25 was renamed and now transfers resources only to Mexico City.  
84
 According to Rabell, around 90% is spent on the salaries of the teachers, so the states administer only 
the other 10% (2010, 109).  
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under the rule of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), the decentralization of revenues 
was pushed further and was materialized in the creation of Item 33 in 1997-
1998. However, the reform did not include responsibility for policy-making. The 
grants created exclusively for education are the Fund for Basic and Normal 
Education (FAEB - Fondo de Aportaciones para la Educación Básica y Normal 
in Spanish), the Fund for Technological and Adult Education (FAETA - Fondo 
de Aportaciones para la Educación Tecnológica y de Adultos in Spanish) and 
the Fund of Multiple Contributions (FAM - Fondo de Aportaciones Multiples in 
Spanish). The outcomes of the process of the decentralization of education 
have been generally contested. For instance, Scott argued that the progressivity 
that public spending on education has reached in recent years is really a 
deceptive progressivity since those who can pay for a service in the private 
market do not use the public service, which is normally seen as being of lower 
quality (2002, 7). Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the reform gave certainty 
to public spending and that the proportion of the emerging labour force with 
elementary and secondary education was greatly expanded.  
However, the difference in the levels of education between the rich and 
the poor has been widened because the reform of 1997 covered only basic 
education, which became the priority of the government before the 
disappointing results of the structural reforms, allowing the private sector to 
have a bigger role in the provision of this service at high school and university 
levels.85 In 1993, the state gave private and public institutions equal access to 
state subsidies for higher education and authorized public universities to charge 
                                                          
85
 In 2011, high school education was upgraded to become part of basic education. This means at least 
two things: 1. the state now has to ensure a broader coverage of high school because basic education is 
considered by the Mexican Constitution as compulsory and; 2. the resources allocated to this level of 
education will be delivered through Item 33. 
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students for tuition. As a result, the growth of educational spending coming from 
the private sector rose from 8.1% in 1990 to 23.1% in 2005, while private 
universities accounted for 31.7% of all university enrollments. Moreover, 
according to Hernández, by 1970, 22% of all the student population in higher 
education was in private universities and by 1994 it had increased to 32%, and 
to 40% at postgraduate level (2005, 39). In contrast, Table 5.1 shows that 
currently public investment in higher education has reached a rate of only 
around one out of every five youngsters.  
Table 5.1 Coverage of higher education level based on the age groups for 
undergraduate studies, 1970-2004. 33 
Year  Men  Women Total  Enrolment Coverage  
1970-1971  1,930,300  2,102,041  4,032,341  271,275  6.7% 
1990-1991  3,738,128  4,091,035  7,829,163  1,206,128  15.4% 
1995-1996  4,538,686  4,858,738  9,397,424  1,455,082  15.5% 
2000-2001  5,002,446  4,949,263  9,951,709  1,918,948  19.3% 
2004-2005  5,143,744  5,082,636  10,226,380  2,277,347  22.3% 
Source: Hernández op. cit., 38. 
The centralization of the resources of higher education has also resulted 
in universities carrying out a discretional negotiation with the federation and the 
states for the allocation of resources, for which, in addition, there are no clear 
rules. By 2010, for instance, higher public education was comprised of six main 
sub-systems: 1. federal universities, 2. state public universities, 3. technological 
universities, 4. polytechnic universities, 5. state public universities with solidarity 
support, and 6. other universities.86 For institutions in sub-systems 1 to 3, 
                                                          
86
 These kinds of universities are targeted at specific groups which are being encouraged to keep 
studying, such as the intercultural universities, whose main goal is to promote the formation of 
professionals committed to economic, social and cultural development, particularly the indigenous 
peoples of the country and around the world.  
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finance is provided according to a scheme of ordinary and extra-ordinary 
subsidies. In the former, a similar amount is assigned every year, adding only 
the increases in salaries and the operating expenses. The latter is comprised of 
conditional grants with specific goals that could go from improving the quality 
and infrastructure of higher education institutions to reducing their deficits in 
order to increase enrolment in higher education. In recent years, conditional 
grants have increased in number and importance (in 2000 there were only four 
of them and by 2012 there were eighteen). However, the amount delivered by 
them represents no more than 25% of the universities’ resources (Tuirán 2011, 
18). For institutions in sub-systems 4 to 6, the federal government agrees the 
support allocated each year with the institution and the government of the state 
concerned (SEP 2006, 2). This has meant that sometimes investment in higher 
education is used politically to benefit some of the states that are governed by 
the same political party as the federal government, especially because students 
at university level are at the minimum age to vote (Hernández op. cit., 45; 
Martínez 2007, 23).  
Furthermore, as previously argued, one of the main problems that 
impede the effectiveness of the decentralization of public services is that fiscal 
resources have not been completely devolved to the local governments. As for 
the financing of higher education, the federal level provides around 80%, and 
the state level barely the other 20% (Hernández op. cit., 28-36). During our 
fieldwork, we had the opportunity to undertake different interviews with people 
from the local Ministry of Finance and from the Institute of Treasury of the State 
of Mexico. Since 2006, the State of Mexico has been able to almost double the 
collection of taxes of its own resources. When we asked the interviewees what 
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had been the main changes that had allowed them to improve the tax collection 
of their own resources, especially of payroll tax, which is one of the most 
important taxes that states have, they highlighted the following factors. 1. 
Administrative simplification of the payment procedures. In the last decade, the 
three levels of government have undertaken an extensive simplification of the 
procedures to pay, which makes it easier and faster for the citizen to pay and 
for the state to collect. At the same time it gives transparency to the tax 
collection process, which, according to them, has increased people’s 
confidence in tax collection; and 2. strengthening the coercive capabilities of the 
state. Now that tax payment is easier and faster, the state can better justify the 
imposition of fines for not paying taxes on time.  
However, state level revenues still represent less than 10% of their whole 
resources. Speaking of the main constraints that do not allow the states to 
increase their revenues, we found that the National System of Fiscal 
Coordination (NSFC), which was created in the 1980s, is outdated and poorly 
regulated, which favours the centralization of resources by the federal level. For 
instance, according to the interviewees, when the NSFC was created, the states 
did not have the institutional and administrative capacities to collect taxes 
effectively and this was the reason why the states agreed to delegate the 
collection of most of them to the federal government. However, they claimed 
that nowadays the state level has enough technology and information to collect 
some of the taxes in a more effective way than the federation itself. They gave 
as an example the collection of taxes from micro-enterprises that had been 
agreed would be collected by the states since 2009 in order to improve the 
effectiveness of the tax collection and, at least in the case of the State of 
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Mexico, they had been able to raise the collection of those taxes.87 Moreover, in 
the case of cellular or car ownership taxes, which imply a high political cost, 
which is the reason why they were avoided by most of the states, sacrificing an 
important potential revenue stream, our interviewees argued that the problem is 
that they are not properly regulated in the Fiscal Coordination Law. That is, the 
amounts of the taxes that have to be charged and the target population are not 
specified in the Law because it is the federal government itself (both legislative 
and executive powers) which are avoiding dealing with the political cost to enact 
more taxes, even though they were collected at the state level.  
This highly discretional and centralized scheme of social spending has 
brought about a situation in which public spending on higher education is not 
only insufficient but it is also regressive, used more by high-income people than 
low-income people. The Mexican federal income law requires the yearly 
publication of the results of a study of the incidence of spending and taxes. 
According to the results of the publication for 2010, although total spending on 
education was mildly progressive, that is, it was mainly used by low-income 
people rather than high-income people, spending on high school education was 
neutral in urban zones and only progressive in rural areas, as Table 5.2 shows. 
At the level of technical education, the concentration ratio showed a regressive 
national expenditure, and it was progressive only in rural areas. On the other 
hand, spending on higher education was regressive in both urban and rural 
                                                          
87
 Some may argue that not all the states could collect some taxes in a more effective way than the 
federation because not all of them have the same institutional and administrative capacities as the state 
of Mexico. However, the point that we want to highlight is precisely that in order to improve the 
progressiveness of the fiscal capacity of the Mexican state it is necessary to improve the institutional 
capacities of the local governments so that they have a major participation in the NSFC system 
 198 
 
areas, and 62.8% of total expenditure was concentrated in 20% of the 
population with higher incomes.  
Table 5.2 Public spending distribution on education in Mexico, 2010. 
Decile Total Preprimary Primary Secondary Bachelor  Technical Higher 
1 12.9  18.5  18.3  13.0  6.3  2.0  0.0  
2 13.5  17.0  16.3  15.0  10.3  5.4  0.8  
3 12.9  14.4  14.6  15.1  11.0  6.6  0.4  
4 12.5  13.0  13.7  12.4  13.0  9.9  2.6  
5 11.5  11.1  10.9  12.3  13.3  10.5  3.9  
6 9.9  8.0  8.6  9.8  13.0  12.3  5.6  
7 8.8  6.9  6.9  8.4  11.9  13.1  9.1  
8 7.6  5.7  5.4  6.6  9.9  13.5  14.8  
9 6.5  3.9  3.8  5.0  7.1  15.5  25.8  
10 3.9  1.5  1.4  2.4  4.1  11.1  37.0  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Urban 75.5  70.7  70.3  72.9  81.1  90.2  96.0  
Rural 24.5  29.3  29.7  27.1  18.9  9.8  4.0  
Concentration coefficient 
National -0.17  -0.31  -0.31  -0.22  -0.05  0.20  0.60  
Urban -0.06  -0.20  -0.20  -0.12  0.02  0.23  0.60  
Rural -0.50  -0.58  -0.57  -0.50  -0.34 -0.12  0.76  
Source: SHCP (2012, 41) 
Accordingly, as Table 5.3 shows, only 32.7% of the ex-recipients (66 
female and 49 male) who we interviewed continued studying to BA level and 
67.3% (237 ex-recipients, 143 women and 94 men) did not do so. Moreover, of 
the 32.7% who were undertaking a BA, only 4.3% studied or were studying for a 
BSc in sciences or engineering, and 99% of all the ex-recipients who were 
unemployed or were self-employed did not study for a BA. Furthermore, out of 
those who had their own business, 9.4% (13 women and 20 men), only one of 
them was studying for a BA and of those who were unemployed, 17.6% (50 
women and 12 men), none of them was studying or had studied for a BA. 
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Likewise, when we asked the ex-recipients in our question 19 ‘What is 
the main constraint that has hampered you from obtaining sustained 
employment’, among the 180 (51%) ex-recipients who did not have a contract, 
were unemployed or had a temporary contract but no access to social security, 
the most recurrent answer was that there were no jobs at all (69), whereas the 
second most recurrent answers were the lack of experience (41) and the lack of 
a BA (41). Only very few of them mentioned the lack of training or maternity 
leave and even the self-employed answered accordingly, admitting that they 
35Table 5.3 Education level and labour status of the ex-recipients 
 
 
Sex 
 
Education level Student Employed 
Own 
business 
Study and 
work 
Unemployed Total 
Female 
Standard high school 0 39 5 2 29 75 
Technical high school  0 40 8 1 19 68 
Finished BA 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Studying BA   54 1 0 1 0 56 
Studying BA in engineering 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Studying BA in sciences  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Degree truncated 0 2 0 0 2 4 
Total  58 84 13 4 50 209 
Male 
Standard high school 0 32 10 0 9 51 
Technical high school  0 32 9 0 2 43 
Finished BA 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Studying BA   28 0 1 4 0 33 
Studying  BA in engineering 8 1 0 0 0 9 
Studying BA in sciences  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Engineering finished 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Degree truncated 0 3 0 0 1 4 
Total 37 70 20 4 12 143 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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had to employ themselves as a result of these constraints, as Table 5.4 
shows.88  
 
The situation regarding high school education, on the other hand, is even 
worse. Not only was the allocation of resources for this level discretionary, as 
for higher education, at least till 2011, when it was upgraded to become part of 
basic education, but also, despite the fact that the high school level has the 
largest drop across the education system and the lowest terminal efficiency, it is 
the level that had historically suffered the most from a lack of financial 
resources, as Table 5.5 shows.  
                                                          
88
 We have left the students out of these figures because most of them had never worked so they did 
not have experience of looking for a job. 
Table 5.4  Main constraints that have hampered the ex-recipients from obtaining sustained 
employment  36 
Access to 
social 
security 
services 
What is the main 
constraint that has 
hampered you from 
obtaining sustained 
employment? 
Student Employed 
Own 
business 
Work 
and 
study 
Unemployed Total 
Yes 
 Lack of experience  30  1  31 
Lack of training  1  0  1 
Maternity  1  0  1 
None  18  0  18 
There are no jobs   11  1  12 
Lack of BA  13  1  14 
No 
Lack of experience   18 9 0 14 41 
Lack of training   4 0 0 2 6 
Maternity leave  3 0 0 7 10 
None  6 7 0 0 13 
There are no jobs  28 9 3 29 69 
Lack of  BA  21 8 2 10 41 
                        Total 95 154 33 8 62 352 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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Table 5.5 Evolution and structure of education spending in Mexico, 2004-2010. 
37 
Concept Amount 
(Pesos) 
Percentage share of total 
Total 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2004 2006 2008 2010 
391,930 417,528 452,504 456,643 43.1 41.6 40.2 38.1 
 
Basic 
 
 
267,594  
 
286,659  
 
306,093  
 
299,482  
 
29.4  
 
28.5  
 
27.2  
 
25.0  
 
High School 
 
 
42,603  
 
44,716  
 
46,047  
 
48,207  
 
4.7  
 
4.5  
 
4.1  
 
4.0  
 
Higher Education 
 
 
56,664  
 
58,499  
 
71,385  
 
76,951  
 
6.2  
 
5.8  
 
6.3  
 
6.4  
Source: SHCP (2012, 36) 
Accordingly, the main constraint that 52.5% of the ex-recipients had 
found to advancing to the BA level was the lack of financial resources. To the 
question ‘What has been the main constraint that has impeded you from 
continuing studying to the BA level’, 33.2% answered that they could not do so 
because of a lack of financial resources, 19.3% replied that they had not passed 
the exam to study at a public university, and only the remaining 13.4% did not 
want to continue studying.  
 
1 
Source: www.sep.gob.mx. Accessed: October 2012.  
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As Figure 5.1 shows, in recent years the federal government has 
increased the number of scholarships awarded.89 However, as can be seen in 
Table 5.6, it was the middle-income population that obtained most of the 
scholarships in urban zones, whereas they are progressive only in rural areas. 
The distribution of private scholarships, on the other hand, is completely 
regressive. The only educational grants that are highly progressive are the ones 
delivered through the Oportunidades programme, where resources are 
concentrated in the first three income deciles. 
Table 5.6 Distribution of expenditure on scholarships, 2010 38 
Decile Total 
Public Scholarships Private 
Scholarships Oportunidades  Public Schools  Total 
I  20.9  27.5  4.7  23.9  0.4  
II  17.4  21.6  10.5  19.8  1.6  
III  13.6  16.2  9.7  15.2  3.0  
IV  12.3  13.8  8.8  13.0  8.1  
V  9.6  10.1  10.4  10.1  5.9  
VI  6.5  5.4  11.0  6.3  7.5  
VII  5.4  3.3  13.3  4.9  8.8  
VIII  4.8  1.2  13.4  3.1  15.8  
IX  4.9  0.7  10.1  2.2  23.6  
X  4.6  0.3  8.0  1.5  25.3  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Urban  51.4  37.2  84.3  44.8  96.5  
Rural  48.6  62.8  15.7  55.2  3.5  
Concentration coefficient 
National  -0.30  -0.50  0.06  -0.41  0.45  
Urban  -0.06  -0.37  0.11  -0.22  0.46  
Rural  -0.56  -0.58  -0.21  -0.57  -0.03  
Source: SHCP (2012, 39) 
 
However, the biggest problem at this level is that it is here where the 
weak correlation between the skills acquired through formal education and 
those required by private firms reaches its highest point. Currently, there are 
                                                          
89
 During 2007–2012 the federal government granted 416,000 scholarships among the different 
programmes (the Programa Nacional de Becas (PRONABES), the Programa de Becas de Apoyo a la 
Práctica Intensiva y al Servicio Social (PROBAPISS), the Programa de Fortalecimiento de Becas para la 
Educación Superior, and the Programa de Becas Universitarias). 
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three types of upper secondary or high school education: 1. the general 
baccalaureate, of which the main purpose is to prepare students to enter 
institutions of higher education and which currently covers around 61% of all the 
students; 2. technological high school, which provides training in specialist fields 
such as the industrial, agricultural, fishing or forestry sectors so that students 
can either join the labour market just after finishing or continue on to higher 
universities; this educational model represents around 30% of total enrolment; 
and 3. the technical high school, which is distinguished from the other two 
models because it seeks to train students specifically to join the labour market, 
and currently covers around the 9% of the total enrollment (Santos & Delgado 
2011, 28).  
Although the classification might seem to be very simple and 
straightforward, there are around 200 programmes of study, most of them 
unrelated to each other and without any possibility of being revalidated since 
there are no links or communication between institutions.90 Accordingly, Table 
5.7 shows that there is no real difference between the employment of those ex-
recipients who studied at high school and those who studied at technical or 
technological high school. This is a very interesting finding since it would 
suggest that either due to the lack of employment the ex-recipients have to 
accept whatever job is available, or that the specialization through which the ex-
recipients who studied either in a technical or technological high school go is 
not making any difference in giving them the necessary skills that firms demand. 
Another important point to highlight is that most of the ex-recipients who had 
finished only the high school level were mainly working in the service sector, 
                                                          
90
 See SEP www.sep.gob.mx accessed: April 2011.  
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which, as we argued above, is the economic sector that mostly offers low-
qualified jobs, and there were no ex-recipients who had finished the BA level 
working in that sector. The situation gets even worse when we look at the types 
of job; there was only one high-qualified job among the employees of private 
firms (one engineer) and the remaining jobs are all low-qualified.   
During our fieldwork, when we asked the person we interviewed who was 
part of the automotive cluster that was due to be formed in the State of Mexico 
about the constraints that the members of the cluster, especially the private 
sector, had found in relation to the correlation between the skills of the labour 
available for hire and what the firms needed, he commented that it was so weak 
that a high investment to train every worker that the firms hire is unavoidable. 
According to him, on average, every one of the three automotive firms (MNCs) 
that were part of the cluster spent around 2000 dollars on every worker to have 
them trained. He also stated that, in an effort to improve this situation, the 
universities that are situated in the State of Mexico had been invited to join the 
cluster. However, and despite the fact that the universities' representatives were 
very committed to helping, nothing could be done because the design of the 
programmes is the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Education. This is 
the case even for those programmes in universities which are financially 
dependent on the states. 
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Table 5.7 Employment and level of education of the ex-recipients 39  
Sector Current employment 
High school 
Technical/technological 
high school 
Finished 
BA 
Studying  BA 
Studyng 
engineering 
Degree 
truncated 
Engnineering 
finished 
Total % 
 
High-tech 
Helper/assistant 
Engineer 
Worker men 
0 4 1 2 0   7 2.0 
0 0 0 0 1   1 0.3 
1 0 0 0 0   1 0.3 
 
 
Manufacturing 
Helper/assistant 
Engineer 
Worker men 
Clerk 
Technician 
Security/ business  
7 10     0 17 4.8 
0 0     1 1 0.3 
7 5     0 12 3.4 
1 0     0 1 0.3 
0 
1 
1 
1 
    
0 1 
2 
0.3 
0.6 
 
 
 
Service sector 
Helper/assistant 
Cashier 
Nurse 
Instructor 
Worker men 
21 13  1  2  37 10.5 
6 4  0  0  10 2.8 
1 0  1  0  2 0.6 
0 
2 
2 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
3 0.9 
2 0.6 
Clerk 3 2  0  0  5 1.4 
Craft/labourer 8 10  1  1  20 5.7 
Technician 0 8  
                          
                        0 
  
                         0 
 
8 2.3 
Own business 
Informal 
17 
10 
14 
7 
 
0 
1 
  
1 
0 
 
32 
18 
9.1 
5.1 
 
 
Government 
Nurse 
Janitor 
Instructor/craft 
Public servant 
Private security 
0 
0 
3 
2 
0 
0 
  
0 
0 
 
3            0.9 
2 0.6 
0 2 0   0  2 0.6 
2 2 2 
0 
  
1 
 
7 
1 
2.0 
0 1 0 0.3 
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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What is more, when we asked the ex-recipients in question 21 whether 
they considered that the education that they had received with the 
Oportunidades programme would allow them to acquire the necessary skills 
and capabilities to obtain sustained employment or generate sustained income 
according to their salary expectations, 87% of the ex-recipients answered ‘yes’, 
even most of the unemployed. In this sense, they believed that they were 
educated enough to compete for a job in the labour market. However, as we 
have seen, most of the ex-recipients have low qualified jobs with poor salaries. 
Moreover, when we asked them in questions 22 and 23 ‘Do you invest your own 
resources to acquire more skills that allow you to obtain sustained employment 
or generate sustained income? YES/NO’ and ‘If you answered NO to the last 
question please highlight the main reason’, more than half of the ex-recipients 
(56%) answered YES to question 22. However, of those that answered YES, 
27% were studying in the higher education level and only 29% were or had 
been working. Of those that answered NO (44%), 27.8% answered that it was 
because they did not have enough economic resources to invest and 15.6% 
answered that they preferred to wait to be trained by firms, especially those who 
were working in the service and manufacturing sectors, as Table 5.8 shows. 
This would suggest that the high levels of short job tenure and weak correlation 
between the skills acquired in the formal education through the Oportunidades 
programme and those needed in the labour market disincentive the ex-
recipients from investing in acquiring new specific skills and/or force them to 
wait to be trained by firms.  
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As can be seen, the regressiveness of public spending impedes the ex-
recipients of the Oportunidades programme from accessing the educational 
levels that would allow them to increase their capabilities to obtain sustained 
income in the labour market. Moreover, as far as the Oportunidades 
programme’s goal is concerned, the weak correlation between the skills 
acquired through the education received through the programme and those 
needed by the private firms is perhaps the main impediment to the ex-recipients 
obtaining a sustained income in the labour market as far as education is 
concerned. An important question then is what is the state doing to help those 
Table 5.8 Investment of the ex-recipients to acquire new skills 40 
Invest your own 
resources 
Type of firm 
Wait to be 
trained by firms 
Lack of 
economic 
resources 
No answer Total % 
Yes 
High-tech   3 3 0.9 
Manufacturing   14 14 4 
Services   30 30 8.5 
Government    9 9 2.6 
Microenterprise   18 18 5.1 
Informal    8 8 2.3 
Unemployment   20 20 5.7 
Student   95 95 27 
Total   197 197 56 
No 
High-tech 5 1 0 6 1.7 
Manufacturing  8 12 0 20 5.7 
Services 23 22 0 45 12.8 
Government  4 2 0 6 1.7 
Microenterprise 6 20 0 26 7.4 
Informal  4 6 0 10 2.8 
Unemployment 5 35 2 42 11.9 
Student 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 55 98 2 155 44 
% 15.6 27.8 0.6 44  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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poor who cannot keep studying and/or those who are unemployed to obtain 
sustained income in the labour market? 
5.2 Oportunidades and its linkages to active labour market policies 
 
5.2.1 Training policies 
 
As has already been argued, the high levels of poverty and socio-
economic inequality brought about by the structural reforms initiated in the early 
1980s put pressure on political leaders in Latin America to introduce, in the 
early 1990s, Conditional Cash Transfer programmes (CCTs) such as 
Oportunidades. In Brazil, as previously stated, the success of Bolsa Familia has 
been the result of the strengthening of its institutional capacities, which allowed 
the increase of the state’s revenue collection and its social spending to tackle 
unemployment and the increasing informalization of labour, investing in active 
labour market policies that have complemented the programme.   
In Mexico, on the other hand, the social and economic policies have 
normally worked on their own. As was explained in Chapter 2, Mexico 
introduced the first Conditional Cash Transfer programmes in 1997 under the 
name of PROGRESA. However, it was not until the late 2000s that it began to 
be officially linked to economic policies. As argued above, the Mexican 
president Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006–2012) was the first president to make 
an effort to link, officially, the Oportunidades programme to the labour market 
policies directed at the general population. In 2011, he created the web-site 
known as Vas con Oportunidades whose main purpose is to let ex-recipients 
know about the labour market policies designed by the Federal Ministry of 
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Labour (STPS – Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social in Spanish), the 
Ministry of Economy (SE - Secretaría de Economía in Spanish) and the 
educational offer of the Ministry of Education (SEP – Secretaría de Educación 
Pública in Spanish).91 In addition, he made it an official requirement that in order 
to be able to apply for a grant of FONAES, a fund that provides subsidies so 
that the poor can start up a business, applicants have to prove that they belong 
to a social development programme.  
As we have seen, most of the ex-recipients worked in the service or the 
manufacturing sectors, where there is normally no training provided by 
employers. Table 5.9 shows that 39.2% of the ex-recipients did not receive 
training, and especially in the service sector, where most of the ex-recipients 
worked, it is mainly non-existent, 47.7% (mainly students and unemployed) did 
not answer and only 13.1% stated that they received training in their 
workplaces. As argued in the previous sections, the ex-recipients who were 
already working preferred to wait to be trained by firms rather than investing in 
upgrading their skills mainly due to the short job tenure and the weak correlation 
between skills acquired in formal education and the skills needed in the labour 
market. An important question then is whether the training policies of the 
Mexican state are helping the ex-recipients to obtain sustained income in the 
labour market. 
 
                                                          
91
 VAS con Oportunidades was designed by a consultant group whose finance was provided by the World 
Bank and was launched on 25 April 2011 with the main purpose of serving as a bridge between the 
recipients and the educative and labour market offer. 
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Table 5.9 Types of firms that provide training 41 
Type of firm Yes No 
No 
answer 
Total % 
High-tech  
Manufacturers 
Services  
Government  
Microenterprises 
Informal  
Unemployment  
No answer 
Total 
6 3 0 9 2.56 
22 12 0 34 9.7 
12 63 0 75 21.3 
5 10 0 15 4.26 
0 35 9 44 12.5 
1 15 2 18 5.1 
0 0 62 62 17.6 
0 0 95 95 27 
46 138 168 352 100 
% 13.1 39.2 47.7 100.0  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
At the time that we were carrying out the fieldwork, there were different 
training programmes offered by the federal and the State of Mexico 
governments which are the two levels of government in charge of providing 
training services for the population in Mexico. At the federal level, there were 
two main programmes: 1. instructor training (FAM - Formación de Agentes 
Multiplicadores) in the workplace, where they just trained a worker in pedagogy 
so that he can train other workers in the area or field in which he is most 
experienced, and 2. PROCADIST, a distance-learning online programme. 
However, due to the lack of resources, each programme was run by only six 
people for the whole country, of which only the people involved in FAM 
belonged to the civil service system.92  
At the state level, there was one main training policy that comprised two 
elements: mixed training and training in the workplace. In mixed training, the 
                                                          
92
 In addition, the Ministry of Education offers online and in the workplace industrial training courses 
through some of the technical high schools, called CECATI (Centros de formación para el trabajo 
industrial in Spanish). 
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company provides the instructor and stationery and the state government 
provides a grant of from one to three minimum salaries for a minimum of six 
workers.93 The companies can participate as many times as they want as long 
as they show that the trained workers remained in their employment for at least 
six months. For training in the workplace, on the other hand, the state office 
pays the minimum salary and the entrepreneur trains the workers.94 The 
problem is that these policies are only available for companies which are 
registered with the Ministry of Treasury (SHCP), and as we have argued before, 
around 90% of the medium, small and micro-enterprises are informal so these 
programmes have a very low impact on increasing the skills levels of the 
population.  
As we can see, there is very limited access to training services. 
Accordingly, when we interviewed the chief of Human Resources of an MNC 
specializing in the manufacture of a detergent, he told us that when the firm has 
a low-qualification job, it sends details of the vacancy to the local government 
offices, but that when it has a highly-qualified position that needs to be filled, it 
draws upon specialized private employment or outsourcing offices. Moreover, in 
response to questions 24 and 25 (‘If you have been part of a government 
employment or training programme as a strategy for finding a job, please tick or 
mention the programme/s and indicate whether it helped you to obtain 
sustained employment or generate sustained income according to your 
capabilities, experience and wage expectations or not’ and ‘If it did not help you 
to obtain sustained employment or generate sustained income according to 
                                                          
93
 The local Ministry of Labour requires a minimum of six workers but there is no limit to the number of 
workers that can be enrolled in the programme.  
94
 A minimum salary is around seven pounds sterling per eight hours of work. 
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your capabilities, experience and wage expectations, or you did not use it, 
please indicate why’) only 24.4% of all the ex-recipients had used or been part 
of a government employment or training office or service, of whom only 4.5% 
were successful in finding sustained employment. The 75.6% of the ex-
recipients who did not use any kind of governmental website or programme for 
training answered that they did not know about them, not even VAS con 
Oportunidades (41%), which was supposed to be the link between the ex-
recipients of the Oportunidades programme and the labour market policies of 
the federal government, and that it was faster to look for a job on their own 
(34.6%).  
The only federal programme used was the website of the National 
Employment Service (www.empleo.gob.mx), which only offers information about 
possible vacant places in some industries, and no-one had used any federal 
training programme or service. The fourteen (3.9%) ex-recipients who had used 
the website of the National Employment Service argued that it did not help them 
to obtain a job, because eight ex-recipients said that the jobs offered on the 
website were only temporary and low-skilled ones, and the other six reported 
that it was faster to look for a job on their own. As for the state-level facilities, 
none of the ex-recipients used any of their services.  
At the municipal level in Toluca, on the other hand, there were no training 
policies at all. The employment office works only as a bank of information, 
letting people attend and giving them information about the vacancies that the 
firms established in that municipality have, or organizing employment fairs 
where the employment offices invite the private sector and civil society to gather 
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and offer their vacancies to the general public. Curiously, the sixteen (4.5%) ex-
recipients who had succeeded in finding sustained employment did so after 
attending one of these events. Moreover, the other 16.9% of ex-recipients who 
had used an employment or programme service but had not succeeded in 
finding employment did use the municipal employment services as well, which 
would suggest that since the municipal level is the closest to the citizenry, it 
really makes sense to have a process of decentralization.  
However, when we interviewed the head of the employment office in 
Toluca, he told us that the main problems that they found with offering training 
policies were the lack of financial resources and also the employment law 
(LFT). The LFT states that the training service can be carried out at the federal 
and state level only, since those levels of government are in charge of providing 
the formal public education whose infrastructure is normally used to organize 
the events. However, as commented above, none of the ex-recipients attended 
the state-level facilities looking for training. As for the lack of financial resources, 
as argued above, in 1983, Article 115 of the constitution was reformed 
specifically to strengthen the political and fiscal roles of the municipalities, 
specifying the public services which municipalities would be in charge of 
delivering and charging for.95 This reform also listed the income sources of 
municipal governments (taxes, service fees, and transfers from the federal 
government), especially the property taxes, which is the most important tax that 
municipalities have. The problem is that municipalities also have an important 
dependency on central transfers – between 80% and 90% of their total revenue 
                                                          
95
 The public services were water delivery; street lighting and cleaning; public squares, markets, and 
gardens; and public security and transit. 
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– and this is the reason why the revenue that they collect and can freely decide 
on which sector to spend it is very low.   
After interviewing the head of the revenue office of Toluca and the head 
of the Institute of Treasury of the State of Mexico (the Instituto Hacendario del 
Estado de México in Spanish), we found that the main reason for that 
dependency is the fact that municipalities do not have a place in the National 
Coordination System, since the Mexican Constitution does not allow the federal 
government to transfer intergovernmental grants directly to municipalities. This 
brings about two main problems. First, the states have the responsibility of 
supervising the correct use of the resources, limiting the federal government to 
validating the correct use of them. Consequently, the resources are not 
accounted properly and the states have a tendency to direct some of the 
resources discretionally without taking into account the federal criteria; and 
second, it impedes the standardization of the processes of taxation which brings 
about not only a lack of coordination between the offices of the municipalities, 
but also many disparities in the way each one of the municipalities collects 
taxes especially because at this level the authorities are very close to the 
citizens who helped them into power, and for that reason they found difficulties 
in taxing them. Consequently, there are municipalities with such very low 
institutional capacities that the state has to collect the property tax for them and 
give it back to them later, whereas there are other municipalities which had 
invested properly in technology to be able to standardize the property registry 
for both the revenue and the cadastral offices. For instance, according to the 
head of the revenue office of Toluca, by 2011 he had achieved the collection of 
only 50% of the property registry because most of the people who worked for 
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him had been appointed by political authorities even though they did not have 
the capabilities to carry out the whole process of taxation from the beginning to 
the end.96 Additionally, the period of time for which municipal authorities hold 
office is very short (only three years) and the situation is exacerbated because 
municipal governments are uncertain about the resources that they are going to 
be given every year by the federal government, which represents the majority of 
their revenues.  
In the case of the expenditures, unlike Brazil, where the state has 
incorporated the civil society groups into the design of the institutional 
framework and policy-making of the state, in Mexico much of the participation is 
channeled through official channels (COPLADEM, COPLADEMUN) (Aldret 
2011, 143-146).97 Accordingly, when we asked the ex-recipients ‘Have you ever 
attended the COPLADEMUN meetings to be informed and participate in the 
public issues of Toluca? YES/NO’ and ‘If you answered NO to the previous 
question, please indicate why’, 98.6% answered NO, because they did not 
know they could, and only 1.4% of the ex-recipients answered YES, as Table 
5.10 shows. 
 
 
                                                          
96
 We also had an opportunity of interviewing a representative of the human resources department of 
Toluca and he confirmed that due to the lack of a civil service law, at least two thirds of the public 
servants had a temporary contract and around 70% of the people rotated every three years. 
97
 COPLADEM and COPLADEMUN are the committees organized by the state and the municipalities, 
respectively, in order to know about the needs of the different groups of civil society and to make them 
part of the way in which social spending should be conducted. 
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Table 5.10 Have you attended the coplademun 
meetings? 42 
What do you do? Yes No  Total % 
Student 0 95 95 27 
Employed 1 153 154 43.8 
Own business 2 31 33 9.4 
Study and work 0 8 8 2.3 
Unemployed 2 60 62 17.6 
Total 5 347 352 100 
% 1.4 98.6 100  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
 
5.2.2 Access to finance 
As has already been discussed, after the implementation of the structural 
reforms, the state abandoned any attempt to invest directly in the industrial 
sector to generate employment since, according to the neo-liberal ideology, the 
state has to withdraw and allow the markets to follow their own dynamics and 
intervene only when market failures occur. This brought about a huge increase 
in the levels of unemployment and, in consequence, poverty. Since 2000, the 
Mexican state, in its three levels of government, has developed a very broad 
strategy to promote employment generation by opening access to finance for 
the creation, expansion and growth of medium, small and micro-enterprises 
(MSMEs) since they represent 99% of all economic units in the country and 
generate more than 70% of jobs in Mexico (PND 20007-2012, 111). They have 
strategies for the different groups in society and for different purposes. As Table 
5.11 shows, at the lowest level there are the programmes that encourage self-
employment (for the poor, the entrepreneurs and micro-enterprises) and then 
the programmes targeted at the small and medium enterprises and high-
technology industries.   
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Table 5.11 Programmes for the promotion of employment 43 
Classification Type of enterprise 
or business 
Federal Programmes State of Mexico Toluca 
MNCs MNCs. 
 
PROMÉXICO, Special tariffs 
from the Ministry of Treasury 
FIDEPAR, Ministry of 
Treasury 
 
Big enterprises First-level 
manufacturers.  
More than 250 
employees 
PROSOFT, PRODIAT, 
Special tariffs from the 
Ministry of Treasury 
FIDEPAR, Ministry of 
Treasury 
 
Small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) 
Second-level 
manufacturers  
50-250 employees 
PROSOFT, PRODIAT, 
Fondo PYME, 
PROLOGYCA, PCEZM, 
PROIND, Special tariffs from 
the Ministry of Treasury 
FIDEPAR, Ministry of 
Treasury 
Quick 
companies 
opening system 
Micro-enterprises Retail suppliers. 
0 – 10 employees. 
Fondo PYME Apoyo al autoempleo, 
Entrepreneurial Institute of 
the State of Mexico (IME) 
Fontol, Quick 
companies 
opening system 
Entrepreneurs Micro-enterprises 
0 – 10 employees. 
FINNOVA, Fondo PYME, Apoyo al autoempleo, IME Fontol, Quick 
companies 
opening system 
Access to finance 
for social 
enterprises of the 
poor. 
Micro-enterprises. 
0 – 10 employees. 
FONAES, FOMMUR, 
PRONAFIM 
Apoyo al autoempleo Fontol, Quick 
companies 
opening system 
Source: Author with information from our semi-structured interviews and the webpages of FONAES, IFAI, INEGI and INFOEM.  
As Figure 5.2 shows, most of the resources for this kind of programme 
are concentrated on encouraging the development of MSMEs of society in 
general (around 60%). The second place is occupied by the programmes that 
target the poor, such as FONAES, FOMMUR and PRONAFIM, which have 
almost 20% of the total investment for this programme. Finally, there is the 
support given to the big enterprises or the MNCs, although, as was explained in 
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Chapter 2, these enterprises are the ones that take most advantage of the 
special tariffs given by the Ministry of Treasury. 
 
2Source: SE (2012, 14). 
 
Most of these programmes are managed, either centralized or 
decentralized, by offices of the Ministry of Economy or their counterparts in the 
states and municipalities, with the exception of the special tariffs of the Ministry 
of Treasury, and in the case of the State of Mexico the Apoyo al auto empleo 
programme, which depends on the local Ministry of Labour. As previously 
discussed, the programmes directed at the MSMEs were a means for the state 
to put the financial resources close to the citizens, since due to the low level of 
law enforcement; banks are reluctant to grant credits for commercial purposes. 
In consequence, the state has encouraged the appearance of what they call the 
development banking system and the multiple banking system, which are 
financial institutions specialized in granting credits and/or subsidies for 
59.46 19.90 
6.05 
3.19 2.65 
2.27 2.18 2.11 
0.90 0.84 
0.43 
Figure 5.2 Budget of the subsidies of the Federal Ministry 
of Economy 2012 
Total: 11, 839.71 
Millions 
Fondo Pyme
FONAES
Prosoft
Prologyca
Finnova
Pronafim
Fommur
Promexico
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commercial purposes to individuals who are part of these governmental 
programmes.98  
In the broadest terms, the MSME’s programmes provide support through 
the multiple or development banking systems or intermediary organizations, for 
the creation and/or consolidation of productive projects or activities to contribute 
to the generation of occupations.99 All of them work on a similar structure; the 
entrepreneurs have to propose an idea for a business, the governmental office 
or the intermediary then studies the feasibility of the project and, if the project is 
accepted, finally, after on average six months, people start receiving their credit 
and, if needed, management training. FONAES presents the only exception 
since it provides a subsidy and not a credit; that is, the resources that the 
people receive do not have to be paid back by the poor as long as they invest it 
for the purposes stated at the beginning. Additionally, finance can be given 
either to individuals or to groups. An extensive analysis of every one of the 
programmes that target the poor is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
the main points to highlight are presented next.  
First, with the exception of FONAES, the rest of them are not linked to 
the Oportunidades or any programme of social assistance. Moreover, in an 
interview with people from PRONAFIM, they told us that since PRONAFIM is a 
programme of the Ministry of Economy and Oportunidades of the Ministry of 
Social Development, they cannot use the word ‘poverty’ in their rules or 
                                                          
98
 The organizations of the development banking system belong to the federal public administration 
whereas the organizations of the multiple banking systems are private organizations authorized to 
operate as lenders by the National Commission of Banking.  
99
 Intermediary organizations are normally private organizations which belong to universities and are 
called ‘incubators’ specializing in giving advice to micro-enterprises. There are federal and state level 
webs of Incubators. They can also be offices or institutes of the local governments, such as FONTOL in 
Toluca or IME for the State of Mexico, through which some resources are brought closer to the citizenry.  
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advertisements, rather they use terms such as ‘people of low resources’. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that FONTOL is a programme half of whose 
financial resources come from FONAES, FONTOL does not require people to 
show that they are part of a social assistance programme and people have to 
pay back the resources given.  
Second, as has already been discussed, potentially there are more poor 
people in urban than in rural zones. However, FONAES, which is the one linked 
directly to the programmes of social development, gives priority to zones of high 
marginality where there is limited access to basic public services such as 
potable water, electricity and so on, and in Mexico most of these are classified 
as rural. As an instance, out of all the occupations created by FONAES from 
2000 to 2012, more than 70% were created in the first sector of the economy 
while only the rest were in the industrial or the service sectors.100  
Third, there is no evidence that these programmes contribute to the 
creation of new enterprises, but only the strengthening of the existing ones 
(UNAM 2009, 3). Furthermore, the formation of groups to receive the finance 
does not have the goal of forming clusters to bring them closer to bigger 
enterprises but to make sure that the borrowers will pay the money back on 
time, since people do not necessarily have to belong to the same sector of the 
economy or work on the same activity or occupation. As a matter of fact, in 
Questions 29 and 30 (‘Have you ever attended or considered attending an 
organization of the state for advice and/or funding to start, expand, introduce 
technology or increase the production of your business? Please tick the 
                                                          
100
 www.fonaes.gob.mx accessed: May 2011. 
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programme’ and ‘If you have not attended or considered attending an 
organization of the state for advice and/or funding to start, expand, introduce 
technology or increase the production of your business, please highlight the 
main reason for that’), of the 352 ex-recipients not one of them had attended or 
had considered requesting advice and/or funding to start, expand, introduce 
technology or increase the production of their own business; 63.6% of them 
answered that they were not interested in having a business as a way of life, 
those who owned a business (9.4%) answered that this was because it took a 
long time to receive an answer from the government and the rest (27%) of the 
ex-recipients (students) did not answer. 
Fourth, most of the micro-enterprises in Mexico are informal – they are 
not registered with the social security and/or fiscal institutions – and there is no 
link between any of these programmes and the Ministry of Treasury or any 
social security institution to promote the formalization of the micro-enterprises. 
As a matter of fact, the rules of the programmes state clearly that their main 
purpose is to generate occupations and not employment, and when we 
interviewed people from FONAES and PRONAFIM, they confirmed that the 
occupations created by the programmes are mainly informal. Moreover, we also 
had opportunities to interview representatives of Apoyo al Autoempleo, 
FONTOL, IME, consultancies and people from the Ministry of Economy, and 
they all agreed that the main constraint that micro-enterprises find to 
maintaining their business as a way of living is the lack of business 
management skills. However, the main difficulty in approaching the micro-
enterprises to formalize and help them to maintain and/or increase their 
production was that people do not see benefits or incentives to paying taxes, 
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which decreases their opportunities to survive in the long-run. According to 
INEGI (2012, 7-9) in 2009 1,135,089 (28.3% of the total) new micro, small and 
medium enterprises were created. However, between 2009 and 2012 884,240 
(22% of the total) micro, small and medium enterprises died.  
Accordingly, when we asked the ex-recipients ‘What are the main 
constraints that you have faced or would face if you wanted to establish a 
business as a way of life?’, most of the students, employed and unemployed 
pointed to the lack of finance as a main constraint. However, most of the ex-
recipients who owned a business (33) identified the taxation system as a main 
constraint; fifteen of them argued that taxes were too high and thirteen that the 
taxation system was complicated, as Table 5.12 shows, in spite of the fact that, 
as argued above, in recent years there has been a thorough administrative 
simplification so that the micro-enterprises find it faster and easier to pay their 
taxes. 
 
Table 5.12 Main constraints to establishing a business as a lifestyle 
What do you do? 
Taxation system 
is complicated 
Finance 
Taxes are 
very high 
Permissions 
Know 
how 
Total % 
Student 1 84 3 5 2  95    27.0 
Employed 4 101 32 9 8 154    43.8 
Own business 13 1 15 4 0 33     9.4 
Study and work 0 7 1 0 0 8     2.3 
Unemployed 2 51 4 1 4 62    17.6 
Total 20 244 55 19 14 352     100 
% 5.7 69.3 15.6 5.4 4.0 100  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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By the same token, when we asked the ex-recipients in our question 32 
‘If you had to choose between a job with access to health security although 
some deductions were made from your salary or wage, or a job in which you 
received your full salary or wage but without access to health services, what 
would you prefer?’, 73% of the ex-recipients answered that they would prefer to 
have a job with access to health services rather than a job without it, even 
though they would not receive their full salary. Likewise, most of the 
unemployed and those who had their own business answered accordingly, as 
Table 5.13 shows. Contrastingly, only 21.9% of the ex-recipients (77) that were 
working had access to social security. This would suggest then that the ex-
recipients would actually prefer to pay taxes as long as they have incentives to 
do so.   
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45Table 5.13 Type of job preferred by the ex-recipients 
 
 
 
 
What do you do? 
‘If you had to choose between a job with 
access to health security although some 
deductions were made from your salary or 
wage, or a job in which you received your 
full salary or wage but without access to 
health security services, what would you 
prefer? 
 
 
Ex-recipients with access to IMSS 
 
Job with access to 
health security 
Job without access to 
health security 
Yes No No answer 
 
Total 
 
% 
Students 61 34 0 8 87 95 27.0 
Craft 6 4 0 10   10 2.8 
Helper/ assistant 49 12 29 32   61 17.3 
Cashier 9 1 5 5   10 2.8 
Labourer 2 0 0 2   2 0.6 
Unemployed 42 20 0 0 62 62 17.6 
Nurse 6 0 0 6   6 1.7 
Engineer 1 1 2 0  2 0.6 
Janitor 3 0 2 1  3 0.9 
Instructor 2 2 1 3  4 1.1 
Waiter 2 0 2 0  2 0.6 
Own business 24 9 1 32  33 9.4 
Nanny 1 0 0 1  1 0.3 
Worker man 12 3 12 3  15 4.3 
Clerk 2 4 2 4  6 1.7 
Private security 2 0 2 0  2 0.6 
Public servant 7 0 3 4  7 2.0 
Employee 1 1 1 1  2 0.6 
Technician 8 1 3 6  9 2.6 
Telemarketer 6 0 5 1  6 1.7 
Peddler 1 0 0 1  1 0.3 
Counter seller 10 3 7 6  13 3.7 
Total 257 95 77 126 149 352 100 
% 73.0 27.0 21.9 35.8 42.3 100  
Source: Author with information from our survey.  
Finally, when we asked the ex-recipients in question 31 about the level of 
trust that they had in relation to the way Mexican officials use the taxes that they 
have paid, 76.4% answered very low or low, 2.3% answered average and the 
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remaining 21.3% answered high or very high. Out of all the ex-recipients who 
owned a business, 70% answered that their level of trust was either low or very 
low, 24% that it was average and only 6% that it was very high, as Table 5.14 
shows. This would suggest that the incentives that the ex-recipients need go 
beyond the simple access to social security services to open access to services 
such as higher education and financial resources that would allow them to 
obtain sustained income to move out of poverty, and only then tax collection 
would be justified. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we have argued that the federal level has tried to 
maintain its power over access to public resources, which has impeded the 
improvement of the institutional and administrative capacities of the lower levels 
of government and consequently has made it difficult to use expenditure as a 
tool for alleviating poverty and in this way to justify greater tax collection. In the 
case of the decentralization of education, the federal level has kept for itself not 
46  Table 5.14 Level of trust in the way in which Mexican officials 
make use of the taxes 
What do you do? 
Very 
low 
Low Average High 
Very 
high 
Total % 
Student 64 15 0 11 5 95 27.0 
Employed  84 32 0 23 15 154 43.8 
Own Business 19 4 8 0 2 33 9.4 
Study and Work  4 3 0 0 1 8 2.3 
Unemployed 31 13 0 7 11 62 17.6 
Total 202 67 8 41 34 352 100 
% 57.4 19.0 2.3 11.6 9.7 100.0  
Source: Author with information from our survey. 
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only the collection and distribution of fiscal resources but also the policy-making 
of the education system, all of which has brought about a weak correlation 
between the skills acquired in formal education and those needed in the labour 
market, which has reduced the opportunities of the ex-recipients of the 
Oportunidades programme form obtaining sustained income as shown above. 
Moreover, instead of helping the local levels to improve their institutional 
capacities to participate in the provision of higher education (BA level), the 
federal level has allowed the private sector to step in, and this has brought 
about a wide educational gap between the rich and the poor since it is difficult 
for the poor to reach that study level which, according to our results, is the level 
that could make a difference as far as finding sustained employment is 
concerned. The situation at the municipal level might be the most serious since, 
although it is the level of government to which more of the ex-recipients attend 
looking for help to find employment, this level of government is not taken into 
account in the National System of Fiscal Coordination and the Employment 
Law, which impedes municipalities from participating in increasing the skills 
levels of the population. As for the programmes whose purpose is to foster self-
employment, the main problem would be that most of the micro-enterprises are 
informal and might find difficulties in surviving in the long run for two main 
reasons. First, the ex-recipients are not interested in paying taxes because they 
do not have incentives to do so and they do not trust the way in which the 
Mexican officials make use of the taxes, which impedes the formalizing of 
enterprises to increase their opportunities to survive. Second, most of the ex-
recipients had not considered opening a business since they preferred 
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sustained employment that would allow them to make plans in the long run and 
to have access to benefits such as social security services.   
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CHAPTER 6 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE EX-RECIPIENTS ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONAL 
CAPACITIES OF THE MEXICAN STATE 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, using the aggregated data that we obtained from our 
survey, we uncovered the extent to which the weakness of the institutional 
capacities of the state has impeded the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades 
programme from obtaining sustained income in the labour market. However, in 
Chapter 1 we argued that institutions and organizations have to be understood 
not only as constraints and/or enabling devices, but also as constitutive ones 
since they are constructed according to the interests, ideology, values and 
world views of the actors involved in the institution-building process and can 
shape not only the economic outcomes of the citizens but also their behaviour. 
In this chapter, we shall analyse the extent to which the neo-liberal ideology of 
the Washington Consensus reforms behind the institutional framework of the 
state has shaped the behaviour of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades 
programme that we interviewed in the occupational realm. 
We argue that, contrary to the neo-liberal ideology of the Washington 
Consensus reforms, which assumes that state intervention to help the poor 
through cash transfers and social provision creates perverse incentives for them 
not to move out of poverty by their own efforts, it is the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the Mexican state which has impeded the 
Oportunidades programme from enabling the poor to obtaining sustained 
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income in the labour market to move out of poverty by their own efforts. For this 
purpose, we shall use the dialogues from the focus group that we carried out 
during our fieldwork, by which we explored as thoroughly as we could the 
perceptions of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme about the 
extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state 
has impeded them from obtaining sustained income in the labour market to 
move out of poverty by their own efforts. We did not question them directly 
about these topics because it would have been difficult for them to know about 
or to have experience of all of them. However, what makes the answers of the 
focus group credible is that we conducted the interviews in a way in which they 
give us variables that would reflect their experiences that could represent the 
effects on the ground of those factors, as we shall see later.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section, we shall 
briefly explain the neo-liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms. 
The second and third sections will present the perceptions of the ex-recipients 
of the Oportunidades programme about the extent to which the weakness of the 
institutional capacities of the Mexican state has impeded them from obtaining 
sustained income in the labour market, in contrast with the neo-liberal ideology 
of the Washington Consensus reforms. The fourth section will present the main 
conclusions of the chapter.  
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6.1 Neo-liberal ideology 
 
While analysing the citizens’ perceptions about subjects related to the 
state’s institutions and organizations, we have to consider the historical 
experience of Mexico and the political culture that exists in the country. Without 
understanding the political system and how it is structured, it is not possible to 
understand the ways in which Mexican citizens perceive the extent to which the 
weakness of the institutional framework of the state impedes them from 
achieving their economic goals. In this sense, as has already been explained in 
previous chapters, an important variable to keep in mind is that the weakness of 
the institutional capacities of the Mexican state has contributed significantly to 
determining the negative outcomes of the development strategies, especially 
after the 1980s, when the Washington Consensus reforms were implemented. 
As discussed in the first part of the thesis, since the late 1970s, Mexico’s, 
and, in general, Latin America’s political economic framework experienced an 
extensive transformation from a state-led development scheme to a neo-liberal 
one. As explained in Chapter 1, after the Great Depression of the late 1920s 
and then World War II, states all over the world faced great pressures to control 
the excesses of capitalism. As a result, the postwar era was marked by state-
dominated development strategies which gave birth to the so-called Welfare 
State, where prosperity, equality and full employment were in equilibrium 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, 18-33). Latin American countries, to some extent, were 
no exception. However, as explained before, due to their weak institutional 
capacities, not only were the Latin American states unable to develop any 
productive sector that allowed them to compete internationally, but they also 
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depended mostly on international loans and/or the profits from oil to sustain 
their social spending. 
 In this context, the globalization of the economy and the fall of the oil 
price during the late 1970s had serious effects on the Mexican and Latin 
American economies and in the early 1980s they suffered a high debt crisis, 
bringing about large devaluations and high levels of inflation, which contributed 
to increasing the levels of unemployment, income inequality and poverty. As 
noted by Centeno and Cohen, scholars still disagree about the main causes of 
the crisis. At the time, however, state interference was signalled as the main 
culprit and its withdrawal from intervening in the economy, allowing the markets 
to follow their own dynamics, was seen as the best solution (op. cit., 4). These 
views were crystallized in the so-called Washington Consensus reforms, which 
would bring about macroeconomic stability and would help to increase 
employment and reduce income inequality and poverty.  
As argued before, the so-called Washington-Consensus reforms started 
to be implemented in the early 1980s and basically comprised two main market-
oriented strategies, the reduction of the size of the state and the openness of 
economic sectors, in order to allow the markets to adjust properly – on their own 
dynamics – to the new conditions and challenges that the new global order 
presented. According to Evans and Sewell, by opening their economic sectors, 
developing countries became part of a rapidly integrating world market, 
regulated by global rules administered by economic governance institutions 
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such as the World Trade Organization, the IMF and the World Bank.101 This 
new regulatory framework of the world economy is commonly referred to as 
neo-liberalism (2013, 2). 
The neo-liberalism or laissez–faire that emerged as an ideology and 
policy paradigm in the 1970s drew on classical liberalism´s ideas that aimed to 
provide an answer to the question of the limits to the power of the state because 
of the complexity of economic mechanisms (Chang & Grabel 2004, 14; Amable 
2010, 7; Evans & Sewell op. cit., 15-16). According to the ideas of classical 
liberalism, in order to have a prosperous society, it is in the interest of states to 
be cautious in any action affecting the economy (Amable op. cit., 8). In contrast, 
neo-liberal ideologists such as Hayek (1944), Friedman (1962) and Murray 
(1984) denigrated the notion that the state was both coordinator and guarantor 
of the well-being of society.102 For them it is a mistake to think that the state 
should be cautious in any action affecting the economy. Instead, they argued 
that the role of the state should be to intervene actively in the economy to 
ensure free and fair competition under the rule of law (Hayek 2006, 79; 
Friedman 1982, 13). More precisely, the main duty of the neo-liberal state is to 
maintain the market order; it refrains from interfering in production and 
exchanges but sanctions attacks against competition between individuals, 
which is always under threat from groups who try to protect themselves from its 
rigour and consequences (Amable op. cit., 10).  
                                                          
101
 According to Chang and Grabel, the term Washington Consensus is often used synonymously with 
neo-liberalism because the United States government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, all based in Washington DC, are such forceful advocates of these reforms (2004, 14). 
102
 See Hayek (2006), especially Chapter 8. 
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As previously discussed, by the early 1990s macroeconomic stability had 
been almost universally achieved. The problem was, as argued above, that the 
Washington Consensus reforms pulled apart the protective regulations and 
mechanisms of socio-economic equalization that characterized the welfare state 
developed between the 1930s and the late 1970s.103 As a result, the global 
economy has become more prone to economic crisis, which has constrained 
the equalization of the socio-economic conditions of the population even more. 
However, as noted by Centeno and Cohen, no matter what one’s views are on 
its costs and benefits, we need to understand neo-liberalism as the triumph of 
market ideologies (op. cit., 22).  
The market’s first great victory was in the academic arena. The principles 
underlying neo-liberalism first established their monopoly in the economics 
profession by stressing the welfare-maximizing consequences of market 
exchange through the use of mathematical models (Evans & Sewell op. cit., 
36). Once they had conquered the academic arena, politicians and policy 
makers began defining an economic guidebook which they sought to apply in 
the developing and, after 1989, in the post-socialist world, better known as the 
Washington Consensus (Centeno & Cohen op. cit., 24). As a political ideology, 
neo-liberalism exalts the superiority of the market allocation of goods and 
services over public provision (Evans & Sewell op. cit., 36). Perhaps the most 
important events that triggered the establishment of neo-liberalism as a political 
                                                          
103
 Huber argued that every model of capitalism has two essential constituents. On the one hand, there 
are growth-oriented strategies that deal with the different aspects of production and the provision of 
commodities, and these are clearly identified as economic policies and, on the other hand, equality-
oriented strategies, in which the emphasis is on the interests of people, and these are identified as 
social and labour market policies (2002, 3).
.
 Both components are not only compatible but they also 
complement each other. However, their distinction and complementarity have been blurred by the neo-
liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms in most of the developing world (Evans 1995, 6). 
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ideology all over the world were the elections of Margaret Thatcher in Britain 
(1979) and Ronald Reagan in the United States (1980), two strong advocates of 
neo-liberalism, because the United States was the world’s hegemonic power 
and Britain was its closest ally in economic and military affairs, which put 
pressure on all their economic partners to include neo-liberal reforms on the 
political agenda (Sewell 2009, 274).  
As a policy paradigm, neo-liberalism refers to the so-called Washington 
Consensus reforms intended to increase the role of markets in regulating 
economic life that we mentioned before, such as the deregulation of financial 
and labour markets, the decentralization of public services, lowering taxes, 
disempowering labour unions, cutting public spending and so on (Evans & 
Sewell op. cit., 36-38). Altogether, as economic theory, political ideology, and 
policy paradigm, neo-liberalism deploys constitutive narratives that shape the 
individual’s behaviour while simultaneously making neo-liberal political ideology 
and policy paradigms seem natural (Hall & Lamont 2013, 4; Evans & Sewell op. 
cit., 38). Perhaps the most powerful and effective constitutive narrative that 
justified the dismantling of the welfare state is the notion that social 
programmes to help the poor to create a moral hazard problem (Hirschman 
1991, 27-28; Somers & Block 2005, 271-274; Somers 2008, 80-81).104 
As noted by Somers and Block, it has been argued that society, like 
nature, is a self-regulating system that, when untouched by political 
intervention, will tend toward equilibrium and order (op. cit., 271). Accordingly, 
any attempt to control and mitigate even its harshest natural laws, such as food 
                                                          
104
 See Friedman (1982), especially Chapter XI. 
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scarcity, would bring about imbalance and disorder (ibid., 273). In view of this, 
social programmes to help the poor through cash transfers and social provision 
create perverse incentives for welfare recipients not to move out of poverty by 
their own efforts, creating a culture of welfare dependency which exacerbates 
poverty (Hayek 2006, 128-129; Friedman 1982, 162-163; Somers op. cit., 80). 
According to Hayek, state intervention to help the poor creates a culture of 
welfare dependency because it prevents competition, that is, individuals – 
relying on their own and/or developing new entrepreneurial skills – have to 
adapt constantly to the supply and demand dynamics of the market (2006, 52 
and 214-215). For him, a competitive system is the only one in which nobody 
can prevent people from achieving their economic goals (ibid., 107). Being poor 
is then a behavioural choice since citizens are responsible for seeking out 
opportunities in the labour market and avoiding, by themselves, the inevitable 
risks that entrepreneurialism entails (ibid., 104-127). 
However, as noted by Evans and Sewell, although the political agendas 
of many countries all over the world were influenced by the Washington 
Consensus reforms, their adoption, implementation and failure or success 
varied according to the internal and external context of each individual country 
(op. cit., 39-40). Accordingly, unlike in Mexico, evidence suggests that, in the 
developing world, poverty has been alleviated more effectively in countries 
where neo-liberal initiatives have been accompanied by strong 
institutionalization of the labour market such as in Brazil, Taiwan and South 
Korea (Chang 2010, 179; Grinberg 2010, 185; Cypher 2013, 391; Evans & 
Sewell op. cit., 48). In the next two sections, we shall analyse the perceptions of 
the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme about the extent to which the 
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weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state has impeded them 
from obtaining sustained income in the labour market, in contrast with the neo-
liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus.  
6.2 Perceptions about the regulatory-market capacity of the state 
 
In this section, we shall analyse the perceptions of the ex-recipients of 
the Oportunidades programme about the extent to which the weakness of the 
regulatory-market capacity of the state has impeded them from obtaining 
sustained income in the labour market, in contrast with the neo-liberal ideology 
of the Washington Consensus reforms. As we shall see later, the findings from 
the focus group discussions about the weakness of the regulatory-market 
capacity of the state were rather scarce since most of the participants had not 
had any experience of dealing with the labour justice systems, the labour 
inspectors or the unions. However, they were extremely revealing since their 
responses showed us a different view of how the weakness of the regulatory-
market capacity of the state has impeded the ex-recipients from obtaining 
sustained income in the labour market.   
6.2.1 Weakly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus 
In line with the neo-liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus 
reforms, during the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American countries initiated a 
process of flexibilization of their labour markets since it was considered that 
their rigidity prevented employment growth (Bayón op. cit., 307; Teichman 
2012, 142-143). Paradoxically, the results in most of the Latin American 
countries have been wage deterioration, job insecurity and the loss of health, 
 237 
 
pension and many other important benefits (Teichman 2012, 143). In Brazil, as 
argued before, an important factor that made it possible, to some extent, to 
cope with the flexibilization of their labour market was the strengthening of its 
bureaucratic apparatus, which enabled them to engage with other government 
and non-government actors, bringing about effective solutions to make the 
private sector comply with the law but, at the same time, helping them to 
increase their production and sales.  
In Mexico, on the other hand, law enforcement has been softened 
informally. That is, the organizations of the state responsible for monitoring and 
inspecting labour regulations and those in charge of the application of labour 
justice have been permissive with the private sector in order to avoid job 
destruction, sacrificing the rights of workers in the process. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the logic behind the softness of the law enforcement in the labour 
market is that the private sector and the employees do not know the labour 
norms and it is necessary to advise them on how to comply with the law to keep 
firms running to avoid job destruction. However, this has meant the weak 
institutionalization of the bureaucratic apparatus in charge of applying labour 
justice and in consequence that workers are prevented from accessing impartial 
and impersonal state organizations that protect their rights while helping the 
private sector at the same time to increase or maintain their productivity. 
For instance, as shown before, all the ex-recipients in the focus group 
were unemployed; when we asked about their previous jobs they all indicated 
that they had been working in large enterprises and when we questioned them 
about why they had lost their previous jobs, they explained that this had been 
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because the enterprises offer only temporary contracts of six months to carry 
out a particular job. If there is more work to do, they renew the contract for 
another six months; if there is not, they do not renew it.105 Additionally, although 
they told us that the enterprise had paid them everything specified in their 
contracts, when we asked if they knew whether their contracts had been written 
in accordance with the Mexican laws, they said that they did not know, and 
when we asked them if they knew which organizations to consult about 
problems related to their rights as workers, they named the Ministry of Labour, 
but when we mentioned specific organizations such as the Federal or Local 
Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration (JFCyA and JLCyA) or the PROFEDET, 
either at the federal or state level, they replied that they did not know about 
them but that they trusted in the Mexican institutions and would apply to them in 
the event that their workers’ rights were not respected.  
However, when we asked them what they thought about the level of 
impartiality and impersonality with which the law is enforced in Mexico, their 
opinions were mainly negative. They argued that because of corruption, law 
enforcement is normally in favour of the patrons, in both trials and labour 
inspections, since the patrons can pay for prestigious lawyers to represent or 
advise them and that is the only way to ensure that the law is applied 
correctly.106 Accordingly, as argued in Chapter 4, the Head of Human 
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 It is important to highlight that although most of the ex-recipients were unemployed, most of them 
were working or helping in a family business. However, they did not consider that to be employment, 
which is why they considered themselves to be unemployed. We shall go back to this point later in 
section 6.3. For now we are just interested in clarifying this issue in order to raise the point that as far as 
the law enforcement section is concerned, most of the talk was carried out in relation to employment in 
the industrial sector.   
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 Latinobarómetro 2009 reported that the confidence of the citizens in the judiciary and the 
government of Latin American countries was mainly negative. Latin American citizens have on average 
little confidence in the judiciary, which is in charge of applying the laws, and only some confidence in the 
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Resources of the small company that manufactured automobile seats that we 
had the chance to interview told us that inspectors normally prefer to monitor 
the medium- or large-sized companies because in those they can obtain a 
larger bribe in the case of an enterprise found to be violating the labour norms 
and regulations, and that when there are health and safety issues, workers do 
not sue the enterprise because they know that a trial will last a long time and 
that hiring a prestigious advocate is very expensive.  
6.2.2 Weak unions 
As argued in Chapters 2 and 4, along with the organizations of 
monitoring and applying labour justice, the unions complement the 
organizations in charge of law enforcement in the world of labour. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, third-party enforcement is vital for having an impersonal 
and impartial institutional framework. However, as shown above, in line with the 
neo-liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms, the private sector in 
most of the Latin American countries, with the indulgence of the states, has 
pushed for the shrinking of unions, since they are considered to be an obstacle 
to the well-functioning of the neo-liberal economic model. As previously 
explained, an exception might be the Brazilian case, where, unlike Mexico, the 
collective and social capacities of its unions have played an important role in 
adjusting the institutional framework of the labour markets to the new conditions 
(Haagh & Cook op. cit., 179) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
government, and in the specific case of Mexico, citizens have little confidence in either the judiciary or 
the government (The scale used was: 0=No answer, 1. A lot of confidence; 2. Some confidence; 3. Little 
confidence; 4. No confidence at all; 8. Do not know). Available at: 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATCorporacion.jsp. Accessed: November 2012. 
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In contrast with the neo-liberal ideology of the Washington consensus 
reforms, the ex-recipients clearly stated that the unions are the bodies that 
protect their rights and are aware of their health and safety conditions. 
Moreover, their perception was that they (the unions) are more reliable than the 
organizations of the state. However, at the same time they believed that the 
enterprises use the unions to keep workers under control, especially the small 
enterprises, which according to them care less about the labour conditions of 
the workers, such as the security and health of the workers, as was shown in 
Chapter 4. Nonetheless, they find incentives for forming or belonging to a union 
since they believe that this is the main way to obtain a stable job.107  
An important point to highlight here is that, according to the ex-recipients 
who we interviewed, they are offered six-month contracts and the unions have 
as a condition of membership the requirement that people have to have had at 
least six months working for the enterprise. This is a major gap in the labour 
norms since, although the unions do not contravene any norm or law by doing 
this, they do constrain the ex-recipients from the possibility of being protected. 
Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 4, this could be an agreement between the 
enterprise and the unions to avoid having more workers protected and to 
eliminate employer responsibilities, taking advantage of the loopholes in the 
Mexican labour norms and regulations, especially the gaps as far as 
                                                          
107
 In accordance not only with what the ex-recipients of the focus group thought but also with the 
results of our survey, Latinobarómetro reported that in 2009 Mexicans and Latin American citizens in 
general had little confidence on average in unions. This report strongly backs up our results since, as we 
explained in Chapters 2 and 4, Mexican citizens in general had lost hope in unions because after the 
structural reforms unions were no longer able to represent and obtain important benefits for workers, 
although they believed that unions were the only way to keep employment for a long period of time. 
Moreover, in accordance with what we have seen about the way in which the unions have been an 
important factor in the adjustment of the labour market to the globalization process in Brazil, 
Latinobarómetro reported that Brazil, alongside Uruguay, was the Latin American country with the 
highest percentage of people that do trust unions. 
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outsourcing is concerned, which have already been discussed in Chapter 2 and 
4.  
6.2.3 Short job tenure 
As a result, in accordance with our results presented in Chapter 4, the 
weakly institutionalized law enforcement in the world of labour has brought 
about short job tenure with high levels of informalization. According to the ex-
recipients interviewed in the focus group, not only do the enterprises offer only 
temporary contracts of no more than six months, but also the only benefits that 
they offer – in small, medium and even in big enterprises –  are health security 
and overtime payment, but they did not receive fringe benefits. Moreover, they 
did not even know that they had the right to receive part of the revenues that the 
enterprises produce every year. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 5, 
sometimes, although workers are registered in IMSS, if there is an accident they 
are taken to a private hospital so that the owners of the enterprise do not have 
to pay for medical leave or attract the attention of IMSS in regard to the working 
conditions that they offer.  
As for their salaries, they were around 3500 pesos on average per 
month.108 As discussed before, according to the official poverty lines in Mexico, 
with these salaries the ex-recipients were no longer poor. Furthermore, we 
confirmed that they did not spend too much time unemployed, because, as has 
been apparent from our findings described in previous chapters, they can find 
employment or an occupation relatively quickly (three to six months). However, 
as previously argued, not only were such employment or occupations low-
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 Around 175 pounds sterling. 
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qualified and temporary but also most of the ex-recipients argued that they had 
had to accept jobs in complete informality (without access to unions or social 
security services, without a contract, and so on), because they could not find 
sustained employment. 
6.3 Perceptions about the fiscal capacity of the state   
 
In the previous section, we analysed the perceptions of the ex-recipients 
of the Oportunidades programme who we interviewed about the extent to which 
the weakness of the regulatory-market capacity of the state impedes them from 
obtaining sustained income in the labour market, in contrast with the neo-liberal 
ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms. We have previously argued 
that combined with the institutional weakness of the regulatory-market capacity 
of the state in the world of labour, the institutional weakness of the fiscal 
capacity of the state has limited the ex-recipients’ access to services such as 
formal education and resources that would allow them to increase their 
capabilities to obtain a sustained income in the labour market. In this section, 
we shall analyse the perceptions of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades 
programme about the extent to which the weakness of the fiscal capacity of the 
state impedes them from obtaining sustained income in the labour market, in 
contrast with the neo-liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms. 
6.3.1 Access to formal education 
As previously argued, the main idea behind the Oportunidades 
programme is to provide a minimum income to the poorest so that they invest it 
in the education and health of their children, who, once educated and healthy, 
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would acquire capabilities that would enable them to keep on obtaining an 
income in the labour market in the mid and long-term to move out of poverty by 
their own efforts. We have argued that one of the most significant positive 
effects of the Oportunidades programme on the well-being of the poor is that it 
has increased the levels of school attendance. As a matter of fact, according to 
our interviews, the ex-recipients really appreciated the help given by the 
programme, and were especially grateful that thanks to the education to which 
they had access, they were sufficiently educated and prepared to compete for a 
job in the labour market.  
However, as briefly shown in Chapters 1 and 2, the low skills levels of the 
population is still an important characteristic of the Mexican labour market. 
Accordingly, as explained earlier, as part of the Washington Consensus 
reforms, the Mexican and Latin American states undertook a process of fiscal 
decentralization (tax and social spending) during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
with the intention of both reducing the size of the state and its intervention in the 
economy, and of improving the effectiveness of the allocation of resources. 
Conversely, as has already been explained, this is not the reality of social 
spending in Mexico since, as was argued in Chapter 5, social spending on 
higher education is not only low but also highly regressive, being one of the 
main impediments that the ex-recipients face when it comes to obtaining 
sustained income in the labour market.  
According to Falleti, the important factor that enabled a, partially, 
successful fiscal decentralization in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s was that 
decentralization was demanded by the sub-national governments (states and 
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municipalities), who called for the decentralization of fiscal resources first (tax 
collection) to improve their institutional capacities and then the decentralization 
of social spending (op. cit., 151-153). In Mexico, on the other hand, we have 
already discussed how the federal level has manipulated the institutional 
framework of the state to keep control over access to basic resources and 
services which has brought about low and regressive public spending. For 
instance, the current National System of Fiscal Coordination does not allow the 
states and municipalities to increase their revenues since not only is it poorly 
regulated but it does not even take the municipalities into account. On the other 
hand, we have argued that not only did the education reform of 1997 not cover 
higher education, bringing about discretionary social spending, but also the 
federal government kept for itself the policy-making of the curricula, bringing 
about a very weak correlation between the skills acquired in formal education 
and those needed by enterprises.109  
Accordingly, the perception of the ex-recipients towards the level of 
education was that a BA is practically necessary to obtain sustained 
employment, just like the answers to our survey which were presented in 
Chapter 5. Even more, they believed that any kind of specialization in a specific 
discipline is not necessary at all, which is also in accordance with what we 
showed in Chapter 5 about the great distance between what is taught in formal 
public education and the skills needed in the labour market. The new uncovered 
point here is that the main constraint that they faced to study at this educational 
level is the process for entry to the public universities – specifically the 
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 In the Latinobarómetro survey of 2009, they asked the Latin American citizens about their 
satisfaction with the way that public education works. The average answer in the Latin American region 
(Mexico included) was ‘rather satisfied’. (The scale was: 0=Do not know, 1=Very satisfied, 2= Rather 
satisfied, 3= Not very satisfied, 4= Not satisfied at all).  
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admission exam that they have to take – which is perceived as a non-
transparent process and discouraged them from planning a career with a BA, 
making them focus on finding employment as their main priority. 
On the other hand, as was shown in Chapter 5, although the state has 
increased its social spending on scholarships so that students can continue 
studying, they find it difficult because they do not know about these 
scholarships. This is probably due to the fact that the procedures to obtain the 
scholarships can only be undertaken once the semester starts and it takes a 
while for the scholarship to be finally granted. Moreover, as has been shown in 
previous chapters, social spending is cyclical, so there is no real certainty about 
the availability of resources to offer scholarships, so the promotion of the 
scheme has less impact.  
Finally, and in accordance with what we have demonstrated in Chapter 5, 
the regressiveness and the discretionary nature of social spending in higher 
education forced the ex-recipients to prefer studying in technical or 
technological high schools to increase their chances of obtaining sustained 
employment. Moreover, it forced them to focus on finding a job as their main 
priority rather than planning a life with a university degree. The problem is, 
however, that even though they might study at a technical or technological high 
school, it does not make a real difference as far as obtaining sustained 
employment is concerned since there are not enough well-paid jobs. 
As a matter of fact, the ex-recipients believed not only that the education 
to which they had access prepared them well enough to obtain a job, but also 
that the technological or technical high school makes a difference as far as 
finding a job is concerned. However, in practice it really does not since the ex-
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recipients explained that not only do they have to be trained by the enterprises 
before they start performing their job, but also that they preferred not to invest 
their own resources in training themselves but waited to be trained by the 
enterprises since they did not know what kind of job they could find. 
Accordingly, as argued in Chapter 5, the person who was part of the automotive 
cluster that was due to be formed in the State of Mexico commented that a high 
investment in training every worker who the firms hire is unavoidable. So, it 
might be the case that the high school diploma is only a requirement that job-
seekers have to fulfil as a filter, but that it would not make a difference at all as 
far as finding a job is concerned. 
6.3.2 Access to training and labour market policies 
According to intergenerational mobility researchers, the socio-economic 
background of the poor is an important determinant of how far they can 
advance in educational levels. In consequence, a poverty reduction strategy 
which opens access to education might not be enough since it would be 
necessary to complement this with labour market policies that allow the poor to 
improve their socio-economic conditions (Nolan et al., 2010, 23; Esping-
Andersen & Wagner 2012, 479). In view of this, an important point to highlight is 
the fact that the socio-economic background of the recipients (that is, the 
education and/or economic levels of their families), along with the support of the 
Oportunidades programme, seems to determine how far they can advance in 
educational levels. For instance, both the ex-recipients that we interviewed in 
the focus group and those in the survey were lower-middle class rather than 
extremely poor. Those who were able to continue to the BA level were in a 
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better position although without reaching the middle-class level, and those who 
studied only the high school level could be easily classified as lower class. 
As previously discussed, in line with the Washington Consensus reforms, 
the Mexican and Latin American states have implemented different self-
employment policies as the main labour market policy to solve the market 
failure of unemployment. These policies are supposed to alleviate the 
unemployment resulting from the necessary reforms and initiatives meant to 
restructure the economy and institutions of government for a trade-liberalized 
world (Tendler op. cit., 3). An important point of that strategy is to lower taxes to 
encourage citizens to set up their own businesses since it is believed that high 
taxes inhibit entrepreneurialism and/or force business to remain informal (ibid., 
4-5).  
However, the ex-recipients whom we interviewed in the focus group had 
considered starting up their own businesses, but only as a last resort since later 
on they might try to find a job in which they could have benefits such as health 
security, fringe benefits and especially a sustained income, in spite of the fact 
that most of them were helping in the family business at the time that we 
interviewed them. For instance, for the government training services, one of the 
main reasons why the ex-recipients found them unhelpful was precisely that the 
courses offered are only linked to self-employment and that there were very few 
courses which would enable them to obtain employment in an enterprise. 
Furthermore, the most-used government employment services were the 
employment fairs at the municipal level mainly because, according to one of the 
ex-recipients, there is a real encounter there with the enterprises and they could 
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talk to them and know more or less what chances they have of obtaining a job 
and the benefits offered.  
Moreover, in spite of the fact that, as shown in Chapter 5, the Mexican 
state, in its three levels of government, has implemented different programmes 
with the purpose of opening access to finance to the poor so that they employ 
themselves, none of the ex-recipients whom we interviewed had requested any 
finance from the state. According to the focus group interview, this was mainly 
because they do not know about these programmes, and secondly because 
their perception of the state is that the procedures for obtaining the finance are 
time-consuming and tricky and that it takes a long time to receive an answer. 
During our fieldwork, we had the chance to interview a couple of small-scale 
manufacturers of teddy bears. Among the informal occupations of Toluca, this is 
one of the most popular and when we asked if they had requested finance from 
the state to increase their production, they gave us the same answer as the ex-
recipients of the focus group: that the procedures are time-consuming and tricky 
since the governants normally do not deliver what they promise.   
Tendler argued that in Brazil, to some extent, the success of these 
policies is due to the fact that municipalities have been able to engage 
effectively with micro-entrepreneurs forming clusters to help them increase their 
wholesale and retail trade but at the same time taxing them to increase the 
possibilities of formalizing them (op. cit., 8-10). On the other hand, as explained 
in Chapter 5, although providing access to finance policies in Mexico has the 
intention of forming clusters, most of the micro enterprises are informal. That is, 
they are not registered with the social security and/or fiscal institutions and in 
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consequence workers or owners do not have access to labour contracts and 
social security services and are not covered by minimum wage legislation.  
Although we did not ask the ex-recipients whether their own or their 
family businesses were formal or informal, we did ask them whether they 
trusted the way that the state uses the taxes that they pay, and their responses 
showed that they not only perceived social spending as regressive but also that 
the governants are corrupt.110 Moreover, we asked the ex-recipients for their 
opinion of the taxation system and they agreed that it was complicated, the 
same as the results of the survey, despite the fact that, as was explained in 
Chapter 5, in recent years there has been administrative simplification which 
has made it very easy for micro-businesses to pay tax, due to the negative 
perception of the governants. Furthermore, the ex-recipients also mentioned the 
need for permits from the government to open a business, despite the fact the 
municipality of Toluca has the Quick opening-a-business system, which is 
supposed to make it easy to open a micro-business within 48 hours.  
In addition, although they complained about the low quality of the public 
services, they stated that they had never attended any of the Coplademun 
meetings, which is supposed to be the organization in charge of working with 
the citizens at the municipal level so that their demands can be fulfilled, 
because they did know anything about it. All of which would suggest, as argued 
before, that contrary to the idea that high taxes force micro-enterprises to 
remain informal, the problem is that micro-entrepreneurs do not pay taxes 
because they do not have incentives to do so since social spending is 
                                                          
110
 Accordingly, on average the Mexican and Latin American people interviewed by Latinobarómetro 
2009 answered that between 2007 and 2009 they perceived very little progress on reducing corruption 
in state institutions and in another question they answered on average that it was not guaranteed at all 
that wealth was justly and fairly distributed in their countries. 
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regressive and discretionary, which impedes the state from formalizing the 
enterprises to increase their opportunities to survive.  
6.4 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we have analysed the extent to which the neo-liberal 
ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms has shaped the ex-recipients’ 
behaviour in the occupational realm. We have argued that, contrary to the neo-
liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms, which assumes that 
state intervention to help the poor through cash transfers and social provision 
creates perverse incentives for them not to move out of poverty by their own 
efforts, it is the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state 
which has impeded the Oportunidades programme from enabling the poor to 
obtain sustained income in the labour market to move out of poverty by their 
own efforts. This would suggest that if neo-liberal policies were accompanied by 
strong institutionalization of the labour market, the poor might be able to expand 
their capabilities to obtain sustained income to move out of poverty by their own 
efforts.   
As far as the regulatory-market capacity of the state is concerned, the ex-
recipients’ perception is that they have limited access to impartial and 
impersonal state and workers’ organizations that protect their rights, since, on 
the one hand, because corruption law enforcement is normally in favour of the 
patrons since they can pay for prestigious lawyers to represent or advise them 
and this is the only way to ensure that the law is applied correctly. On the other 
hand, the ex-recipients perceive the unions to be a tool used by the private 
sector to organize the workers and make them accept their labour conditions 
rather that to protect workers’ rights. All of which has contributed importantly to 
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employment being institutionalized, informally, as short-tenured with minimal 
benefits. 
In the case of the fiscal capacity of the state, we have confirmed that, on 
the one hand, the ex-recipients believe that it is necessary to have a BA to 
increase their capabilities to obtain sustained income. However, they perceive 
the (institutional) process for entry as non-transparent, which makes them focus 
on studying at a technical high school rather than planning a career with a BA. 
Finally, contrary to the neo-liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus 
reforms that self-employment policies are the labour market policy that will solve 
the market failure of unemployment, the ex-recipients preferred to have 
sustained employment that allows them to make plans in the long run, mainly 
due to the fact that they have limited access to resources and activities that 
would allow them to expand their capabilities to obtain sustained income, which 
creates a culture of dependency on passive employment since they see active 
employment as more difficult to succeed in.   
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the main conclusions and wider implications of the 
empirical analysis of the role of the state in alleviating poverty in Mexico. The 
central argument is that the Oportunidades programme has failed to enable the 
recipients to obtain sustained income in the labour market that would allow 
them to escape out of poverty due to the lack of effective training and labour 
market policies that complement the programme. The core cause of that is the 
weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state, which has 
impeded the creation of some of the necessary conditions so that the poor can 
obtain sustained income in the labour market that would allow them to escape 
poverty. A particularly important variable was the implementation of the 
structural reforms during the 1980s, which meant the withdrawal of the state 
from its substantive roles as coordinator and distributor of resources.  
Accordingly, throughout this thesis we have argued that with an impartial 
and impersonal institutional framework that ensures the freedom of any citizen 
or group of individuals to organize and pursue their social, political and 
economic goals, there is a greater likelihood of the alleviation of poverty. 
However, the further establishment of an impartial and impersonal institutional 
framework alone will not guarantee greater socio-economic equality. A shift in 
the ideology behind the developmental strategy of the Mexican state is also 
necessary in order to take into account the interests of the citizenry in the 
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decision-making process, especially of those at the bottom of the social 
structure, to achieve greater socio-economic equality.  
In the previous three empirical chapters, we have analysed the extent to 
which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state impedes 
the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme from obtaining sustained 
income in the labour market that would allow them to move out of poverty. 
Throughout this chapter, we shall try to address the issues which we have 
analysed in the empirical chapters and to frame them within the theoretical 
framework that we discussed in the first part of the research. The aim is to 
clarify what the role of the Mexican state is in alleviating poverty and the extent 
to which the weakness of its institutional capacities has led to failure in poverty 
alleviation by impeding the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme from 
obtaining sustained income in the labour market.   
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of 
the main empirical findings of this work. Section 2 discusses the implications of 
this thesis for the role of the state in alleviating poverty in a middle-income 
country such as Mexico. Section 3 presents concluding remarks about the 
institutional capacities of the Mexican state. Finally, section 4 presents an 
analysis of the latest reforms of the Mexican government to the labour market 
institutions.  
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7.1 Main empirical findings 
 
The central aim of this thesis was to understand better the role of the 
Mexican state in alleviating poverty and the extent to which the weakness of its 
institutional capacities impedes it from fulfilling it. We began addressing our 
research question by exploring the logic of the main anti-poverty policy that the 
Mexican state and some other countries in the Latin American region have 
implemented in the last two decades. As argued in the Introduction and in 
Chapter 2, the logic of the so-called Conditional Cash Transfer (CCTs) 
programmes is to provide a minimum income to the poorest so that they invest 
it in the education and health of their children, who, once educated and healthy, 
would acquire capabilities that would enable them to keep on obtaining an 
income in the labour market in the mid and long-term to move out of poverty by 
their own efforts. We claimed that much of the previous research about these 
programmes has focused on highlighting the positive effects on the well-being 
of the recipients, such as the increase in school attendance or in health checks 
and reducing income inequality while families or recipients belong to the 
programme, among other short-term effects. However, there were very few 
studies that have offered real evidence showing whether or not the recipients 
are able to obtain sustained income in the labour market.   
In this context, we argued that our thesis distinguishes itself from such 
studies in that: 1) it examines the role of the Mexican state in alleviating poverty 
taking into account that poverty is a problem that requires a lot more than just 
access to health or education services to be alleviated. This point is relevant 
because while historically the Mexican state had played an important role in the 
coordination of the economy and the provision and distribution of basic services 
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such as health, education and social rights (since its creation in 1917 until the 
early 1970s), the structural reforms implemented during the 1980s in Mexico 
changed that role, causing the state to withdraw from intervening in the 
economy to allow the market to follow its own dynamics. And; 2) our study not 
only presents empirical evidence of the way in which the institutional weakness 
of the state impedes the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme from 
obtaining sustained income in the labour market, but it does so by examining 
the situation of the poor in urban zones. This point is worthy of note because 
while historically poverty has been concentrated in rural zones, the process of 
industrialization that took place between the 1930s and the late 1970s pushed 
poverty to grow in urban zones where the poor have the disadvantage that the 
only way to obtain an income to satisfy their needs is by selling their labour.   
In Chapter 1, we introduced the theoretical framework utilized throughout 
the thesis, and this included our understanding of institutions and organizations 
of the state.  We argued that the institutions and organizations of the state 
configure the relationships of the different actors of the social structure and 
determine the access to valuable resources and activities that allow the different 
groups of society to pursue their social, political and economic goals. In this 
sense, an institutional political economy analysis allowed us to consider in 
greater depth the extent to which the state’s institutional framework limits or 
opens access to valuable resources or activities for the different groups of 
society and the political process behind it.   
We then moved to a discussion of why state intervention is needed to 
alleviate poverty. Building on the insights offered by contributions to the 
institutional political economy tradition, we argued that state intervention to 
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coordinate the economy is needed because there are markets (labour, natural 
resources and money) that cannot be left to follow the supply and demand logic 
because they are not commodities that can be traded. Should that happen, 
social diseases such as poverty would appear because in a free-market system 
it is the citizenry – micro-entrepreneurs, workers and farmers – who bear the 
costs of the market failures. Consequently, the state has to intervene to adjust 
the supply of money and credit to avoid the destruction of micro and small 
enterprises, to implement labour market policies to avoid unemployment, and to 
maintain continuity in the production of natural resources by protecting farmers 
from imports in order to avoid social diseases such as poverty from appearing 
or worsening. 
We then undertook a discussion about the role of the state in alleviating 
poverty under the poverty paradigm on which the CCTs like the Oportunidades 
programme are based. Within the so-called capabilities approach, poverty is 
understood as the impossibility of carrying out autonomous life projects, since 
poor people lack equal opportunities to access valuable activities and resources 
such as education and health services which allow them to move out poverty. 
This paradigm has been operationalized under the logic that with access to 
health and educational services, the poor will acquire capabilities that will 
increase their opportunities to obtain sustained income in the labour market that 
would allow them to move out of poverty, bringing the state back as an 
important actor for the distribution of those services and for the implementation 
of labour market policies that would allow the poor to obtain an income in the 
mid and long term. Finally, we discussed how states can intervene in the labour 
market to alleviate poverty through their institutional capacities, drawing on the 
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successful experiences of different states of the developing and the developed 
world. We highlighted, for instance, how countries in East Asia, Scandinavia 
and some countries in Latin America, such as Brazil, have shown that strong 
institutionalization of the labour market (high levels of social spending, effective 
law enforcement, access to union representation and so on) has mattered more 
to poverty alleviation than high educational levels. 
In Chapter 2, we briefly discussed how the economic model of the 
Mexican state before the implementation of the structural reforms of the 1980s 
seemed to be more socially inclusive than in the last three decades, particularly 
due to the extensive social rights that were negotiated by the labour movement 
and thus more conducive to alleviating poverty than the current model. 
However, the weakness of the institutional – regulatory-market and fiscal – 
capacities of the Mexican state have contributed importantly to determining the 
negative outcomes of the development strategies followed before and after the 
implementation of the structural reforms in the 1980s. The difference between 
the two periods was mainly the shift in ideology behind the overall development 
strategy of the state, which brought about the withdrawal of the state from the 
coordination of the economy and distribution of the services in the latter period, 
which exacerbated even more the socio-economic inequalities of the 
population. 
In this sense, it was important to uncover the extent to which the 
institutional weakness of the Mexican state could impede the Oportunidades 
programme from achieving its main goal. More precisely, we needed to expose 
the extent to which the institutional weaknesses of the Mexican state impede 
the Oportunidades programme from enabling the poor to obtain sustained 
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income in the labour market that would allow them to move out of poverty. The 
main question that we tried to answer in the analytical chapters of the thesis 
and that guided the design of the empirical methods of research in our field 
work was: to what extent does the weakness of the institutional capacities of the 
Mexican state impede it from alleviating poverty? 
Consequently, in Chapter 3, we constructed a methodology aimed at 
uncovering the extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of 
the Mexican state impedes the Oportunidades programme from enabling the 
poor to obtain sustained income in the labour market. Following our ontological 
and epistemological positions, we combined qualitative and quantitative data 
collection techniques in order to aproach the best possible explanation of our 
problem, which included qualitative interviews and a questionnaire. We also 
discussed how we used random sampling techniques to select the poor for 
interviews and how we selected the State of Mexico and Toluca as sites to carry 
out our fieldwork.    
In Chapter 4, we sought to answer our question partially: to what extent 
does the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state impede it 
from alleviating poverty? Following the theoretical framework that we discussed 
in Chapter 1, we showed that the weakly institutionalized bureaucratic 
apparatus of the Mexican state in charge of applying the law in the world of 
labour impedes the state from harnessing the interests of the private sector into 
areas of public interest while helping them to maintain or increase their 
productivity. This is mainly due to the clientelist practices that permeate the 
organizations in charge of monitoring and applying labour justice, such as the 
inspection offices and the boards of conciliation and arbitration respectively, 
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who in the exercise of their functions end up benefiting the private sector to 
avoid job destruction rather than protecting workers' rights.   
In the case of the monitoring offices at both the federal and state levels, 
the public servants not only lack enough inspectors with the necessary 
capabilities to make the enterprises comply with the law, but also the ideology 
behind their job is that it is preferable to keep the enterprises running to avoid 
destroying employment, even though workers' rights are unprotected. As shown 
in Chapter 4, the worst case perhaps is the state level (State of Mexico), where 
there is no civil service system in those organizations, especially because this is 
the level of government in charge of inspecting and monitoring the goods and 
service sectors, which is where there are more workers in terms of numbers 
and where the less-qualified jobs are.111 On the other hand, in the case of the 
boards of conciliation and arbitration, although they are supposed to be 
autonomous bodies, they are under the wing of the executive power since the 
heads of the offices of those boards are appointed directly by the federal and 
state executive powers respectively, which, as argued above, normally seeks to 
benefit the private sector rather than to protect workers' rights, in order to avoid 
job destruction. Accordingly, the opinions of the ex-recipients as far as the 
impartiality and impersonality of the application of labour justice in the world of 
labour were mainly negative.  
We argued as well that this was partly a consequence of the fact that the 
private and political elites have been limiting access to forming or belonging to 
organizations that represent workers' interests because they consider them to 
be obsolete and no longer part of the new economic model. This, on the one 
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 As explained in Chapters 2 and 4, municipalities do not have any participation in the inspection or the 
resolution of conflicts between workers and the private sector.  
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hand, has impeded the labour movement from using its political power to claim 
social rights. On the other hand, there is no third party enforcement which can 
bring about a situation in which the different incumbents in the world of labour 
monitor each other, ensuring that the law is enforced impartially and 
impersonally. Accordingly, the opinions of the ex-recipients were that although 
the enterprises use the unions to keep workers under control, they still see 
unions as the most important organizations to keep sustained employment. The 
result of this is an increase in the levels of labour informalization and short job 
tenure since the enterprises, in order to lower their production costs, offer only 
short-term contracts with very low salaries (especially because they do not 
share the profits according to law) and without access to benefits such as 
training or social security services in most of the cases.  
Chapter 5 also demonstrated that due to the institutional weakness of the 
fiscal capacity of the state, it has not been possible to increase the skills of the 
citizens and their access to active labour market policies that would allow them 
to obtain sustained income. We argued that the federal level has tried to 
maintain its power over access to public resources, which has impeded the 
improvement of the institutional and administrative capacities of the lower levels 
of government and consequently has made it difficult to use expenditure as a 
tool for alleviating poverty and in this way to justify greater tax collection. In the 
case of education, the federal level has kept for itself not only the collection and 
distribution of fiscal resources but also the policy-making of the education 
system, all of which has brought about a weak correlation between the skills 
acquired in formal education and those needed in the labour market, which has 
reduced the opportunities of the ex-recipients of the Oportunidades programme 
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form obtaining sustained income as shown above. Moreover, instead of helping 
the local levels to improve their institutional capacities to participate in the 
provision of higher education (BA level), the federal level has allowed the 
private sector to step in, and this has brought about a wide educational gap 
between the rich and the poor since it is difficult for the poor to reach that study 
level which, according to our results, is the level that could make a difference as 
far as finding sustained employment is concerned. Accordingly, the ex-
recipients who we interviewed answered that one of the main constraints that 
had impeded them from achieving access to employment was the lack of a 
Bachelor degree and we found no difference in the job opportunities between 
those who studied at technical and at general high schools. 
We also showed the way in which the federal government has prevented 
the lower levels of government from having a greater participation in the 
National Fiscal Coordination System. On the one hand, not only does the 
federal government collect around 90% of the total revenues of the Mexican 
state, but also the National Fiscal Coordination System is not properly regulated 
since the federal level, in order to avoid political costs, has decentralized some 
taxes to the state level without regulating them properly. Furthermore, 
municipalities are vaguely taken into account in the National Fiscal Coordination 
System since they cannot receive resources directly from the federal level, 
which impedes the effective delivery of public goods since this is the level that is 
closest to the citizens. In addition, citizenship participation in general is 
channelled through official organizations in order to keep citizens under control. 
All of which impedes the state from increasing the progressiveness of social 
spending and brings about distrust in the way in which the Mexican officials 
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make use of the resources collected, impeding the justification of greater tax 
collection. 
As for the programmes whose purpose is to foster self-employment, the 
main problem would be that the ex-recipients are not interested in paying taxes, 
since they do not have incentives to do so and they do not trust the way in 
which the Mexican officials make use of the taxes, which impedes the 
formalizing of enterprises to increase their opportunities to survive. Moreover, 
those who had businesses felt that the taxation system was complicated in spite 
of the fact that in recent years there has been administrative simplification so 
that the micro-businesses pay faster and more easily than before, due to the 
negative perception that they have of the way in which the taxes collected are 
used. As a consequence, most of the ex-recipients had not considered opening 
a business since they preferred sustained employment that would allow them to 
make plans in the long run and to have access to benefits such as social 
security services. Accordingly, none of the currently available access to finance 
programmes at the three levels of government was used by the ex-recipients in 
spite of the fact that these programmes are one of the main employment-
generation policies of the state at the federal and local levels, and that the ex-
recipients signalled a lack of finance as the main constraint to starting up a 
business.   
In the penultimate chapter of this thesis, Chapter 6, we presented an 
analysis of the extent to which the neo-liberal ideology of the Washington 
Consensus reforms has shaped the ex-recipients’ behaviour in the occupational 
realm. In this way, we were able to complement the findings reported in the 
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previous chapters to understand in a better way the extent to which the 
weakness of the institutional capacities of the state impedes the Oportunidades 
programme from achieving its main goal. We argued that, contrary to the neo-
liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms, which assumes that 
state intervention to help the poor through cash transfers and social provision 
creates perverse incentives for them not to move out of poverty by their own 
efforts, it is the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state 
which has impeded the Oportunidades programme from enabling the poor to 
obtaining sustained income in the labour market to move out of poverty by their 
own efforts. 
As far as the regulatory-market capacity of the state is concerned, the ex-
recipients’ perception is that, on the one hand, because corruption law 
enforcement is normally in favour of the patrons since they can pay for 
prestigious lawyers to represent or advise them and that is the only way to 
ensure that the law is applied correctly. On the other hand, the ex-recipients 
perceived unions to be a tool used by the private sector to organize the workers 
and make them accept their labour conditions rather that to protect workers’ 
rights. All of which has contributed significantly to employment being 
institutionalized, informally, as short-tenured with minimal benefits.  
In the case of the fiscal capacity of the state, on the one hand, the ex-
recipients perceive the (institutional) process for entry to the public universities 
as non-transparent, which makes them focus on studying at a technical high 
school rather than planning a career with a BA. Finally, contrary to the neo-
liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus reforms that self-employment 
policies are the labour market policy that will solve the market failure of 
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unemployment, the ex-recipients preferred to have sustained employment that 
allows them to make plans in the long run, mainly due to the fact that they have 
limited access to the resources and activities that would allow them to expand 
their capabilities to obtain sustained income, which creates a culture of 
dependency on passive employment since they see active employment as more 
difficult to succeed in.   
7.2 Conclusions: The role of the state in alleviating poverty 
 
In this section, we shall spell out the wider implications of our research in 
relation to the existing literature about the role of the state in alleviating poverty 
in a middle-income country such as Mexico. More precisely, we aimed at 
expanding the existing literature in at least five ways. First, we empirically 
examined the role of the state in alleviating poverty (understood as increasing 
the capabilities of the poor through access to basic services such as education 
and health that would allow them to increase their opportunities to obtain 
sustained income in the labour market, thus equalizing their socio-economic 
conditions) in urban zones of a middle-income country. Our analysis suggests 
that the Mexican state will be unlikely to alleviate poverty because the 
weakness of its institutional capacities impedes the provision of training and 
labour market policies that complement the programme and enable the poor to 
obtain a sustained income in the mid and long run. Complementing the 
Oportunidades programme with training and labour market policies in urban 
zones is especially important because, as we have argued, nowadays more 
than 60% of the whole population works in the service sector, most of them in 
complete informality without access to labour contracts, training or social 
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security services, and they are not covered by minimum wage legislation, which 
impedes them from obtaining sustained income in the mid and long run.  
Second, we advanced the discussion about the importance of institutions 
for the working of human society and the socialization of individuals. As 
previously explained, the logic of the capabilities approach, which 
Oportunidades is based on (where poverty is broadly understood as the 
impossibility of carrying out autonomous life projects, since poor people lack 
equal opportunities to acquire or access the means to pursue their projects), 
brings in the state as an essential actor in the alleviation of poverty by 
emphasizing the importance of opening access for the poor to basic services 
such as education and health, which would allow them to increase their 
capabilities of obtaining a sustained income in the labour market. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, the capabilities approach falls short in explaining the 
causes or consequences of unequal distribution or redistribution of public 
services and resources that bring about the inequalities in acquiring the 
necessary capabilities to obtain sustained income in the labour market. As a 
consequence, this makes the paradigm difficult to employ in contexts of high 
socio-economic inequality such as in Mexico, where, among other important 
factors, the institutional weakness of the states is one of the key causes that 
prevent the equal distribution of resources and services that could have an 
impact on alleviating poverty. This thesis provides an example of the way in 
which the institutional weakness of the state can prevent the Oportunidades 
programme – based on the capabilities approach – from enabling the poor to 
obtain sustained income in the labour market that would allow them to move out 
of poverty by their own efforts.  
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Third, we also showed the importance of the institutionalization of the 
labour market, which, although it is a market, cannot be left to follow the supply 
and demand dynamics because it includes human beings who cannot be 
treated as commodities. As shown throughout the thesis, in spite of the positive 
results of the programme in increasing the school attendance of the recipients, 
the withdrawal of the Mexican state from its substantive roles as coordinator of 
the economy and distributor of resources has contributed significantly to 
bringing about an informalization of labour of different types and to varying 
degrees, especially in urban zones, since workers do not have access to social 
security services, stable contracts, union representation, access to finance, 
training schemes and so on. All of this has impeded the Oportunidades 
programme from enabling the recipients to obtain sustained income that would 
allow them to move out of poverty by their own efforts. 
Fourth, as explained above, by the time that we started our research, 
there was little empirical evidence that showed that the ex-recipients of the 
Oportunidades programme are able to obtain sustained income in the labour 
market that allows them to move out of poverty and/or the causes of that. 
Accordingly, we constructed a methodology using a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative data–collection techniques which allowed us to collect appropriate 
information to more accurately assess the programme’s main goal. Fifth, in the 
analysis of the CCTs as the main anti-poverty policy in many countries of Latin 
America, the role of the state has received relatively little attention. The 
conclusions that have come out of our research presented in this thesis add 
relevant understanding to the extent to which the state can play a more active 
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role in alleviating poverty through the strong institutionalization of the labour 
market in urban zones. Some of these are summarized next. 
7.3 Concluding remarks: The institutional capacities of the state 
 
 
The analytical framework that we have presented in this chapter 
suggests that the capacity of states to fulfil their functions stems from the way in 
which their institutional framework supports complex and specialized 
organizations through which the different groups in society can pursue their 
social, political and economic goals, irrespective of the personal identity of the 
leaders. Accordingly, we identified those institutions and organizations that can 
have an important contribution in the creation of the conditions that allow the 
poor to obtain sustained income in the labour market as those related to the 
regulatory and fiscal systems. As for the Mexican case, we argued that the 
weakness of the institutional capacities of the state make poverty alleviation 
much less likely to occur because of the influence of the private and political 
elites, which has negatively affected the creation of some of the necessary 
conditions so that the poor can obtain sustained income in the labour market.  
Due to the institutional weakness of the regulatory-market capacity of the 
Mexican state, the private sector was able to flexibilize the labour market 
institutions informally, bringing about high levels of informalization and short job 
tenure. It happened like this for the following reasons. First, the weakly 
institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus to monitor and apply labour justice to 
make employers comply with the law, helping them at the same time to increase 
or maintain their productivity to foster employment growth brought about a 
modus operandi within the enterprises by which, in order to diminish their costs, 
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they started to outsource labour and/or goods and services, taking advantage of 
the fact that outsourcing has many gaps in the Mexican labour norms and 
regulations. Second, the limited access to workers’ organizations that provide 
third-party enforcement in the world of labour constrains workers from 
exercising their political rights and in consequence the achievement of social 
rights. As an instance, most of our respondants had low-qualified jobs with 
short-term contracts and very low salaries and without access to benefits such 
as training, union representation or social security services in most cases. 
The institutional weaknesses of the other capacity examined – the fiscal 
system – also stems from the pervasiveness of the patron-client practices that 
structure the state-society relationships. In this case, however, it is more a 
political issue rather than an administrative one. First, not only is the Mexican 
state still dependent on oil revenues, which represent almost 40% of the whole 
revenue of the Mexican State, but also, the private sector has been granted 
many tax exemptions in order to lower its costs to attract local and international 
investment, especially the manufacturing sector. Second, the federal 
government has kept tax collection for itself (just over 90% of all tax collection) 
and the provision and decision-making process of key services such as 
education in order to avoid losing control over access to those services, and this 
impedes the local governments from improving their institutional and 
administrative capacities. Third, citizenship participation has been channelled 
through official organizations in order to keep people under control, which 
constrains the capacity of the state to increase the progressiveness of social 
spending and justify greater tax collection since people do not trust the 
government. As an instance, most of our respondents answered that they did 
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not trust the way in which their taxes are used, meaning that they are reluctant 
to pay them. This is also the case with the owners of micro-enterprises, which in 
turn constrains the possibility of formalizing those businesses, reducing their 
chances of obtaining sustained income. 
7.4 Current reforms to the Mexican labour market institutions 
 
In this thesis, we have discussed how the institutional weakness of the 
Mexican state impedes the state from supporting autonomous and complex 
organizations through which the society can freely pursue its social, political and 
social goals, and this is what allowed the private sector to succeed in 
informalizing the Mexican labour market. We have also seen that the informal 
adjustment of the labour market institutions by the private sector elites, under 
the indulgence of the political elites, has brought about high levels of 
informalization that leave the poor vulnerable to falling into poverty again. 
Moreover, as argued in Chapter 2, what distinguishes the Mexican labour 
market from those of other countries in Latin America is that in spite of the 
structural reforms implemented during the 1980s, the world of labour did not go 
through any kind of formal reform until 2012.  
On 30 November 2012, one day before President Calderón (2006-2012) 
of the right-wing political party PAN left the presidency of Mexico, the first 
thorough reform of the Employment Law (LFT) since 1970 was enacted. The 
new Mexican president from PRI, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), not only 
saw his inheritance from his party's neo-liberal political party friend (PAN) 
positively, but also stated that the reform would help to protect workers' rights. 
The reality is that the changes introduced to the law responded to the interests 
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of the private sector, who took a big further step, influencing the 
institutionalization of the informal changes that they had promoted since the 
early 1980s, and we have commented on that in previous chapters. As a matter 
of fact, according to Bensusam, the reform had not been passed in exchange 
for the support of the CTM and other labour unions to establish a restrictive 
wage policy to avoid inflation after the implementation of the structural reforms 
and the privatization of social security during the 2000s, which is the reason 
why the Mexican state allowed the informal flexibilization of the labour market 
institutions in the meantime (2008, 31). 
As an instance, the new law now covers outsourcing but leaves many 
gaps that the private sector can take advantage of, since it introduced new 
flexible ways of hiring and firing, such as probationary and initial training 
contracts, that allow employers to hire workers for up to six months, being able 
to end the labour relationship whenever they want. Furthermore, although the 
law specifies that whoever uses outsourcing to reduce labour rights will face 
high fines, it still leaves in the air how inspectors will do this if, as we saw in 
Chapters 2 and 4, there is only a very small number of inspectors and the 
ideology behind their function is that of a compliance-guide and advisory body 
rather than to impose strict sanctions.  
As argued in Chapter 4, in Mexico the federal level is in charge of 
monitoring labour conditions in most of the industrial sector, where there is most 
investment of capital. On the other hand, the state level is in charge of 
monitoring labour conditions in most of the service sector, where there is little 
investment of capital but there are potentially more workers. According to what 
we have seen so far, this division would fit in with the idea that there are 
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potentially more rents in the high-industry level than in the service sector. On 
the positive side, the reform of the employment law now gives the federal level 
the responsibility for inspecting the service sector as well. However, again, 
there is still the problem of how inspectors will do this.    
In the case of labour justice, some positive changes have been made, 
such as the fact that the local and federal Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration 
will now be forced to implement a civil service system. The problem here is that 
the implementation of these systems will be developed by the head of the 
Boards and not by a special institute or a different organization in charge of 
ensuring that the system works with transparency, and this might leave the 
functioning of the system as very discretional, as with the LSPC at the federal 
level.  
As for the unions, the law did not introduce changes that could open 
access for workers to organize and use their political power to claim social 
rights. On the contrary, the unions are more than ever controlled by the 
executive power since they now have more responsibilities to fulfil, such as 
declaring their heritage and making public their collective contracts should they 
want to be registered with the Ministry of Labour. The rationale here, according 
to the Mexican executive power, is that unions' functioning cannot be inspected 
or monitored and this is the reason why all that can be done is to make public 
which unions are transparent and which are not.  
Additionally, the labour reform of 2012 seems to have the intention of 
having the economic and social policies also working as one. Now the Ministry 
of Labour and the Ministry of Economy are forced to work together to increase 
the productivity of micro and small enterprises through the provision of the 
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programmes referred to in Chapter 5 which provide advice and access to 
finance. The same is the case for the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of 
Education, which are now forced to work together in order to develop a national 
catalogue of occupations that links the labour market and formal education. 
However, not only are they by-passing some other important links between 
ministries such as the necessary collaboration between the Ministry of 
Economy, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Treasury so that inspectors 
can be prepared both to enforce the law and to increase the productivity of 
enterprises, but also they leave the way in which they have to operate at the 
discretion of the heads of the ministries without clear rules on how to proceed.  
As for the fiscal system of the state, the current Mexican president 
Enrique Peña Nieto, from the PRI political party, sent a proposal to the 
Congress in early September 2013, which, at the time of the writing of this 
chapter, has not been completely approved. However, the main changes 
proposed are twofold. First, instead of helping the local levels to improve their 
institutional capacities, the federal executive is proposing to centralize spending 
on education and health completely “to improve the effectiveness of the 
allocation of resources”, which would mean the reversal of the process of 
decentralization initiated in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, as previously 
argued, education and health are the two social areas on which the state 
spends the most; by centralizing social spending in these two areas the federal 
executive power would be in charge of both collecting and spending around 
90% of the whole revenue of the Mexican state, which was what allowed the 
PRI political party to control the different social groups - through clientelist 
practices – before the opening of the economy, when the MNCs and the BGs 
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became stronger than the Mexican state. So, it seems that the Federal 
government is trying to strengthen its position to be able to negotiate with the 
different social groups. However, this strengthening could also bring about the 
perpetuation of the PRI political party in power one more time. Second, Peña 
Nieto is proposing to continue institutionalizing self-employment as one of the 
main employment generation strategies of the Mexican state. As a matter of 
fact, the National Institute of the Entrepreneur (Instituto Nacional del 
Emprendedor in Spanish) was created in early 2013. However, as shown 
above, the ex-recipients that we interviewed preferred to have sustained 
employment that allows them to make plans in the long run, mainly due to the 
fact that they have limited access to resources and activities that would allow 
them to expand their capabilities in the occupational realm. On the positive side, 
this active labour market policy is supposed to be complemented by the 
implementation of unemployment insurance, the creation of a universal health 
system and the reinforcement of the law enforcement capacities of the state in 
matters related to the supply of credit. However, we still have to see, on the one 
hand, whether the Mexican state is capable of collecting enough revenue to 
make these labour market policies sustainable in the mid and long run, since, 
as argued above, the Mexican state depends greatly on oil revenues (more than 
40% of the whole revenue) to finance its social spending. On the other hand, we 
still have to see whether the reinforcement of the law enforcement capacities in 
matters related to the supply of credit can overcome the clientelist practices that 
permeate the institutional framework of the Mexican state and encourage the 
banking system to open access to finance for the citizenry.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
 
List of people interviewed 
 
1. Members of staff of the General Direction of Inspectorate of the Ministry of 
Labour of the State of Mexico.  
2. Juan García and Francisco Ramírez, small manufacturers of teddy bears.  
3. Head of Human Resources at a small company that manufactures 
automobile seats.  
4. Antonio Tajonar, ex-member of the automotive cluster which operated in the 
State of Mexico between 2008 and 2010. 
5. Ricardo Treviño Chapa, General Director of Revenue of the Ministry of 
Finance of the State of Mexico. 
6. Soraya Pérez Munguía, Executive Director of the Institute of Treasury of the 
State of Mexico. 
7. Heads of the Human Resources and the Accountancy departments of an 
MNC specializing in the manufacture of a detergent. 
8. Werner Christof Maletz Ramírez, Head of the Employment Office in Toluca. 
9. Head of the Revenue Office in Toluca. 
10. Benjamín González, member of staff of the Human Resources department 
of Toluca. 
11. Martín Zamalvide Tortt, Evaluation Consultant of the National Programme of 
Microenterprise Finance (PRONAFIM) of the Federal Ministry of Economy. 
12. Miguel Ángel Múñoz Arámbula, federal representative of the National Fund 
of Social Enterprises (FONAES) in the State of Mexico.  
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13. Pablo Valdovino Romero, Head of the Municipal Institute of Toluqueño 
Entrepreneur (FONTOL).  
14. Raul Ángel Otero Díaz, Head of the Entrepreneurial Institute of the State of 
Mexico (IME). 
15. Head of the business management consultancy of the Autonomous 
University of the State of Mexico (UAEM).  
17. Ing. Jesús Serrano Landeros, General Director of Heavy Industries in the 
Federal Ministry of Economy. 
18. Carmen Arzate Martínez, Head of the Regional Office of Employment of 
Toluca of the Ministry of Labour of the State of Mexico.  
19. Members of staff of the General Direction of Training and the National 
Service of Employment in the Federal Ministry of Labour.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We have omitted the names of some of our interviewees at their request at the time 
they agreed to be interviewed. In the case of the interviewees listed above as numbers 3 and 
7, we also omitted the name of their employing organization at their request.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Questionnaire: English Version 
 
No. ____ 
QUESTIONNAIRE ABOUT THE LABOUR AND EDUCATIONAL 
LOCATION OF THE OPORTUNIDADES PROGRAMME’S EX-RECIPIENTS. 
Objective: To identify the main constraints that ex-recipients of 
the Oportunidades programme face when they try to obtain sustained income in 
the labour market.  
First of all, thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. This 
questionnaire is completely anonymous so it is not necessary to write your 
name anywhere on the document. No-one will know who has completed this 
questionnaire. The responses to these questions will be used for my doctoral 
thesis and nothing more since I am not part of, or connected to the Ministry of 
Social Development team, and the grant of your family members is not 
conditional on you completing this questionnaire.  
 
Please, for each question only choose one response, unless the question 
indicates otherwise.  
 
Section 1 
1. - Gender:  F       M                       2. - Age: ______________         
3. - Marital status:  
Single               Married               Divorced                 Free Union  
 
4.- Place of birth: ______________________________________________ 
5.- Municipality you work, study or try to work and / or study currently? 
a. Valle de Toluca            b. Valle de México       c. Distrito Federal 
d. Other (specify)________________ 
6.- Year in which you finished high school? 
 
7.- Education: 
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a) General High School Diploma  
 
 
b) Technical High School 
Diploma  
 c) Bachelor of Arts completed  
d) Currently studying a Bachelor 
of Arts 
 
 
e) Currently studying a Bachelor 
in engineering  
 f) Currently studying a 
Bachelor in sciences 
 
g) Truncated degree  
 
 
h) Bachelor in engineering 
completed 
 
 
i) Bachelor in Science 
completed 
 
k) Other (specify)_____________      
 
8.- What do you do? 
a) Student 
 
b) Employee  
c) Own business 
(specify)_________ 
 
 
d) Study and work  
 
 
e) study and own business 
(Specify)_______________ 
  
f) Unemployed 
 
 
Section 2 
 
9. - ¿Do you consider that labour inspectors properly monitor and inspect 
compliance with labour norms and regulations in the companies where you 
have worked? 
  Yes    No    
 
10.- If you answered NO to the previous question, please indicate why 
 
a) There are very few 
inspections 
b) There is corruption to avoid 
sanctioning the employer 
c) Inspectors are not specialized 
enough to advise and/or enforce the 
law 
 
11. With what level of impartiality and impersonality do you believe that the 
labour norms and regulations are enforced in the resolutions of conflicts 
between workers and employers? 
      
 
 Very low  low  Average  High  
 
Very high  
 
      
12.- If you answered low or very low in the previous question, indicate the main 
reason you chose that answer. 
      
 
The rights of 
the workers are 
 
Trials take too 
long to finish 
 
Workers are 
not properly 
advised on 
 
Other 
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disregarded to 
benefit the 
employer 
how to defend 
their rights 
 
13. - Do you consider it worthwhile to invest your time and pay fees to form 
unions or workers’ organizations that represent your interests to companies?  
 
                  Yes                             No         
 
Section 3 
 
14. - Complete the following information about your formal or informal current 
job/occupation.  
 
 
Concept Current job 
Post 
 
 
 
Type of contract 
 
1. Undefined             2. Temporary             3. No Contract 
Name and nature of 
company/organization 
 
 
___________________________  ________________________________ 
Access to social security 
services  
 
 
1. Yes                    2. No 
 
Hours of work per week  
 
 
 
 
If you have worked 
overtime, did you get 
paid as set by law? 
 
  1. Yes             2. No            3. Do not work overtimes 
 
Monthly wage? 
 
 
 
Do you receive your 
profit sharing as stated in 
the law? 
 
 
 
 
 
  1. Yes                           2. No 
Access to workers' 
organizations that 
represent your interests? 
 
1. Yes                           2. No 
 
Constant training? 
 
 
1. Yes                          2. No 
 
 
15. - In your opinion what is the most worrying issue about your working 
conditions?  
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a) Wage/Salary  b) inequality and abuse  c) Risks at Work  
d) Lack of 
access to social security 
services 
 e) Temporary employment  f) lack of training 
g) Other (Specify)_______________ 
 
 
16. How many Jobs have you had since you finished high school?     
 
17.- What is the maximum amount of time that you have remained 
unemployed? 
 
18. - If you are or have been an employee in complete informality (No contract, 
no kind of social security, no access to organizations that represent your 
interests), please indicate why you chose that kind of employment.  
a) Wage  b) Flexibility of schedule  c) To gain experience  
d) Did not find formal 
employment 
  
f) Other (Specify)_________________________________________ 
 
Section 4 
 
19.-  What is the main constraint that has hampered you from obtaining 
sustained employment? 
A) Lack of experience 
 
 B) Lack of training 
 
 C) Maternity 
 
 
D) There are no jobs  
 
 E) Lack of BA 
 
 f) None 
 
G) Other (specify)_______________ 
 
20.- What has been the main constraint that has impeded you from continuing 
studying to the BA level? 
a) lack of financial resources 
 b) I did not want to continue 
studying 
 c) I did not pass the exam to 
study at a public university 
 
f) Other (specify)____________________ 
 
21.- Do you consider that the education that you had access to thanks to the 
Oportunidades program allowed you to acquire the necessary skills and abilities 
to find formal employment according to your experience and wage 
expectations?  
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              Yes                             No         
22.- Do you invest your own resources to acquire more skills that allow you to 
obtain sustained employment or generate sustained income?  
              Yes                             No         
 
23.- If you answered NO to the last question please highlight the main reason. 
      
 
a) Wait to be trained by 
firms 
 
b) lack of economic 
resources  
 
 
c) other 
 
 
      
Section 5 
 
24.- If you have been part of a government employment or training programme 
as a strategy for finding a job, please tick or mention the programme/s and 
indicate whether it helped you to obtain sustained employment or generate 
sustained income according to your capabilities, experience and wage 
expectations or not 
 
a) Municipal employment 
office  
 
 
b) State employment 
office  
 
 
c) National employment 
service 
 
 
d) Municipal Job Fair  
 
e) State employment 
Fair 
 
 
 
f) Federal employment fair 
 
 
 
g) VAS with Oportunidades  
 
 
 
 
h) My first job program 
 
 
 
 
i) Temporary employment 
program 
 
 
j) Workshops for job seekers   k) BECATE  
l) School of Arts and 
occupations 
 
m) PROCADIST  
n) Man Power 
scholarships 
 o) SEP training for work  
p) None  q) Oher (Specify) __________________________________ 
       
 Yes it helped me                        No, it did not help me         
 
25. - If the programme/s did not help you to obtain sustained employment or 
generate sustained income according to your capabilities, experience and wage 
expectations, or you did not use it, please indicate why. 
 
 281 
 
a) They were poorly paid jobs  
b) Procedures take a long 
time to be finished  c) They were temporary jobs  
 
d) I did not know those 
services 
 e) I do not trust government 
employment services 
 f) It is faster to search on my 
own 
 
 
g) Other (Specify)________________________________ 
 
 
26. Have you ever attended the COPLADEMUN meetings to be informed and 
participate in the public issues of Toluca?  
Yes       Why? 
No      Why?  
27. If you answered NO to the last question, please indicate why. 
a) Do not know it  
b) Not interested in getting 
involved in public matters  c) Other (specify)  
 
28. What are the main constraints that you have faced or would face if you 
wanted to establish a business as a way of life? 
a) Taxation system is 
complicated 
 b) finance  c) taxes are very high  
d) permissions  
 
e) know how 
 f) h) Other (Specify) ______  
 
29. Have you ever attended or considered attending an organization of the state 
for advice and/ or funding to start, expand, introduce technology or increase the 
production of your business? please tick the programme. 
a) Ayuntamiento 
municipal de 
Toluca(Fontol) 
 b) Ayuntamiento de 
Metepec 
 c) Servicio Estatal de 
Empleo 
 
d) Instituto Mexiquense 
del emprendedor 
 e) FONAES  f) PRONAFIM  
g) Programa de Capital 
Semilla 
 h) Centro México 
Emprende 
 i) Centros PyMe 
Exporta 
 
j)Banca Comercial  k) Banca social  
l) NO, I have never 
considered it. 
 
m) Other (Specify)  
____________________________________________________________ 
 
30. If you have not attended or considered attending an organization of the 
state for advice and/ or funding to start, expand, introduce technology or 
increase the production of your business, please highlight the main reason for 
that. 
a) Procedures take a long  b) I am not interested in  c) I did not know those  
 282 
 
time having a business as a way 
of life 
services 
 
d) Other (Specify) ___________ 
 
31. Indicate the level of trust that you have in relation to the way in which 
Mexican officials make use of the taxes that you pay 
Very low  Low  Average  High  Very high  
 
32. If you had to choose between a job with access to health security although 
some deductions were made from your salary or wage, or a job in which you 
received your full salary or wage but without access to health services, what 
would you prefer? 
1. Working with access to social 
security having deductions from my 
wage. 
 2. Working obtaining full salary but without access 
to social security services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby consent that the information I have provided in this questionnaire may 
be used by Christian Becerril with his research, writing and professional 
activities, and may be used, exhibited, and published through any medium 
whatsoever as part of or in connection with his research, writing, and 
professional activities.  
 
 
Signature………………………………….. 
Date…………………………………………. 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Research Abstract Presented to Respondents (English) 
 
 
My research looks at the relationship between the institutional framework 
of the Mexican state, employment and poverty. The central aim of this research 
is to determine the extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities 
of the Mexican state, among other important factors, has impeded the current 
Mexican CCT programme known as Oportunidades from enabling the ex-
recipients to obtain a sustained income in the labour market. Mexico is one of 
the most unequal countries all over the world in terms of the concentration of 
wealth due to the fact that the institutional framework of the state benefits the 
elites instead of the citizenry, which not only constrains the poor from escaping 
poverty but also increases it. In this sense, our study is different from previous 
studies about the Oportunidades programme that have focused on the benefits 
that the programme gives to the recipients and not on the context that produces 
income inequality. In Mexico poverty has kept increasing even though the 
programme has been running for nearly 16 years and every time they include 
more recipients. As such, it would seem that the logic of the programme about 
that once educated the recipients will be able to obtain or generate sustained 
income has not been proved at all. The purpose of this survey is to research the 
extent to which the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state 
has impeded the current Mexican CCT programme known as Oportunidades 
from enabling the ex-recipients to obtain a sustained income in the labour 
market.  
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LIST OF ACRONYMS   
 
ASF Superior Auditing Organism of the Mexican Federation, 
Auditoría Superior de la Federación. 
BGs Business Groups 
CCTs       Conditional Cash Transfer programmes  
CONAPO  
       
National Council of Population, Consejo Nacional de Población 
CONEVAL    
  
National Council of Evaluation, Consejo Nacional de Evaluación 
de la política de Desarrollo Social 
COPARMEX   
 
 
Employers’ Confederation of the Mexican Republic, 
Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana 
COPLADEMUN 
 
 
Council of Municipal Development Planning, Consejo de 
Planeación de Desarrollo Municipal 
CTM        
 
  
Confederation of Mexican Workers, Confederación Mexicana de 
Trabajadores  
DECLARE  
 
Labour Electronic Declaration, Declaración Laboral Electrónica 
DICONSA Social supply of basic food, Abasto Social de Productos 
Alimenticios Básicos 
FAEB 
 
Fund for Basic and Normal Education, Fondo de Aportaciones 
para la Educación Básica y Normal 
FAETA  Fund for Technological and Adult Education, Fondo de 
Aportaciones para la Educación Tecnológica y de Adultos  
FAM Fund of Multiple Contributions, Fondo de Aportaciones Multiples  
FAM Instructor training programme, Formación de Agentes 
Multiplicadores 
FCNS Fiscal Coordination National System, Sistema Nacional de 
Coordinación Fiscal  
FIDEPAR Trust for the development of Parks and Industrial Areas in the 
State of Mexico, Fideicomiso para el Desarrollo de Parques y 
Zonas Industriales en el Estado de México 
FINNOVA Sectoral Innovation Fund, Fondo Sectorial de Innovación 
FOMMUR Microfinance Fund for Rural Women, Fondo de 
Microfinanciamiento a Mujeres Rurales 
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FONAES   National Fund of Social Enterprises, Fondo Nacional de 
Empresas Sociales 
FONTOL    
 
Municipal Institute of Toluqueño Entrepreneurs, Instituto 
Municipal del emprendedor toluqueño 
GATT     
  
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP 
 
Gross Domestic Product 
HDI   
     
Human Development Index  
HDR   
      
Human Development Report  
IBGE      Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography, Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística  
IFAI        Federal Institute of Access to Information and data protection, 
Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información 
ILO    
      
International Labour Organization 
IME Entrepreneurial Institute of the State of Mexico, Instituto 
Mexiquense del Emprendedor 
IMF     
     
International Monetary Fund  
IMSS        Mexican Institute of Social Insurance, Instituto Mexicano del 
Seguro Social  
INAPAM National Institute of elderly people, Instituto Nacional de las 
Personas Adultas Mayores  
INDESOL National Institute of Social Development, Instituto Nacional de 
Desarrollo Social 
INEGI       National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Geografía  
INFOEM Institute of transparency, access to public information and 
protection of personal data of the State of Mexico and 
Municipalities, Instituto de Transparencia, Acceso a la 
Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales del 
Estado de México y Municipios 
ISI             Import Substitution Industrialization system, Sistema de 
Sustitución de Importaciones 
ISSSTE        Institute of Security and Social Services of the state’s workers, 
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Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores 
del Estado 
ITESM Technological Institute of Higher Education of Monterrey, 
Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey 
JFC y A     
 
Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, Junta Federal de 
Conciliación y Arbitraje  
JLC y A      Local Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, Junta Local de 
Conciliación y Arbitraje  
LFT    
        
Federal Employment Law, Ley Federal del Trabajo 
LGDS General Law of Social Development, Ley General de Desarrollo 
Social 
LICONSA Social supply of Milk, Abasto Social de Leche 
LSPC Federal Public Service Career Law, Ley del Servicio Profesional 
de Carrera en la Administración Pública Federal 
LSS     
       
Social Security Law, Ley del Seguro Social  
MNCs     
       
Multi-national Corporations  
NAFTA     
     
North American Free Trade Agreement  
NGOs    
      
Non-Governmental Organizations 
OECD  
 
   
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Organización para la Cooperación y Desarrollo Económicos 
PAN       
    
National Action Party, Partido Acción Nacional  
PASST   Self-Management Programme on Safety and Health at Work, 
Programa de Autogestión en Seguridad y Salud en el Trabajo  
PCEZM Programme to create jobs in disadvantaged areas, Programa 
para la creación de empleo en zonas marginadas 
PND      
      
National Plan of Development, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo  
PRD      
    
Democratic Revolution Party, Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática        
PRI         Institutional Revolutionary Party, Partido Revolucionario 
Institutional  
PROCADIST  
 
Distance Training Programme for Workers, Programa de 
Capacitación a Distancia para Trabajadores 
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PROCAMPO Programme of direct support to farmers, Programa de apoyos 
directos al campo  
PRODET     
 
Local Attorney of Workers’ Defence, Procuraduría Estatal de la 
Defensa del Trabajador   
PRODIAT Programme for the Development of High Technology Industries, 
Programa para el Desarollo de las Industrias de Alta Tecnología 
PROFEDET  Federal Attorney of Workers’ Defence, Procuraduría Federal de 
la Defensa del Trabajador  
PROGRESA    Education, Health and Nutrition Programme, Programa de 
Educación, Salud y Alimentación 
PROIND Programme to Promote the Competitiveness of Industrial 
Sectors, Programa para Impulsar la Competitividad de Sectores 
Industriales 
PROLOGYCA Competitiveness Programme in Logistics and Supply Centres, 
Programa de Competitividad en Logística y Centrales de Abasto 
PRONAFIM     National Programme of Microenterprise Finance, Programa 
Nacional de Financiamiento al Microempresario 
PRONASOL    National Solidarity Programme, Programa Nacional de 
Solidaridad 
PROSOFT Programme for the Development of the Software Industry, 
Programa para el Desarrollo de la Industria del Software 
PYME Small and Medium Enterprise, Pequeña y mediana empresa 
SCJN Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, Suprema Corte de 
Justicia de la Nación 
SE 
 
Ministry of Economy, Secretaría de Economía 
SEDESOL   
 
Ministry of Social Development, Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
SEP 
 
Ministry of Education, Secretaría de Educación 
SHCP       
    
Ministry of Treasury, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
SMEs      
 
Small and Medium Enterprises, Pequeña y Mediana Empresas  
SNE       
 
National Employment Service, Servicio Nacional de Empleo 
SNTE  National Union of Education Workers, Sindicato Nacional de 
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Trabajadores de la Educación  
STyPS  
 
Ministry of Labour, Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social 
ST Ministry of Labour of the State of Mexico, Secretaría del Trabajo 
del Estado de México 
UAEM Autonomous University of the State of Mexico, Universidad 
Autónoma del Estado de México  
UNAM  Autonomous National University of Mexico, Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México 
UNDP     
   
United Nations Development Programme  
USA United States of America 
VAT        
  
Value Added Tax  
WB         World Bank  
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